Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ISTANBUL182
2008-04-11 18:10:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Istanbul
Cable title:  

TURKEY: THIS COUNTRY IS NOT WITHOUT AN OWNER

Tags:  PGOV PREL TU 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 000182 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2028
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: THIS COUNTRY IS NOT WITHOUT AN OWNER

Classified By: Consul General Sharon A. Wiener for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 000182

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2028
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: THIS COUNTRY IS NOT WITHOUT AN OWNER

Classified By: Consul General Sharon A. Wiener for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (C) Summary. Consul General called on Turkish Economic
and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) Chairman Can Paker on
April 1, the day after Turkey's Constitutional Court agreed
to hear arguments in the Justice and Development Party's
(AKP) closure case. Paker said the secular elite is fighting
to preserve their position and perks. Unlike previous
battles between the government and the civil
(judicial)/military group arrayed against them, Paker could
not predict the outcome of this confrontation but he drew
attention to a phrase well-known, he said, in Turkey which
everyone accepted as true: "This country is not without an
owner," referring to the civil/military bureaucracy. End
summary.


2. (C) The timing of the Consul General's courtesy call on
the unreserved TESEV Chairman took place less than 24 hours
after Turkey's Constitutional Court placed AKP in jeopardy by
agreeing to hear a closure case against the party brought by
the country's chief prosecutor. While he couldn't predict
the final outcome after anticipated legal and other moves and
counter moves, Paker said he was sure of what Turkey's
friends in the west and liberals in Turkey should do: fight
the closure with every available tool. Turkey, he explained,
is in transition from a centralized, statist country to one
imbued with the values of liberal democracy. Turkey had been
founded with a "civil/military" elite at the core supporting
a state apparatus set up to protect them and their cadre,
including through special economic set-asides. This
structure is now challenged by a new capitalist class that is
no longer satisfied with "crumbs from the table" offered by
old monopolistic structures. The new class are competitors
born of the experience in capitalistic enterprise. The "old
guard" will oppose the challenge to their privilege with
everything they have, said Paker. "This country is not
without an owner." The lightly coded sentence meaning the
civil and military bureaucracy owns Turkey is regarded as so
descriptive of fact that no one in Turkey finds the statement
awkward, he claimed.


3. (C) But the fundamental dynamic has changed, according to
Paker, since the end of the Cold War. During the Cold War,
the U.S. only concerned itself with preserving Turkey's
anti-Soviet stance, now, the U.S., as well as the EU, want a
democratic Turkey. These external forces are powerful and
reinforce internal demands.


4. (C) Paker referred to TESEV research that indicates 30
percent of the Turkish population is secular and the
remaining 70 percent religious. Among the 70 percent
religious, one in seven, or 10 percent of the population,
hold extreme nationalist views. Another group of the
religious Turks (nine percent of the population),are
extremely religious and support imposition of sharia. Among
the overall 30 percent of the population that is secular,
one-third, or 10 percent of the population, hold extreme
nationalist views that are anti-Europe, anti-U.S. and
anti-foreigner. The 50 percent of the population who are
religious moderates trade, marry and socially interact with
the 20 percent of the population who are moderate seculars,
according to the TESEV research. AKP has the potential to
unite this 70 percent of the population to defeat efforts to
remove what religiously-oriented middle-class Turks have won
through continuing social and economic reform. If not AKP,
Paker predicted another entity would in time overturn the
civil/military bureaucratic elite structure in Turkey.

WHAT HAPPENS NOW?
--------------


5. (C) Paker concedes legal experts diverge in their views
of relevant law and practice on whether AKP's bid to modify
two articles in the constitution successfully shield it from
closure. The possible referendum on these changes, which
Paker supports, will represent a very serious moment for
Turkey. Before the July 2007 general election in which AKP
won nearly 47 percent of the vote, memorable pro-secular
rallies were held in Istanbul, Izmir, Ankara and other cities
around the country. The AKP and its supporters chose not to
respond. But all those attending the pro-secular rallies in
the summer of 2007 cannot be counted on to support party
closures; AKP can easily turn out street demonstrations that
would dwarf the 2007 rallies, especially if they succeed in
galvanizing the 70 percent of the population that potentially
supports their cause. A rally effort would intensify the
already charged atmosphere and could even result in violence.
But Paker supports taking that chance.

ISTANBUL 00000182 002 OF 002




6. (C) AKP missteps since the July elections resulted from
the party's focus on upcoming municipal elections in March
2009, according to Paker. Hoping to co-opt the
nationalism-motivated voter in 2009, AKP relegated continuing
economic and free expression reform to the back burner. Had
AKP reignited its program of transformational reform on July
23 following their resounding victory at national polls,
Paker maintains elites would not have dared touch the party
now due to the support the AKP would have drawn from the EU.


7. (C) Unable to predict a linear unfolding of events,
Paker's research leads him to optimism. Eighty-five percent
of Turks believe they are middle class and 60 percent say
they're fighting for advancement through diligence and hard
work, not corruption and sleaze. Turkey looks much more like
the U.S. than geographically closer countries like Russia or
especially France (darling of the civil/military bureaucracy
for its enthrallment with elitist ascendancy.) Turkey's
misfortune is that it is located in Anatolia and not Mexico.
The right move for the United States now would be to signify
clear support for the aspirations of the Turkish middle
class, Paker argues. Delayed backing will be seen in the
future as unprincipled and not worthy of respect. These
Anatolian tigers, fostering explosive production resulting in
new centers of learning and further economic development,
will not be deterred from their goal of free market economic
rules and equal treatment under the law. There will be ups
and downs, Paker predicted, in this desperate struggle, but
the long-term outcome for Turkey, if not AKP, is secure.

WHAT SHOULD BE DONE
--------------


8. (C) Paker believes Tayyip Erdogan should do everything he
can to win the struggle. Paker claimed he'd succeeded in
convincing the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's
Association (TUSIAD) to state that closing political parties
is not a solution to current divisions. If it were up to
Paker, he would advise the Prime Minister to use public
demonstrations to influence the outcome, even knowing this
could risk confrontation; he did not know if the PM would
take this route. Prompted, Paker agreed there were means of
building bridges to unite disparate groups. Bankers,
businessmen, teachers, people from the professions such as
law and medicine, represented in the 51/20 majority could
unite to build societal bridges with the capacity to defeat
the "frenzied, illogical and destructive" plans of the
civil/military bureaucracy.


9. (C) Comment. Paker's views are a forceful echo of those
held by many conservative liberals. A child of the
privileged class, Paker is convinced of the rightness of the
liberal ideals of liberty, equal treatment under law, freedom
of expression and choice. Though he factually describes
sociological phenomena regarding the debate over the
headscarf, possibly a trip-wire that led to the closure
indictment, he also downplays the concerns of those like
Lieutenant Colonel Vedat Zamir, public information officer
with the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps in Istanbul who told us
March 13 "the military is fighting radical Islam." For
example, Paker declined to comment on where he thought the
Fethullah Gulen movement fit into Turkey's political
landscape, claiming he had no research results on which to
base any judgment. End comment.
WIENER