WAY FORWARD ON BAJAUR AND COIN STRATEGY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 002962

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PREF PINR PK
SUBJECT: WAY FORWARD ON BAJAUR AND COIN STRATEGY

REF: A. ISLAMABAD 2798

B. ISLAMABAD 2876

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b),(d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Reftels laid out the opportunity that the current
situation in Bajaur presents to help the Pakistani government
implement a comprehensive counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy,
and our recommended approach for helping them get there.
While the circumstances on the ground have changed somewhat,
the fundamental situation has not: the Pakistani military
continues to struggle to reverse insurgent advances into
population centers in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA) and Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP),while the
civilian government is grappling with providing services to
the displaced, repairing damaged infrastructure, and ensuring
basic security now and after the military reduces its
presence or realigns its forces.


2. (C) We believe that success in Bajaur will significantly
color Pakistani willingness to adopt what is, for them, a new
way of doing things as they move into other areas where
insurgents have made inroads. But they need our assistance
urgently. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) are already
moving back home, despite continued fighting, and we have
deployed little in the way of assistance. The camps were
completely inadequate (one factor contributing to the
quickness with which people returned to Bajaur),and it does
not appear much is being done to help with reintegration.
The way is dangerously open for insurgents to exploit the
population's deep unhappiness with its government's actions
(or lack thereof).


3. (C) This cable lays out the overall approach we are taking
to help the GoP deal with this complex situation, and reviews
some of the resource requests we made in Ref B. Septels will
cover: our strategy for enhancing GoP capabilities on the
security side in clearing and holding operations in Bajaur
and beyond; the OFDA regional representative's
recommendations on OFDA-specific funding levels for Bajaur;
and a plan for strategic communications to drive home to
Bajauris the damage caused by the extremists and militants
operating in their midst.


4. (C) In using Bajaur as a test case, we need to pursue
short- medium- and long-term tracks simultaneously, across
three main areas: security (both clearing phase and
long-term holding),development (jobs, services, good
governance),and information (separating the insurgents from
the people and boosting popular perceptions of government).
In the short term, we will help provide relief supplies to
IDPs and reconstruction assistance as they return home. We
will provide law enforcement agencies with some equipment and
commodities to improve their ability to react to immediate
security issues. We will also press GoP officials to better
coordinate across military and civilian lines to inform the
population of military operations as well as on how the
government will assist those affected. The GoP also needs to
shape the message that this is Pakistan's battle for its own
future (and not a U.S. proxy war),and that the government's
fight is with the insurgents, not the people.


5. (C) Over the longer term, we plan to increase our mil-mil
engagement to help transform the Pakistani military from one
poised only to fight a conventional war to one that can
handle the difficult and complex challenges of a
counter-insurgency mission. We will help to reform Pakistani
law enforcement entities, especially along the border with
Afghanistan, so that they become capable of providing basic
security and holding areas that have been cleared by the
Pakistani military. Once areas are cleared and secured, we
will be able to better offer assistance in improving the
lives of people living in these areas - through jobs and
economic development, health and education, and good
governance. If we can help the Pakistanis succeed in Bajaur,
we should be able to replicate that success as the GoP moves
into other areas where insurgents have infiltrated. End
Summary.


ISLAMABAD 00002962 002 OF 004


CURRENT SITUATION
--------------


6. (SBU) With Minister of Interior Rehman Malik's August 30
announcement of a cessation of military operations during
Ramadan, most IDPs have moved back into Bajaur. However, the
suspension announcement was not coordinated with the
military, which continues operations. As a result, we are
witnessing mass confusion on the part of the government and
the people. Embassy staff report that nearly all IDP camps
in Lower Dir (where most of the IDPs had fled) have been
closed. Some supplies remain, and are being warehoused by
District officials in case IDPs return. The International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and some local authorities
are establishing provisional camps, on the assumption that if
the fighting continues, residents will flee again. To date,
because of ongoing military operations, we have been unable
to get into Bajaur to assess relief, reconstruction or
rehabilitation needs. Embassy officials are in continuous
contact with the Political Agent for the Bajaur Agency and
hope to be able to get a better understanding of the
situation soon.


7. (S) Pakistani military officials have told us that they
plan to continue airstrikes and artillery operations in
Bajaur until they have cleared key population centers and
roads of militants. There is talk of a ground campaign to
follow, but it is not clear that will happen. Officials have
told us that when they finish in Bajaur, they will move in
force to Swat (where some anti-insurgent operations are
already occurring),Mohmand, and possibly Kurram (which is
embroiled in sectarian fighting not directly related to the
war on terror, but there is some evidence that it is being
exploited by Sunni extremists to build their own position in
the agency). However, the Pakistani military cannot execute
these operations simultaneously and will likely encounter
militant resistance along the way.


8. (C) This leaves open the question of what force will hold
the territory once the military moves on to its next
operation. Traditional law enforcement bodies (like the
tribal Levies) are neither large enough nor well enough
trained and equipped to do it. The NWFP Police and Frontier
Constabulary have no jurisdiction in the Tribal Areas, except
in hot pursuit. The Frontier Corps (FC) is the logical
choice (it has both the administrative mandate and is a
heavier, better trained and equipped force). But several
officials have told us the FC is "tapped out." The FC has
been fighting for the better part of five years, and because
it is stretched so thin, has had no opportunity to break and
train up to the next level of competence or to replace and
modernize equipment. The FC is also stretched thin
geographically, and a number of jurisdictions along the
border have suffered because of FC troops being called off to
address an emergency somewhere else. This could easily
happen to the forces left behind to secure Bajaur, once Army
operations end.

LIMITING FACTORS
--------------


9. (C) Paras 1-4 above, and reftels, laid out our suggested
approach to helping the Pakistanis deal with this difficult
and complex challenge. However, there are a number of
limiting factors we must keep in mind as we go forward:

-- Suspicions of U.S. intentions. We deal with this
phenomenon across all aspects of our bilateral relationship,
and especially with our mil-mil relationship. While we have
made progress and are having more open discussions with our
Pakistani military counterparts now than at any time in
recent memory, we are not yet to the point at which they will
tell us in advance what they plan to do operationally, nor
will we likely be able to engage in detailed forward planning
with them.

-- Lack of Army receptivity to U.S. training. The Army
generally declines U.S. offers for training on Pakistani
soil. The NAS Airwing gets the same message from the
Frontier Corps officer staff (seconded from the Pakistani
Army). We have had better success with the various police
forces, which fall under MOI.

ISLAMABAD 00002962 003 OF 004



-- Limited military capacity. Despite its traditional
reputation and self-image, the Pakistani military is
currently not up to the challenge of securing the entire
frontier. Septel will discuss this issue further; what it
means for us is that we will have to be modest in our
expectations of what they can do in the short term.

-- Limited capacity of law enforcement bodies. The
balkanized system of law enforcement entities throughout the
FATA and NWFP means there are both duplication of efforts and
huge gaps in coverage. The Frontier Corps and tribal Levies
serve in the FATA. The Frontier Constabulary serves the
Frontier region, a belt between the tribal areas and settles
areas. The NWFP Police serve the settled areas.
Additionally, none of the forces engage in strategic
planning. There is no consistency in operational capability
or in training/procedures that would allow these forces to
effectively secure the contested areas along the border, nor
do they have the equipment or the manning to do so. Insurgent
forces exploit these weaknesses.

-- Political situation. While the drama of Musharraf's
resignation and Zardari's election as President are now over,
and we are hopeful that the political paralysis will ease,
disagreement remains among the Pakistani leadership on how
aggressively the GoP should go after insurgent groups. Some
among the military and in the civilian leadership in
Islamabad understand the threat these groups present to
Pakistan itself. But some local leaders and some elements of
other Pakistani organizations are less enthusiastic, and
resist tough action against insurgents. These groups have
engaged in a pattern of concluding separate peace agreements
with various groups at various times, which muddy the picture
and impede the GoP, as a whole, from attacking the problem in
a consistent manner.

NEXT STEPS - ASSISTANCE
--------------


10. (SBU) As noted above, there are both short term and long
term things we can do to help the GoP stay committed to these
operations and be successful in the end. Reftels laid out a
short-medium-long term approach. Because of the Government's
unexpected decision to encourage IDPs to return home, even as
military operations continued, the short and medium term
activities we described have become merged. We need to
support ICRC and local governments outside Bajaur as they
stockpile relief items (water, food, medicine, and tents)
which will be needed if the continued fighting makes people
flee their homes a second time. Likewise, the GoP and the
international community need to be preparing to receive those
who will be displaced by expected new operations in other
agencies near Bajaur. The terrible condition of the camps
was also a huge black mark for the government as the newly
empowered media visited the camps and interviewed residents
who had received little or no help from the government. The
media also interviewed families who could hardly afford to
feed themselves but were taking in relatives. This sharply
increased the political pressure on the government to
encourage the IDPs to go home.


11. (SBU) At the same time, we should be helping people now
to rebuild homes and damaged infrastructure as the harvest
season and winter approach. Although we cannot yet get into
Bajaur to make an assessment, what we know of how the air
campaign was conducted leads us to believe that collateral
damage to civilian properties and infrastructure will be
significant. In ref B, we laid out expected needs, to
include: tents, basic building materials, and a small
monetary award to each family to assist in the return to, and
rehabilitation of, areas damaged by the fighting.


12. (SBU) USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives
(USAID/OTI) has been told by the FATA secretariat that they
will know this week whether they can begin operations in
Bajaur. If the answer is yes, OTI will begin its "quick
impact" programs, which will then be followed by USAID
entities and their Livelihoods program.

NEXT STEPS - LONG TERM PLANNING
--------------

ISLAMABAD 00002962 004 OF 004




13. (C) In addition, we hope to use this opportunity to force
changes in the way Pakistani officials deal with these kinds
of situations. Currently, the approach is completely ad hoc.
The Pakistani side has resisted the appointment of a senior
FATA coordinator/Czar in the area of operations with
civilian-military authority, as was done following the
October 2005 earthquake. At the national level, there is no
formal system for civilian-military planning, and we cannot
conclude that such planning is going on informally.
Likewise, there is no apparent mechanism for coordinating
public information or communicating a coherent government
line or policy. Neither is there a forum in which national
level and provincial level officials coordinate on either
actions or on messaging.


14. (C) In the coming weeks, we will continue to press
Pakistani officials to meet together. Now that the new
civilian government is firmly in place, we will press, at the
highest levels, for a session in which officials from the
National Disaster Management Agency, the Ministry of
Interior, the NWFP government, and the Army sit down to
assess the situation in Bajaur and develop a clear strategy.
We will also renew our suggestion on the appointment of a
senior Pakistani to act as FATA coordinator.


15. (C) Our first objective is to craft a plan for delivering
assistance and services now to affected populations. Our
second objective is to work with the Pakistanis to craft
coherent communications on issues of insurgency (putting the
blame where it belongs and characterizing insurgency as a
national threat, not an international problem),military
operations, government support for the civilian population,
etc. The third objective is to move Pakistani officials
closer to some sort of civil-military planning, at least for
identifiable upcoming operations in the short term.

COMMENT
--------------


16. (C) Additional cables in this series will address post
recommendations regarding security assistance, economic
development and humanitarian relief as well as lay out a
strategic communication plan. We believe that we are facing
a potentially significant opportunity to change fundamentally
the nature of Pakistan's engagement with us in the war on
terror. Both rhetorically and tangibly, the Government of
Pakistan and the Pakistani military have acknowledged that
this war is aimed at them. Gone is the conceit that they are
drawn into fighting "America's war." Equally gone is the
notion that they can draw easy distinctions between al-Qaeda,
the Afghan Taliban, and the Pakistani Taliban. The enemy
here is coalescing into a single extremist entity that
threatens equally Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the
international community, and senior Pakistani officials are
increasingly willing to recognize that reality. Thus, we
believe that we have a new opportunity to change the dynamic
of our cooperation here.


17. (C) But the opportunity is fleeting, and if we are going
to succeed, it's essential that we make the same focused,
intense effort here that we have made and are making in Iraq
and Afghanistan. Pakistan's increasing willingness to face
the realities of its situation has not translated into
increased capacity to address either the military or
humanitarian aspects of its engagement. To avoid having them
fall back into old habits or, worse, into defeatism, requires
that the U.S. step up here in a way that previous efforts
have not matched. We look forward to working with Washington
agencies to shape an appropriate U.S. response.

PATTERSON