Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08IRANRPODUBAI8
2008-02-28 16:12:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Iran RPO Dubai
Cable title:  

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE 2008 IRANIAN MAJLES ELECTIONS

Tags:  IR PGOV 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9940
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHDIR #0008/01 0591612
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 281612Z FEB 08
FM IRAN RPO DUBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0226
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDHP/DIA DHP-1 WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0200
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0168
RUEHDIR/IRAN RPO DUBAI 0219
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 IRAN RPO DUBAI 000008 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

LONDON FOR GAYLE, BERLIN FOR PAETZOLD
BAKU FOR HAUGEN, ISTANBUL FOR ODLUM
PARIS FOR WALLER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/28/2018
TAGS: IR PGOV
SUBJECT: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE 2008 IRANIAN MAJLES ELECTIONS

REF: RPO DUBAI 0004

RPO DUBAI 00000008 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Jillian Burns, Director, Iran Regional Presence
Office, DoS.
REASON: 1.4 (d)



S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 IRAN RPO DUBAI 000008

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

LONDON FOR GAYLE, BERLIN FOR PAETZOLD
BAKU FOR HAUGEN, ISTANBUL FOR ODLUM
PARIS FOR WALLER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/28/2018
TAGS: IR PGOV
SUBJECT: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE 2008 IRANIAN MAJLES ELECTIONS

REF: RPO DUBAI 0004

RPO DUBAI 00000008 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Jillian Burns, Director, Iran Regional Presence
Office, DoS.
REASON: 1.4 (d)




1.(S) Summary: The results of the 2008 Majles elections in Iran
will have little to no immediate bearing on Iranian foreign or
nuclear policy, on which the Majles has little impact, but may
foreshadow the likely result of the 2009 presidential election.
Numerous contacts report that the Iranian public appears to have
scant interest in the Majles elections and expects to see little
change. Although the Majles does have some institutional
powers, these powers are largely limited to domestic policy.
That said, the elections are a valuable barometer in the shaping
of political alliances and pre-positioning for the 2009
presidential elections, as well as a glimpse inside current
power relationships. Furthermore, cabinet members often are
chosen from among the parliamentary leadership. The reformers
are unlikely to gain many seats, but the triumvirate of Ali
Akbar Rafsanjani, Mohammad Khatami, and Mehdi Karrubi appears to
yield political influence. End summary.

2.(C) The March 14 Iranian Majles elections will not likely
result in any significant immediate changes in the country's
foreign or nuclear policy, as the Majles has limited impact on
those areas. In addition, numerous contacts have told IRPO that
the Iranian public appears to have scant interest in the Majles
elections and expects to see little change. (Comment: This
reportedly scant interest among the Iranian public in the
elections does not necessarily translate into a low voter
turnout. The Islamic Republic has had voter participation
numbers of 50-60% in most elections, and the Iranian government
strongly encourages high turnouts, since it views voter
participation as a reflection of systemic legitimacy. End
comment.)

3.(S//NF) Oppositionist Ebrahim Yazdi (please protect),leader
of the banned political party Freedom Party and former Islamic
Republic of Iran Foreign Minister, told IRPO Febraury 20 that he
attaches little importance to the Majles elections. Despite the

reinstatement of several hundred previously disqualified
reformist candidates, he did not expect there would be
competitive elections in most districts. Yazdi added that
although his Freedom Party registered some candidates for the
elections, they were disqualified, as expected for a banned
political party. (Yazdi's views on US policy and Iran's
political future are reported septel.)

Political alliances

--------------

4.(C) The significance of these elections and all the
politicking preceding them is largely in the shaping of
political alliances. Although the Majles has institutional
powers, these powers are largely limited to domestic policy.
The reformist-centrist triumvirate formed by former president
Khatami, Expediency Council chair Rafsanjani, and former Majles
speaker Karrubi has some influence, largely derived from the
personal influence of the three leaders. However, despite
strenuous lobbying efforts by reformists and Rafsanjani for
reversal of disqualifications, the reformists will not be able
to field candidates in all constituencies. Politically
speaking, the reformist-centrist triumvirate is out-flanked by a
conservative-pragmatist triumvirate of former National Security
Council secretary Larijani, Tehran mayor Qalibaf, and former
IRGC commander Rezaie. The latter grouping is providing an
alternative to the more hardline conservatives associated with
President Ahmadinejad. A coalition called the Broad and Popular
Coalition of Principle-ists (BPCP, sometimes translated as the
Comprehensive Coalition of Principle-ists) has been formed by
Larijani, Rezaie, and Qalibaf, reportedly as a result of
disagreements with the existing United Front of Principle-ists
(UFP) which includes several conservative groups that are
largely pro-Ahmadinejad. There are also a few other smaller
conservative groups, such as the Independent Principle-ists led
by MP Ahmad Tavakkoli, and the Progressive Principle-ist Front
led by former intelligence minister Ali Fallahian that remain
separate from the UFP and BPCP.

RPO DUBAI 00000008 002.2 OF 003



Vetting

--------------


5. (S//NF) Candidates were first examined by Executive Councils
run by the Interior Ministry and subsequently by Supervisory
Councils, which answer to the Guardian Council (GC). Then, the
Guardian Council itself examined the candidacies. A majority of
reformist candidates were initially disqualified, many for
having "legal records," although it was reportedly not made
clear to candidates what this meant. Some were also
disqualified because their adherence to Islam was in question.


6. (S//NF) Khatami, Rafsanjani, and Karrubi found some unusual
allies in lobbying to overturn the mass vetting of candidates by
the Interior Ministry -- several prominent conservatives
including Deputy Majles speaker Mohammad Reza Bahonar, MP Ahmad
Tavakkoli, and Tehran mayor Qalibaf also publicly protested the
vetting. In one widely publicized case, a grandson of Ayatollah
Khomeini, Ali Eshragi, was disqualified after officials
reportedly questioned neighbors about his personal life,
including whether he prays, fasts, or smokes. Eshragi was later
reinstated following significant criticism over his
disqualification. Several incumbent Majles deputies were also
disqualified, although most of those candidates were reinstated,
including a reformist candidate who had earlier detailed to IRPO
his anger in being vetted out. (Reftel).

7.(U) Following the loud criticism of the disqualifications,
hundreds of candidates were reinstated by the Guardian Council
and permitted to run. The Guardian Council spokesman told
reporters that of the nearly 7,600 people who registered their
candidacies for the elections, over 4,500 have been approved to
run. Reformist officials have given the media varying estimates
regarding how many seats they can contest, ranging from 90-120
for the reformist coalition, and about 160 for the reformist
National Trust (Karrubi's Etemad-e-Melli) Party, which is not
part of the reformist coalition. It is clear, however, that
reformists will not be competitive for all of the Majles seats.
.

8.(S//NF) Asked why the majority of the vetting of Majles
candidates came from the Interior Ministry and not the Guardian
Council as in prior elections, a former GC staff member
indicated to IRPO that the change was only a cosmetic shift to
improve the GC's public relations; the GC has not ceded any
real authority. According to the source, the GC is trying to
shift blame for vetting candidates away from itself, in the eyes
of both the Supreme Leader and the Iranian public. In the 2005
presidential election, the Supreme Leader publicly rebuked the
GC for vetting out all but one of the reformists running for the
presidency, and the GC eventually reinstated two reformist
candidates. The source explained that there is little
difference today between the Interior Ministry and the Guardian
Council, unlike under the Khatami administration when the two
entities had ideological differences, and in fact, the GC is
currently represented in the Interior Ministry Executive
Councils. The contact explained that the 5th Majles (1996-2000)
gave the GC the funds to extend its oversight of elections. The
GC has one representative in each Iranian province, who also
sits on the Interior Ministry's Executive Council for the
province, thereby exercising authority that should be limited to
the Guardian Council.

Beyond vetting - interference in elections

-------------- --------------

9.(S//NF) Contacts expect to see interference on election day
from the IRGC and the Basij, although it is not yet known how
extensive the meddling may be. It appears that the general
public does not have confidence in the legitimacy of the
process. The Interior Ministry will also be testing new
electronic voting technology during the Majles elections,
although hand counting will still be done alongside. (Note:
This issue will be explored in more detail septel. End note.)

Looking toward the presidential election

-------------- --------------


RPO DUBAI 00000008 003.2 OF 003


10.(C) The results of the Majles elections will be a good
indication of whether the political trends are turning more
toward the pragmatic and traditional conservatives
(principle-ists) exemplified by Larijani, Qalibaf, and Rezaie,
and away from the hard-liners associated with Ahmadinejad. In
the December 2006 municipal elections, pragmatic conservatives
fared best, but it is too early to determine whether those
elections were indicative of a trend. However, if the trend
continues in the Majles elections, it could carry through to the
2009 presidential election. Furthermore, cabinet members often
are chosen from among the parliamentary leadership, which means
the face of each parliament can shape politics for years to
come. It will also be interesting to see the degree of support
the reform candidates get, although it is clear they cannot
retake the parliament.

11.(C) The Khatami-Karrubi-Rafsanjani and
Larijani-Rezaie-Qalibaf alliances appear to have been created
specifically to pool resources and coordinate strategies for the
Majles elections. (Note: Karrubi always stays somewhat
independent. End note.) Whether they remain in place in the
lead up to the 2009 presidential elections remains to be seen.
Rumors abound that Khatami is considering running for the
presidency again; it appears unlikely that Karrubi will run
again, and it is unlikely that Rafsanjani will try to challenge
the constitutional age limit of 75. Many believe he has his
sights set on the Supreme Leader position or at least a position
on the council he proposes as a substitute. On the conservative
side, Larijani's candidacy for the Majles elections suggests
that he does not have an eye toward the presidency in 2009.
Some sources indicate that Rezaie doubts he could win an
election and therefore will not run. At this time, it appears
that Qalibaf is the strongest potential candidate of the latter
group.

12.(C) However, Ahmadinejad apparently retains popularity with
his core constituency, the religious poor, and could be
re-elected. One Iranian political science professor predicted
-- with regret -- that Ahmadinejad would win re-election,
despite the dire straits that his economic policies have brought
upon ordinary Iranians. Iranians, he said, are like people who
keep buying lottery tickets, even though they have never won.
Maybe this time, they say to themselves. It is that sentiment
that would see Ahmadinejad re-elected, the professor said. In
any case, the Supreme Leader's view of Ahmadinejad in 2009 -- as
an asset or liability -- will undoubtedly impact the outcome of
the elections.
BURNS