Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ISLAMABAD3398
2008-10-28 09:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Islamabad
Cable title:  

QURESHI TALKS TO BOUCHER ABOUT FRIENDS AND

Tags:  PGOV PREL PTER EAID PK 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 003398 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER EAID PK
SUBJECT: QURESHI TALKS TO BOUCHER ABOUT FRIENDS AND
OPPONENTS

REF: ISLAMABAD 2441

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b),(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 003398

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER EAID PK
SUBJECT: QURESHI TALKS TO BOUCHER ABOUT FRIENDS AND
OPPONENTS

REF: ISLAMABAD 2441

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b),(d).


1. (C) Summary: Assistant Secretary Boucher met Foreign
Minister Qureshi late October 20. Qureshi was appreciative
of the effort put into the "Friends of Pakistan." He hoped
the initiative would be more than "just a donors' group," and
informed Boucher that an action plan was with President
Zardari. He also welcomed greater participation in the group
by Saudi Arabia and China, but was uncertain about involving
the U.N. Qureshi stated that Zardari's recent trip to China
had focused on trade. Qureshi was open to Boucher's
suggestion to "structure" Pakistan's relationship with
Afghanistan, which had weathered recent storms, the Foreign
Minister believed. Turning to the current debate in
parliament on his government's national counterterrorism
strategy, Qureshi warned against trusting the opposition's
claimed interest in reaching a consensus. Nawaz Sharif's
public actions contradicted his private characterizations,
Qureshi argued. Instead, Nawaz wanted to talk to the Taliban
a course already rejected by Qureshi and the current
coalition, the Foreign Minister said. End Summary.

Friends of Pakistan
- - - - - - - - - -


2. (C) Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian
Affairs Richard Boucher and the Ambassador met late October
20 with Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi. The Foreign
Minister opened by expressing his government's enthusiasm and
appreciation for the "Friends of Pakistan" initiative. He
stressed that the group be, as well as be viewed as, "more
than just a donor group."


3. (C) Qureshi agreed with Boucher that this engagement was
an opportunity for Pakistan to list what it specifically
needs and informed Boucher that an action plan had been
passed up to President Zardari. Qureshi looked forward to
ambassador-level preparatory meetings in Islamabad, leading
up to a ministerial-level meeting in Abu Dhabi in
mid-November. Without providing details, Qureshi referred to
four parts of a security development program.


4. (C) Qureshi was pleased that the Saudis had participated

in the "Friends" forum earlier the same day; their presence
would be helpful. He voiced surprise that the Saudis had
pulled back after the initial meeting of the group in New
York. Qureshi claimed to have convinced China to participate
in "Friends" and recognized the next hurdle was to have them
play a core role. Boucher said the Chinese may prefer to
focus on bilateral engagement and had been cautious
throughout this process.


5. (C) The Foreign Minister was suspicious of a role for the
U.N. Though he recognized the value of having the U.N.
Secretary General's "Good Offices" support this "Friends"
initiative, he admitted his disappointment with the
organization, which he believed ignored Pakistan's request
for an official investigation of Benazir Bhutto's
assassination. He also wanted to avoid the appearance that
Pakistan had become a "basket case," needing a special office
for its problems.

Neighbors
- - - - -


6. (C) Qureshi commented that Zardari's recent trip to China
had gone well. Both sides had focused on their trade
relationship.


7. (C) He felt Pakistan's relationship with Afghanistan had
improved under the current government. The increasing
interaction between Zardari and Karzai was a "positive
dynamic," and his own foreign ministers' relationship had
gotten both countries through difficult incidents. Qureshi
noted that, for the sake of progress, he had avoided any

ISLAMABAD 00003398 002 OF 002


negative statements during these delicate moments. Both
sides' bigger worry, he believed, was antagonism within their
domestic constituencies. Boucher suggested that the two
countries build on this good start: create a structure for
regular meetings, channel their interests, and coordinate
their actions and messages.

Nawaz
- - -


8. (C) Qureshi commented on the letter his government had
just received from opposition party leader Nawaz Sharif
outlining six points for a national counterterrorism strategy
(septel). Qureshi admitted he had not seen the document but
had been informed of its parts. Boucher added that, in his
own meeting with the opposition, Nawaz had characterized the
document as a basis on which to build consensus. Qureshi
mistrusted this characterization, adding that Nawaz's
statements in public and supporters' remarks in parliament
were instead antagonist. He believed Nawaz had not yet
decided whether to engage the government or more aggressively
take on its ruling Pakistan People's Party.


9. (C) But Qureshi thought the parliamentary debate about the
government's plans to fight terrorism was healthy and
historical. Never before had the Director General of
Military Operations briefed parliament, much less stand
before it for four hours to answer pointed questions. This
is "not a minor thing." He implied controversy was expected
by the government, but that the decision had been made to
"let people vent" and to "see if they would be willing to say
publicly what they said in private."


10. (C) Qureshi was adamant that his party would stay in
coalition with Nawaz's party in the Punjab provincial
government, providing stability to Pakistan's largest
province, he argued. Qureshi claimed his Pakistan People's
Party could have aligned with the other opposition party,
Pakistan Muslim League, and taken control of the province,
but this would have caused a level of political clashes not
seen since the 1990s, he argued.

Peace Accords
- - - - - - -


11. (C) Qureshi was adamant that peace accords with the
frontier region's militants had not worked in the past. He
was certain that coalition partners Awami National Party
(ANP) and Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) were on board. He
agreed with Boucher's formulation that the government should
continue to "fight the people who want to fight us."


12. (U) Assistant Secretary Boucher has cleared this cable.

PATTERSON