Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ISLAMABAD3133
2008-09-25 13:03:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Islamabad
Cable title:  

CREATING A CERP-LIKE FUND FOR PAKISTAN

Tags:  PREL PTER PGOV MOPS MCAP MASS PK 
pdf how-to read a cable
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FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9061
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 9189
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 8773
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 3826
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 0390
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 6132
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 4958
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHWSMRC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 003133 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV MOPS MCAP MASS PK
SUBJECT: CREATING A CERP-LIKE FUND FOR PAKISTAN

REF: A. PESHAWAR 463

B. ISLAMABAD 3035

C. ISLAMABAD 2962

D. ISLAMABAD 2961

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 003133

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV MOPS MCAP MASS PK
SUBJECT: CREATING A CERP-LIKE FUND FOR PAKISTAN

REF: A. PESHAWAR 463

B. ISLAMABAD 3035

C. ISLAMABAD 2962

D. ISLAMABAD 2961

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)


1. (C) Summary. Pakistani military action in Bajaur and
Swat is generating up to 200,000 internally displaced persons
(IDPs) who likely will need shelter and support through the
winter unless they receive help in refurbishing homes and
communities destroyed by ground and aerial attacks. In a
nascent yet encouraging development, some local tribes are
rising up to form lashkars (tribal militias) to fight
militants themselves. We need to help the cash-strapped GOP
apply classic counter-insurgency (COIN) doctrine by following
up military operations with humanitarian and economic
development and rewarding tribes who fight militants.


2. (C) USAID is working throughout the tribal areas to
provide jobs and small-scale community development projects,
but they have restricted access to combat zones. As of now,
we have neither the funding nor the program flexibility to
help; we propose establishing a USD 2 million pilot program
under DOD/CENTCOM theater auspices to provide condolence
payments under rules similar to those that govern the
Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP),which has been
so successful in Iraq and Afghanistan.


3. (C) Our goal is to enhance the writ of the Pakistani
government, and USG civilian and military personnel have
limited access to affected areas. We propose, therefore, to
funnel condolence payments perhaps through the SOCCE Civil
Military Support Element in Peshawar to pre-designated
Pakistani Army and Frontier Corps officers for disbursement
to war victims/communities. We fully acknowledge that this
will be problematic, but we must help the Pakistanis hold and
stabilize Swat and Bajaur. The September 20 bombing of the
Marriott Hotel in Islamabad was a stunning wake-up call--some
are describing it as Pakistan's 9/11--and we need to move

quickly to build on new GOP resolve to fight back. End
Summary.

Renewed Military Action
--------------


4. (C) The Pakistani Army and Frontier Corps, finally, are
re-engaged in military operations in Swat (Northwest Frontier
Province - NWFP) and Bajaur (Federally Administered Tribal
Areas - FATA). The GOP forces are meeting heavy resistance
against militants armed with heavy weapons who are being
reinforced by brethren crossing over from Afghanistan and
other parts of FATA. While we are seeing a new demonstration
of GOP will to fight, the Army and Frontier Corps (FC) still
lack capacity and an understanding of how to effectively
apply COIN strategy. We are concerned that, even when the
Army clears Swat and Bajaur, the GOP will not have the heavy
forces to hold these areas while the Army moves on to
neighboring Mohmand Agency. We need, therefore, to enhance
law enforcement capabilities and help the GOP win a hearts
and minds campaign.


5. (C) Ref B outlines the equipment/training required to
turn Pakistan's outdated conventional forces into a light,
mobile, COIN-capable force. To improve U.S. and Pakistani
military coordination in the Pak-Afghan border region, we are
creating a Joint Military Operations Coordination Center in
Peshawar; we have completed one tripartite Border
Coordination Center in Torkham and plan several more sites on
both sides of the border. In October, we will initiate a
train-the-trainer program for the FC in Abbottabad pending
completion of a new training center at Warsak. SOCOM
training for the Pakistani Special Forces (SSG) is ongoing.
We are responding to new requests from the Pakistani Air
Force for Close Air Support training.


6. (C) Key to our success will be changing the level and
flexibility of how we fund COIN programs in Pakistan. In Ref
B, Post strongly recommended that we begin funding COIN
strategy in Pakistan as a DOD Program of Record, thus
securing consistent out-year funding with which to craft our
continued mil-mil engagement. This will synchronize funding

ISLAMABAD 00003133 002 OF 003


streams and make funding sources transparent, reliable and
predictable. Ongoing train and equip programs and a DOD
Program of Record will deliver medium/long-term benefits, but
we must also help Pakistan deliver short-term immediate
relief in support of COIN operations.

New Condolence Payment Fund
--------------


7. (C) We need to help the Pakistani Army and FC deliver
relief through some type of Commander's Emergency Response
Program (CERP),which is essential to win the hearts and
minds of the people in the tribal areas. Pakistan must be
able to quickly follow combat actions with humanitarian
assistance. Additionally, they must be able to provide
people who have been victimized by collateral damage with the
means to rebuild. During his September 16 visit to
Islamabad, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Mullen discussed the
idea of providing CERP-like assistance with Chief of Army
Staff General Kayani.


8. (C) The most expedient method for assisting these people
is to provide them a cash assistance package so that they can
purchase foodstuffs and building materials to repair/rebuild
their homes. Vouchers and the provision of building
materials is not as effective since the insurgents are simply
able to "out-bid" the government by providing cash handouts
to ensure continued local support. The current economic
crisis precludes the GOP from funding such critical COIN
activities. However, as we know from our experiences in Iraq
and Afghanistan, immediate impact assistance initiated by
commanders on the ground is extremely effective in turning
the support of the local populace away from the insurgents
and towards the legitimate government.


9. (C) Interior Minister Rehman Malik has appealed to the
U.S. and the international donor community for help in
assisting IDPs fleeing military action in Swat and Bajaur.
Through USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives, we are
providing an initial USD 10 million in limited help
(relocation kits, e.g.) to the victims of fighting in Bajaur
and are applying a jobs creation contract to cover Bajaur
victims. State's Bureau of Population, Refugees and
Migration is helping with a USD 5 million contribution to
UNHCR. With USD 15 million in reprogrammed State/INL
funding, we will enhance the ability of the NWFP police to
maintain law and order by providing vehicles, communications
equipment, bullet-proof vests and helmets. Using both
DOD/MIST and State funding, we are enhancing our
anti-extremist information campaign. State's limited
resources, however, are inadequate for the job, especially as
the military expands operations into other parts of the FATA.


How it Would Work
--------------


10. (C) We would like to build on the successful Afghan and
Iraqi CERP and solatia (payments to civilians for property
damage caused by military operations) models by providing
condolence payments to give war victims cash to buy
foodstuffs and/or repair homes/communities damaged in
GOP-militant fighting. The difference in Pakistan is that
our goal is to enhance the writ of the Pakistani government,
so we would not want to disburse funds directly to the
population ourselves. Further, with limited USG access to
war-affected areas, we will have to funnel these funds
through the Pakistani Army and FC. We have a potential model
for this flow of support; the SOCCE Civil Military Support
Element in Peshawar is preparing to disburse USD 40,000 in
humanitarian assistance items to the FC for the local
population.


11. (C) Ideally, the funds would be used for reconstruction
of homes, schools, health clinics, government law and order
facilities and key roads and water/sanitation facilities
destroyed in the fighting. Individual heads of household
and/or village chiefs would sign a simple receipt
acknowledging they received funds and pledging to use them
for a stated purpose that conforms with the program
parameters. Funding could be used to pay for labor in
support of community projects. Monies could not be used to

ISLAMABAD 00003133 003 OF 003


purchase weapons or ammunition, directly support projects
that benefit the Pakistani Army and/or FC, or fund for-profit
government or private enterprises. Pre-designated Pakistani
Army and FC commanders would be required to provide the
receipts to the SOCCE Civil Military Support Element.
Pakistan Military Commanders also will be responsible for
monitoring the project to ensure completion. We fully
acknowledged that this program will be problematic. We know
that it will be very difficult to monitor the use of the
funds, and some of the money will go astray. Given the
opportunity to distribute these funds, however, we believe
General Kayani will support a program that imposes reasonable
fiscal controls on designated commanders.


12. (C) We are open to ideas about funding sources and
specific monitoring/accounting mechanisms but strongly
recommend that these remain flexible enough to deliver quick
response COIN-based payments. We are requesting USD 2
million of DOD monies to create a new pilot condolence
payment program in Pakistan. We need to be able to begin
disbursing monies before the onset of winter in
October/November.
PATTERSON