DEVELOPING PAKISTANI COIN CAPABILITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ISLAMABAD 003035

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/16/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV MOPS PK
SUBJECT: DEVELOPING PAKISTANI COIN CAPABILITY

REF: A. ISLAMABAD 2962

B. ISLAMABAD 2961

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)


1. (C) Summary: To help Pakistan roll back an increasingly
virulent combination of foreign terrorists and domestic
insurgents, the U.S. is implementing a three-part strategy to
improve governance, provide economic development and fight
extremism in the tribal areas along the Afghanistan border.
USAID already has begun work on governance and development
projects, and we are exploring (Reftels) ways to help
Pakistan apply counter-insurgency (COIN) theory in Bajaur.
To date, however, Pakistan has not employed a
clear/hold/build COIN strategy. This cable addresses the
challenges we face in improving the will and capacity of
Pakistan's security forces to implement a COIN strategy. To
achieve success, defined as eliminating terrorist safe havens
and the conditions that breed support for them, it will
require a long term strategy and significant resources. Post
strongly recommends that we secure consistent out-year
military funding by establishing COIN operations as a Program
of Record in the DOD budget and significantly enhancing
State/INL support for civil armed forces/police training
(addressed septel). End Summary

Background/Assumptions
--------------


2. (C) Pakistan has fought three wars and multiple
lower-level conflicts with India; the composition,
deployment, doctrine and tactics of the Pakistani Army (and
strategic forces) are designed to fight a land war with
India. Former President and Chief of Army Staff (COAS)
Musharraf and current COAS General Kayani recognized that a
shift has occurred, and that Pakistan now faces a significant
threat emanating from extremists in the tribal areas; Kayani
accordingly has begun to train forces for low-intensity
conflict. However, the bulk of the Pakistani military
establishment has yet to make this transition, and promotions
have not historically been based on tours in the tribal
areas. General Kayani now recognizes the value of experience
in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) among the
military forces. We want the Pakistani military to accept
using COIN doctrine and tactics, but we also recognize that
the move to a new strategic focus will be slow.


3. (C) The Pakistan Armed Forces are the primary GOP
organizations tasked with clearing anti-government elements
from both the settled areas of the Northwest Frontier
Province (NWFP) and the FATA. Until 2002, however, the
Pakistani military very rarely entered the FATA. The tribal
areas were controlled by political agents with authority to
call on tribal levies to maintain law and order; the FATA
was, and still is, governed by a hodge-podge of
administrative punishments and what was for years a
successful strategy of divide and conquer over the tribes.


4. (C) The 1980's campaign to oust the Soviets from
Afghanistan which was launched from the FATA, eroded tribal
leadership structures and undermined the writ of government
in the region. Pakistanis constantly remind us
(exaggeratedly) that the U.S. then packed up and went home;
one result being a weakened region ripe for exploitation by
the Taliban and al Qaeda. The Pakistani military remains
wary of repeating this experience and strongly opposes
deployment of U.S. combat or combat support personnel (with
the possible exception of intelligence assets) on Pakistani
soil.


5. (C) When the Punjab-based Army began operations in the
FATA 2002-2005, it was seen as a foreign invader and incurred
significant casualties. Increasingly, the Army began using
the tribal-based Frontier Corps (FC) as its visible front
line in the FATA. The FC is the most credible alternative to
the Army, but it is neither equipped nor trained for clearing
operations, and its numerically limited and underpaid forces
are exhausted by over five years of fighting without
rotation. The FC reports to the Ministry of Interior in
peacetime and to the Army in wartime. As such, the FC should
be interoperable with, and tasked to work only with existing
Pakistan Security Forces and Pakistan Military units. At
present there is no civil-military coordination for planning,

ISLAMABAD 00003035 002 OF 005


especially for follow-on actions. A unity of effort is
required by both military and civil planners for transition
from clearing operations to holding operations, and finally
to routine law enforcement operations.


6. (C) To further reduce casualties, the Government of
Pakistan, the Pakistani military and intelligence services
also turned to traditional divide and conquer tactics,
including peace negotiations, with the tribes. What the GOP
has not yet accepted is that the nature of the enemy has
changed, and their traditional strategies are now
counterproductive. Even where they acknowledge that
negotiations have allowed militants time and space to
regroup, Pakistani forces argue that their limited capacity
to fight a multi-front war in the FATA leaves them no choice
but to use proxy forces. Implementing a successful COIN
strategy will require changing the current mindset among the
GOP, the military and intelligence forces.

Recent Trends
--------------


7. (C) In the past year and a half, while Islamabad was
distracted with domestic politics, the GOP ceded control of
an increasing amount of territory to foreign and domestic
militants; reversing this trend thus requires a geographic
approach rather than sequential in time or event to clear and
hold operations. The spread of Talibanization from the
tribal areas into the "settled" areas of the NWFP and the
ability of militants to launch successful suicide attacks
across the country have forced the GOP to recognize the need
for operations now underway in the NWFP and FATA.


8. (C) Civilian casualties from militant attacks on
factories and hospitals could be exploited to build public
support for what had previously been overwhelmingly unpopular
military operations. In some areas of the FATA, local tribes
are turning on the militants they previously hosted or
tolerated. The GOP has now banned the Tehrik-e-Taliban
(TTP),prohibited TV coverage of al Qaeda/Taliban interviews,
and acknowledged the increasing intersection of personnel,
resources, and action by the once independent Taliban, al
Qaeda and homegrown Islamic extremist groups.


9. (C) Policy and operational cooperation between the
central and NWFP governments remains poor, as does the
willingness of the Pakistani military and Interior Ministry
to share intelligence with each other or with the USG. This
adversely affects operational coordination and the ability of
the GOP to speak with one voice. This also undermines
civilian initiatives and blocks USG training of Pakistan
Military and Frontier Corps personnel.


10. (C) A growing sophistication of militant weaponry and
tactics comes as the Pakistan military remains a heavy
conventional force focused on regional threats not COIN
operations. The Pakistan military and Ministry of Interior
have an historic bias against USG provided military/security
training. Faced with new militant capabilities, however, the
Pakistani military has now recognized the need for additional
COIN capability and has asked for Close Air Support (CAS),
and Combat Search and Rescue training. They have also agreed
to U.S./UK training for the Frontier Corps. Turning the
Pakistani military into a modern, light, lethal and agile
force trained and equipped to conduct COIN operations is our
goal.

Developing Clear and Hold Capability
--------------


11. (C) We need to advance on two tracks for synchronized
COIN strategy operations. Both tracks must be supported by
coordinated Information Operations and ongoing USAID
development assistance.

(I) CLEAR CAPABILITY


12. (C) We must increase the Pakistani military's ability to
clear an area of militants; this will require a complete
overhaul of Pakistan Security Assistance Programs in support
of a needs-based acquisition program and training in support
of both COIN and territorial defense. Post recommends the
following missions receive priority emphasis:

ISLAMABAD 00003035 003 OF 005




A. Increase Pakistan Air Mobile Capability

--Modernized combat aviation force that includes attack,
medium and heavy lift helicopters; air transport of tactical
vehicles; and sufficient capability to resupply parts conduct
maintenance, and maintain a cadre of trained staff to sustain
a high operations tempo
--Airborne delivery of combat personnel and equipment


B. Combat Logistics and Sustainment

--Rotary wing resupply of forward forces
--Airdrop of resupply via Pakistan C-130 aircraft
--Improve sustainment of forward forces by ground via
enhanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR),
air support, convoy operations, adequate ground assets and
maintenance
--Enhance combat logistics and sustainment of forward forces
via sling-load operations


C. Counter Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) Capability /
Survivability

--Provide Counter Remote-Controlled IED Electronic Warfare
(CREW) devices
--Provide pre-detonation (PREDET) electronic warfare flights
--Pre-deployment C-IED Training, Explosive Ordnance
Recognition (EOR)
--ISR and air assets for reconnaissance operations
--Unexploded ordinance (UXO) clearing in previously
anti-government held areas


D. Command, Control, Communications, Computers and
Intelligence (C4I)/ ISR

--Radio relay, secure, long-range communications equipment
which provides interoperability between ground forces and
combat aircraft
--Enhance and employ Pakistan's unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
capability, both day and night, for COIN operations
--Combined ISR operation with US and/or ISAF forces
--Increase capability to fuse intelligence with current
operations in order to execute precision strikes and reduce
collateral damage
--Integration of fixed/rotary-wing assets with current ISR
capability to increase coverage in tribal areas


E. Close Air Support / Joint Fires

--Enhance ability to increase air presence in tribal areas
for show of force, route reconnaissance, and kinetic strike
operations
--Increase PAKMIL CAS capability through better integration
with ground forces (terminal guidance operations),use of
precision-guidance munitions, and limited visibility/night
operations
--Increase air threat incorporation using an attack rotary
wing and fixed wing fighters
--Integrate CAS operations with ground operations utilizing
Joint Tactical Air Controllers (JTACS)
--Enable the Pakistan military to reduce collateral damage
and fratricide via the proper use of CAS operations


F. Civil Affairs (CA) / Humanitarian Assistance (HA)
Operations
--Enable Pakistan Military and Frontier Corps units with
CA/HA training and engagement
--Provision Pakistan Military units to provide immediate HA
post battle


G. Night Operations

--Increase Pakistan Arm