IRAN,S MAJLES ELECTIONS: A TECHNICAL PERSPECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISTANBUL 000279

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/24/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM IR TU
SUBJECT: IRAN,S MAJLES ELECTIONS: A TECHNICAL PERSPECTIVE

REF: (A) ISTANBUL 245 (B) DUBAI 25 (C) DUBAI 15 AND

PREVIOUS (D) 2007 ISTANBUL 694

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Classified By: Acting Principal Officer Sandra Oudkirk; Reason 1.5 (d)


1. (C) Summary: A Turkish professor who led an unofficial
(unbeknownst to the Iranian regime) election observation
mission to Iran's recent Majles elections shared his findings
with Consulate Istanbul "Iran Watcher." (Election results
and post-election analysis were reported in refs B and C).
He and several Turkish academic colleagues visited Iran in
March and April, ostensibly for academic exchanges with
Iranian counterparts. They visited nine polling stations in
Tehran and Qom, observed activity outside polling stations in
Esfahan, and interviewed over 50 potential Iranian voters.


2. (C) Summary, continued: The election observation mission
concluded that the regime's efforts to manipulate the
election outcome, compounded by its refusal to accept
international electoral observation or assistance, resulted
in an election that does not meet internationally accepted
norms and standards. The Turkish observers recognize the
regime is unlikely to consider reforming what is the biggest
obstacle to free and fair elections -- the Guardian Council's
widespread disqualification of candidates. However, the
Turkish observers believe there is still room for meaningful
Iranian electoral reform in other procedural areas, and that
this can be pursued over time by encouraging more active
election observation and assessment by domestic civil society
groups and political parties. We will encourage the Turkish
professor to raise these ideas with his non-governmental
Iranian interlocutors and others. End summary.

(C) Observing Iran's Majles Elections
--------------


3. (C) A Turkish professor at Istanbul's Isik University
(please protect) led two unofficial election observation
missions, unbeknownst to the Iranian regime, to observe the
first and second round of Iran's Majles elections. He
recently shared his observations and conclusions with
Consulate Istanbul's "Iran Watcher." The professor and
several Turkish academic colleagues visited Iran March 11-15
and April 23-26, ostensibly for academic exchanges with
Iranian counterparts. However, the Turkish observers used
most of their time during these visits to travel around
Tehran, Qom and Esfahan, interviewing over 50 Iranian
potential voters, visiting nine polling stations in Tehran
and Qom, collecting polling materials, and personally
observing election practices.

Campaigning
--------------


4. (C) The Turkish professors saw only a few subdued signs
of election preparations. A government-enforced moratorium
on campaigning in the final days before the election
prevented candidates from holding campaign rallies, engaging
in televised debates, advertising on television, or erecting
billboards. However, the observers saw campaign leaflets and
brochures left at park benches, bus stops, and other public
places, as well as occasional campaign posters in store
windows.


5. (C) Despite official restrictions imposed on candidates'
use of television as a campaign tool, the observers saw
widespread use of state-owned media to urge high voter
turnout, "to show Iran's enemies the strength of the Iranian
nation" according to one slogan. Such media efforts
emphasized national pride, support for the Islamic
revolution, and resentment towards the west's claims of
superiority. The observers were also told by several voters
at polling stations near government Ministries that the
government had pressured state employees to vote. Moreover,
the government allowed polls to stay open several hours after
voting was set to end, to increase turnout figures.
According to the Turkish professor who led the observation
mission: "The government tried to minimize the importance of
who is actually elected, since every candidate running is
already seen as supporting the system, and tried to maximize
the importance of a high voter turnout because this is what
they think represents the clearest symbol of the system's
popular legitimacy."

Public Pre-election Perceptions
--------------


6. (C) The observers interviewed 30 Iranians before and
during the first round of voting, finding widespread apathy.

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A majority of those interviewed were dismissive of the
elections, and were more excited about Iranian New Year
(Nowruz) festivals. Most respondents felt the system was
inherently biased towards the conservative parties, making it
pointless to vote. Most predicted the conservatives would
win a sizable majority regardless of whether the respondents
voted or not. The Turkish observers found that potential
voters who felt most favorable towards reformist candidates
expressed the most apathy. Finally, all Iranians interviewed
expressed a pervasive preoccupation with the state of the
Iranian economy.


7. (C) The observers interviewed an additional 25 Iranian
potential voters before and during the second round and found
them certain of a conservative victory, though most
interpreted such an outcome as likely to cause problems for
President Ahmadinejad rather than as a victory for his wing
of the conservative movement. They continued to feel
widespread apathy about the election's impact on their own
lives.

The Vote
--------------


8. (C) Polling stations: The observers saw polling stations
located in schools and mosques, as well as "mobile stations"
erected at street corners, though they saw no signs to direct
voters to polling stations. Voters were not required to vote
in specific polling stations assigned according to
residential addresses, but rather could vote at a polling
station of their choice (with the exception that those who
voted in the first round were required to vote in the second
round at the same polling station). The observation team was
able to gain entrance to nine polling stations -- six in
Tehran and three in Qom -- though they were blocked from
entering polling stations in Esfahan. Inside each polling
station, several government officials were on hand to oversee
voting procedures and control entrance and exit. In some
stations the observers saw up to 10 election officials,
including some who simply stood at the voting tables and
watched voters filling out their ballots. The observers did
not observe queues of voters waiting outside any polling
stations. In Tehran and Qom, voters were segregated by
gender. In Esfahan, men and women voted in the same polling
stations. In a minority of polling stations they saw party
representatives (including reformists) observing the vote
conduct; they did not encounter any foreign observers in any
station.


9. (C) Voting procedures: According to the observers,
voting procedures appeared ad hoc. Polling stations did not
have standalone booths where voters could vote in secret, but
rather a central table where voters jostled and debated with
each other as they filled out ballots by writing in the names
of candidates within full view of each other and of
government officials. In Tehran, where 750 candidates were
competing for 30 seats, voters spent long period of time
studying the board on which voter names were posted, and then
writing their 30 chosen names onto their ballots. (Comment:
the Turkish professor identified this system as "Single
Non-Transferable Voting" (SNTV),as opposed to voting for a
single party list of pre-selected candidates. He termed SNTV
as a very cumbersome method for voting for a large number of
seats, especially when voter information about candidates is
limited or where voter literacy rates are low; he also
suggested that SNTV can dilute the influence of a political
party if several candidates from that party end up drawing
votes from each other.) After writing in candidate names,
voter folded up ballots and placed them in locked ballot
boxes. Upon exiting the polling station, a Ministry of
Interior official marked each voter's national ID card to
prevent repeat voting. The observers assessed that voters in
the second round appeared to have fewer procedural problems,
as polling stations were less crowded and the official list
of candidate names was much shorter.


10. (C) Pilot project to computerize voting: According to
the observers, the Interior Ministry ran a pilot project at
some polling stations in Tehran to computerize the voting
process, involving a form of "Optical Character Recognition"
(OCR). This reportedly involved voting on paper ballots by
identifying candidates by a five-number and two-letter code,
and then scanning the and tabulating the ballots at the
polling station. The Turkish professor was told that
Interior Minister Pour-Mohammadi had voted this way, with the
process taking him 20 minutes to complete.


11. (C) Voter turnout claims: After the March 14 first
round, Iranian press reported Interior Ministry claims of 65

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percent voter turnout, while the Guardian Council claimed 56
percent. Official figures from the Interior Ministry's
election management body later asserted a 52 percent turnout
rate. Following the second round, Interior Minister
Pour-Mohammadi announced that voter turnout had increased by
26 percent from the first round, though the study mission's
anecdotal conclusion was that voter turnout had declined in
the second round. The Turkish observers claimed that
particularly in Tehran (including at several south Tehran
polling stations, in neighborhoods considered to be
Ahmadinejad strongholds),throughout the day of second round
voting, polling stations remained largely empty.

Conclusions
--------------


12. (C) Election Observers' conclusions: The Turkish
observers concluded that the Iranian regime's efforts to
manipulate the outcome through candidate disqualification and
other measures, compounded by its refusal (since 1979) to
accept any UN or other outside electoral assistance or
monitoring, has resulted in an electoral process that does
not meet internationally accepted norms and standards. That
said, the Turkish observers believe that Iranian elections
still offer sufficient scope for allowing voters to demand
political change, especially if Iranian voters themselves can
be persuaded to press the regime to undertake basic electoral
process reforms. In Iran's case, according to the Turkish
observers, the electoral system is most in need of reform at
the "candidate qualification" phase (where the regime
disqualified 1700 mostly reformist-oriented candidates),and
the lack of transparency in vote tabulation at both the
polling stations and the Ministry of Interior (as evidenced
by the divergent, and unsubstantiated, regime claims about
voter turnout percentages). According to the Turkish
observers, "the introduction of computerized tabulation of
ballots will offer more opportunities to manipulate the vote
count." Further areas where the observers suggested that
procedural reforms could have a significant positive impact
are: voter registration, candidate access to the media,
televised public debates, improved ballot modalities, and
mandatory secrecy of voting.


13. (C) Comment: The Turkish observation team's conclusions
provide useful food for academic thought. Regarding the most
serious obstacle to free and fair elections in Iran -- the
Guardian Council's disqualification of 1700 candidates --
the Turkish observers themselves recognize that without the
support of regime leaders it is unlikely the Guardian Council
would give up its role as the body responsible for vetting
candidates, or indeed its approach of disqualifying any
candidates it believes are not sufficiently vested in "the
system." However, the Turkish professors do believe other
electoral reforms may be achievable in Iran, starting with
increased domestic election observation by civil society
organizations and political parties. (Turkey's own model of
relying on civil society to help monitor elections, per Ref
D, could serve as a useful example in this regard.) The
Turkish professor suggested that electoral assessment reports
from such groups, if disseminated widely within Iran, and as
long as they advocate procedural reform rather than wholesale
systematic change, could then help generate wider Iranian
public awareness and public advocacy for such procedural
reforms. We will encourage the Turkish professor and his
colleagues to raise these ideas with their non-governmental
Iranian interlocutors and to pursue these ideas in their
wider contacts with western academic counterparts and NGOs.
End comment.
OUDKIRK