FRIENDS OF PAKISTAN: NEXT STEPS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 003371

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2018
TAGS: PREL EAID PK
SUBJECT: FRIENDS OF PAKISTAN: NEXT STEPS

REF: (A) ISLAMABAD 3350 (B) STATE 110863

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)


1. (C) Summary. At a meeting October 22 with Ambassador,
Foreign Secretary Bashir reported that the MFA was
circulating to GOP ministries a tasking for an options paper
on Pakistan's sectoral needs to build security and economic
capacity. The MFA will share that paper with the U.S. and
the UK before circulating it to the core Friends of Pakistan
group in anticipation of a meeting in Abu Dhabi. Bashir felt
that President Zardari would want to attend the Abu Dhabi
meeting; therefore, this meeting could not occur until late
November. While agreeing that Jean Arnault had an excellent
reputation, Bashir continued to exhibit concern about the
optics of UN coordination for the Friends and wondered if the
EU could play a more positive role. Given Zardari's support,
we can roll the MFA on UN coordination but would prefer not
to. We recommend that Arnault visit Islamabad to discuss
with MFA the modalities of moving forward under UN auspices.
End Summary.


2. (C) Ambassador and Polcouns met October 22 with Foreign
Secretary Salman Bashir and Additional Secretary for South
Asia Aizaz Chaudhry to follow up on the October 20 meeting
(Ref A) of the Friends of Pakistan core group in Islamabad.
As he had in the October 20 meeting, Bashir stressed that the
MFA sees two important benefits of the Friends group: (1) as
a way to expand Pakistan's bilateral ties, especially with
European Union states and Japan; and (2) as a means to
attract concrete assistance to enhance Pakistan's economic
and security capacity. Bashir stressed that the initiative
was not about pledging, but about increasing capacity to
attract more support from international financial
institutions.

Menu of Options
--------------


3. (C) Bashir said the MFA was distributing a circular
tasking to other GOP ministries to come up with a menu of
options for potential donors to review. It would focus on
sectors (e.g., education, health, security) where Pakistan
needed assistance. He noted that the UK Foreign Office
Director Philip Barton had offered suggestions for how the UK
could contribute; Bashir welcomed similar suggestion from the
U.S. Once the MFA had collected this menu, they would share
it with the U.S. and the UK before convening the heads of
mission of the core group in Islamabad. Chaudhry said the MFA
would include in the paper proposed modalities for
organization, membership and decision-making. The MFA was
leaning, he said, to an informal organizational structure.

Still Hesitant on UN Role
--------------


4. (C) Ambassador noted that there were an increasing
number of countries interested in joining the Friends group,
including Germany and Spain. The U.S. believed a Frontier
Trust Fund that could be managed by the Friends would elicit
financial support from many of the smaller countries that
were reluctant to put people on the ground. She said that
Jean Arnault had a great deal of relevant experience and a
proven track record; we understood that he would be available
to play the role of coordinator and believed that we could
find other interested countries--perhaps the UAE--to pay for
a small secretariat. This initiative conceivably could be
done under a Good Offices mission and not require the formal
approval of the Security Council.


5. (C) Clearly aware that President Zardari had overruled
his concern about the optics of a UN mission, Bashir
nevertheless again expressed reservations about using the UN
to organize the Friends. He agreed that Arnault had an
excellent reputation but asked whether we could use the EU as
the vehicle to hire Arnault. Zardari, he said, "doesn't
understand the diplomatic nuances involved in having Pakistan
appear to be a basket case country."


6. (C) Ambassador said we were particularly pleased that

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Saudi Ambassador Asseri had attended the October 20 meeting
and made some very positive contributions. Bashir agreed,
saying that he believed the Saudis had been surprised and
unprepared for the New York meeting. Likewise, the Chinese
had been surprised by Zardari's decision to invite them to
the Islamabad meeting and were seeking clarification about
their role in the process. Overall, Bashir thought it was
better to be more inclusive than exclusive about inviting
participation as we moved forward.

Timing
--------------


7. (C) Bashir doubted that it would be possible to organize
a meeting in Abu Dhabi in early November. He suspected that
President Zardari himself would like to participate, and the
President was scheduled to visit Saudi Arabia November 4/5 at
King Abdullah's invitation and New York November 12-13 for
the Saudi Interfaith Dialogue at the UN. It would be better,
he said, to circulate the options menu to participant
countries ahead of the Abu Dhabi meeting so they could come
prepared to respond. Bashir will review the draft options
paper when he returns from accompanying the Prime Minister to
China; he then plans to visit Turkey before returning to
Islamabad.


8. (C) Comment: Given Zardari's blessing, we can certainly
roll the MFA on the issue of UN coordination, but we would
prefer not to. We understand SYG Ban is leaning towards the
appointment of Jean Arnault, and we fully agree that it would
be better to have a non-American be the lead coordinator.
Talks between Arnault and Zardari in New York would certainly
be useful. We recommend, however, that Arnault visit
Islamabad for talks with the MFA at the earliest opportunity
to calm their concerns about how the Friends initiative would
work.
PATTERSON