Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ISLAMABAD3788
2008-12-07 11:53:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Islamabad
Cable title:  

PML-N KITCHEN CABINET: NAWAZ'S BETTER HALF

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR PK 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 003788 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PK
SUBJECT: PML-N KITCHEN CABINET: NAWAZ'S BETTER HALF

REF: A. ISLAMABAD 2817

B. ISLAMABAD 2611

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 003788

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PK
SUBJECT: PML-N KITCHEN CABINET: NAWAZ'S BETTER HALF

REF: A. ISLAMABAD 2817

B. ISLAMABAD 2611

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) Summary: On November 25 last year, opposition leader
Nawaz Sharif triumphantly returned to Lahore. Even then,
however, prospects for his Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz
looked dim. In fact, Nawaz announced (three times) that his
party would boycott the February 18 parliamentary elections,
just to be walked back by his inner circle. In this and on
other subjects, Sharif's unquestionably loyal and cohesive
inner circle has steered the party from opposition to
government and back to opposition. They are convinced that
Nawaz will soon return to power whenever the Pakistan
People's Party loses its grip. When this inner circle does
return, the GOP will have a very capable cadre of leaders --
some are pragmatists, some ideologues (though not religious
dogmatists); many are Western-experienced, while others are
district politicos; most entered politics during General Zia
ul Haq's era, institutionalizing Islam under his direction,
but today they are quick to claim only the label of
"religious populist," stressing Islam's conservative
socio-cultural aspects, not any fervent, dogmatic fanaticism.
End summary.

Never Say "Never"
- - - - - - - - -


2. (C) Just one year ago, some commentators had proclaimed
the death knell of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N)
party. PML-N leader Nawaz Sharif had been exiled in Saudi
Arabia since December 9, 2000. Sharif's attempt to return to
Pakistan on September 10, 2007, miserably failed. His
party's boycott of former President Pervez Musharraf's
controversial re-election had no effect. Only with the
return of Pakistan People's Party (PPP) leader Benazir Bhutto
did Sharif's own return on November 25, 2007, become
possible.


3. (C) With the December 27, 2007, assassination of Bhutto,
however, Sharif became the sole leader of the anti-Musharraf
opposition; Bhutto's widower (now President) Asif Zardari
never acquired that mantle. Though Zardari's PPP out-polled
the PML-N in the February 18 parliamentary elections, even
Sharif was surprised at his party's new 91-seat strength at
the federal level and its predominant position in Punjab

provincial government. PML-N's close runner-up finish puts
Nawaz (and his kitchen cabinet) in an enviable standing to
return to power.

Pragmatism and Ideology
- - - - - - - - - - - -


4. (C) Sharif's kitchen cabinet can be grouped into two main
strains: (1) pragmatists -- concerned about increasing
commodity prices, electricity shortages, and overall poverty
and unemployment; and, (2) ideologues -- unbending and
legalistic on the issues of the judges' restoration,
Musharraf's removal/prosecution, and war on terror
implementation. While there are exceptions, many of the
pragmatist strain have been educated or worked in the West;
many of the ideologue strain are traditional district
politicos. It would be misleading, though, to label these
strains as competing factions. Overall, the party is
pro-business, pro-defense complex, pro-traditional family
values, and more nationalist than rival PPP. Nawaz's
confidants, chief of whom is his brother Shahbaz, are
unquestionably loyal to him, surprisingly cohesive as a
group, and extremely competent in their fields.


5. (C) For example, Shahbaz earned a reputation for being an
efficient "behind-the-scenes troubleshooter" when he served
previously as Punjab Chief Minister (1997-1999). Ishaq Dar
is Nawaz's main advisor on economic issues, having previously
worked as a Director at the International Monetary Fund
(IMF),the Asian Development Bank, and the Islamic
Development Bank. He has also served as Chief Executive of
the Pakistan Board of Investment, as well as Commerce
Minister (1997-1998) and then Finance Minister (1998-1999).
Khawaja Muhammad Asif can be added to the "pragmatist camp,"
a businessman and banker by profession who served as Chairman
of the Privatization Commission (1997-1999).

ISLAMABAD 00003788 002 OF 003




6. (C) The kitchen cabinet's ideologues are equally
accomplished, at least as politicians. Though starting his
political career with religious party Jamaat-I-Islami (JI),
Nawaz's long-time spokesman Ahsan Iqbal is a Wharton Business
School graduate who formulated Pakistan's first national
information technology policy. The party's parliamentary
leader Chaudhary Nisar Ali Khan has been elected to the
National Assembly in every election since 1985 and has been a
cabinet member off-and-on since 1987. Makhdoom Javed Hashmi,
party senior vice president, also started with JI and has
been a parliamentarian since 1985. He was jailed for
highlighting dissension in Musharraf's Army ranks from the
floor of the National Assembly. And party secretary general
Iqbal Zafar Jhagra, uncharacteristically hailing from
Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) instead of
Punjab, has been with the party and served with Nawaz since

1983.

Counter-balance
- - - - - - - -


7. (C) But more than pushing their own pragmatic or
ideological lines, this group of top advisors
counter-balances Nawaz's own instinctive reactions. In
October 2007 meetings with PolOff, just before Sharif's
return, both Nisar Ali Khan and Khawaja Asif criticized
Nawaz's rush to fire Musharraf as Chief of Army Staff (COAS)
back in October 1999. Asif revealed that he also counseled
against Nawaz's premature return to Pakistan in September
2007, fearing a diminished crowd and official cordons; both
occurred. The inner circle also had to walk back, three
times, their leader's rash announcements that the party would
boycott the February 18 parliamentary elections. And most,
if not all, privately hesitated to leave the federal cabinet
on May 12 when Nawaz took his first step away from the
PPP-led GOP over the judges issue.


8. (C) By all accounts, Sharif has matured over the eight
years of exile in Saudi Arabia, though, with breaking news,
his inner circle still dashes to get a hold of him before the
press gets a scintillating quote. Sharif's decision-making
style is now reportedly more open and inclusive. PML-N
parliamentarians and party staff have commented that Sharif
pulls together preparatory sessions before big meetings.
Such sessions have taken place in the last few months before
each encounter with the PPP's Zardari, and a similar session
occurred before Sharif met with Assistant Secretary Boucher
in Islamabad in mid-October. In fact, a couple of party
sources have claimed that Sharif has recently silenced
Hashmi, even in private sessions, because he is too strident
and hard-line.

"Religious Populists"
- - - - - - - - - - -


9. (C) It is noteworthy that many of Sharif's kitchen
cabinet, like he himself, rose through the political ranks
during General Zia ul Haq's regime (1977-1988). Of course,
for aspiring politicians and technocrats of that era,
accepting Zia's tutelage was an expedient route. Party Chair
Raja Muhammad Zafar-ul-Haq, along with the others mentioned
above, is a good example. He served as Zia's Religious
Affairs Minister (1984-1985),but has backed away from his
pro-mujahideen slant, which he reportedly held until 9/11.
These advisors joined Zia's re-born Pakistan Muslim League, a
center-right party in response to the liberal-left PPP of
Zulfikhar Ali Bhutto. (Note: Of Sharif's kitchen cabinet,
only party vice president and parliamentarian Tehmina
Daultana can claim no links to Zia. Her political star has
risen because of her leading demonstrations against the
military governments of Zia and Musharraf.)


10. (C) At its base, according to members of this PML-N inner
circle, the party is secular, though not stridently so. It
has aligned with religious conservatives (farther right on
the political spectrum) to cobble together a winning
coalition. Sometimes the religious conservatives are just
coalition partners; other times, they have formally joined
Nawaz's "big tent." PML-N contacts are quick to mention,
however, that they are "religious populists," not advocates
of the hard-line of the religious parties or strict
application of sharia law. Put another way, the PML-N

ISLAMABAD 00003788 003 OF 003


invokes religion as a socio-cultural impulse not as an
imperative of faith. They freely admit their conservatism
and the natural appeal their party has for many of the
country's religious conservatives.


11. (C) Comment: The PML-N's political and electoral need to
curry favor with Pakistan's religious conservatives explains
the party's push for dialogue with the frontier militants.
This policy stance has broad appeal with both urban and rural
Punjabis, who represent more than half of the country's
population, as well as (until maybe recently) with the
frontier's tribals. When the PML-N has been successful at
the polls in Punjab and in the frontier, it has come to power
in Islamabad. End comment.

PATTERSON