Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08IRANRPODUBAI27
2008-05-13 13:41:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Iran RPO Dubai
Cable title:  

US-BASED IRANIAN POLITICAL ACTIVIST DISCUSSES IRGC, SUPREME

Tags:  IR PGOV PREL PHUM 
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VZCZCXRO2985
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHDIR #0027/01 1341341
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 131341Z MAY 08
FM IRAN RPO DUBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0272
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0204
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0236
RUEHDIR/IRAN RPO DUBAI 0265
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 IRAN RPO DUBAI 000027 

NOFORN
SIPDIS

LONDON FOR GAYLE, BERLIN FOR PAETZOLD
BAKU FOR HAUGEN, ISTANBUL FOR ODLUM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/13/2028
TAGS: IR PGOV PREL PHUM
SUBJECT: US-BASED IRANIAN POLITICAL ACTIVIST DISCUSSES IRGC, SUPREME
LEADER'S HEALTH, CIVIL SOCIETY

REF: A) 2007 RPO DUBAI 0032; B) RPO DUBAI 0010

RPO DUBAI 00000027 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Ramin Asgard, Acting Director, Iran Regional
Presence Office, DoS.
REASON: 1.4 (d)
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 IRAN RPO DUBAI 000027

NOFORN
SIPDIS

LONDON FOR GAYLE, BERLIN FOR PAETZOLD
BAKU FOR HAUGEN, ISTANBUL FOR ODLUM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/13/2028
TAGS: IR PGOV PREL PHUM
SUBJECT: US-BASED IRANIAN POLITICAL ACTIVIST DISCUSSES IRGC, SUPREME
LEADER'S HEALTH, CIVIL SOCIETY

REF: A) 2007 RPO DUBAI 0032; B) RPO DUBAI 0010

RPO DUBAI 00000027 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Ramin Asgard, Acting Director, Iran Regional
Presence Office, DoS.
REASON: 1.4 (d)

1.(S//NF) Summary: US-based Iranian political activist Mohsen
Sazegara held a wide-ranging discussion with IRPOff during a
recent visit to Dubai. He gave his assessment of Iran's goals
in Iraq, identified what he called the "Gang of 7" most
influential current and former IRGC officers, and discussed the
political consequences of the Supreme Leader's reportedly
continued ill health. IRPO is unable to assess his access, but
some of his information tracks with other reporting. Sazegara
also proposed a plan whereby the international community should
block Iran's financial access to its oil revenues to force Iran
to negotiate; asserting that the primary goal of the ensuing
talks should be to aid Iranian civil society. Sazegara is
unabashedly a proponent of fostering a "velvet revolution" in
Iran, and claimed to be working with others in the US and
European diaspora toward that end. End summary.

Iraq

--------------

2.(S//NF) In a recent conversation with IRPOff, Iranian
political activist Mohsen Sazegara shared his thoughts on Iran's
involvement in Iraq, Iranian leadership and the need for a
"velvet revolution" in Iran. Asked his assessment of Qods Force
goals in Iraq and who controls Iran's policy on Iraq, Sazegara
said that the Supreme Leader and Qods Force commander Qassem
Soleimani are in control of Iraq policy and that their primary
aim in Iraq is to disturb and hamper US efforts there. When
pressed about Tehran's ultimate goals--i.e. are their actions in
Iraq an attempt to prevent a US attack on Iran, or are there
other reasons?--Sazegara conceded that Tehran wants to "keep the
US busy" but suggested that US withdrawal from Iraq is also an
Iranian goal. (Comment: Sazegara seemed to imply that Iran is
more focused on the tactic of hampering US efforts in Iraq than
on their overall Iraq strategy. End comment.) Asked about

Iranian support of Shia groups who are fighting Iraqi forces,
Sazegara acknowledged the support, and added that he even
considered Iranian government support for anti-government Sunni
groups in Iraq to be plausible. The Iranian leaders are
confident that they retain sufficient support among some
elements of the Iraqi government, he asserted, without naming
any specific groups or individuals.

IRGC

--------------

3.(S//NF) Among current and former IRGC officers, Sazegara
identified what he called the "Gang of 7" most influential
individuals. They are head of IRGC Intelligence Morteza Rezai;
head of IRGC Strategic Studies Bureau Mohammad Hejazi; IRGC
Commander Mohammad Ali Aziz Jafari, IRGC Qods Force Commander
Qassem Soleimani, former IRGC Commander Yahya Rahim Safavi,
Supreme Leader's advisor and IRGC veteran Mohammad Baqer
Zolqadr, and head of state broadcasting Ezzatollah Zarqami, who
was formerly an IRGC officer and a deputy culture minister, and
according to open source information, a hostage taker.

4.(S//NF) Sazegara identified the Strategic Studies Bureau of
the IRGC as an internal think-tank that holds significant
influence and is sometimes consulted by the Supreme Leader.
Khamenei exerts control through the IRGC, the MOIS, and a
"parallel security force" nominally called the Security Division
of the Judiciary Power, he said. When pressed on the "parallel
security force" Sazegara said it was comprised of many of the
individuals who were responsible for the murders of dissidents
in the late 1990s, but did not elaborate further.

Supreme Leader's ill health

--------------

5.(S//NF) Sazegara claimed that Supreme Leader Khamenei is
clinically depressed and sometimes leaves Tehran for mountain
retreats for a week or more, leaving his son Mojtaba in control.
(Note: It has been widely reported in the international press
that the Supreme Leader suffers from prostate cancer, however

RPO DUBAI 00000027 002.2 OF 003


the claim that he suffers from clinical depression appears new.
End note.) On some occasions, Sazegara claimed, Khamenei goes
to a Qods Force base in the city of Amol in northern Iran
because the base is very secure and the scenery is lovely and
relaxing.

Rafsanjani trying to sideline Khamenei's son or Supreme Leader
himself?

-------------- --------------
--------------

6.(S//NF) Sazegara said that Expediency Council chair
Rafsanjani and the influential Assembly of Experts member
Ayatollah Mahdavi-Kani are both concerned that the Supreme
Leader's son Mojtaba has grown too powerful. (Note: See ref A
for more detailed reporting on Mojtaba Khamenei. End note.)
According to Sazegara, Rafsanjani and Mahdavi-Kani are not the
rivals that the press portrays them as, and Mahdavi-Kani is not
seeking the chairmanship of the Assembly of Experts. On the
contrary, he said, the two men have collaborated on ways to
limit the influence of Mojtaba Khamenei and have been advocating
the creation of a "Vice Leader" position, although apparently
without success. Sazegara characterized Supreme Leader Khamenei
as weak and fearful of losing power, citing this as the reason
Khamenei has not designated a successor. (Comment: If this
report is accurate, it is another instance of Rafsanjani working
to limit the power of the Supreme Leader while Khamenei is still
in office rather than after [ref B]. While it could indicate
that Rafsanjani is moving more openly against Khamenei, it is
also possible that he is laying the groundwork for the
leadership succession, which Khamenei himself has neglected to
do thus far. End comment.)

Military strikes?

--------------

7.(S//NF) Sazegara expressed hope that there would be no
military action against Iran, but said that if there were, then
the best targets would be, for example, unmanned Iranian oil
platforms in the Gulf. This would be an effective show of
strength and warning to the Iranian government, he claimed.
Asked what the Iran government's response would be to such a
hypothetical attack, and who would make the decisions, Sazegara
said the final decision would rest with the Supreme Leader but
he would be influenced by others. According to Sazegara,
Rafsanjani, Mahdavi-Kani, Judiciary chief Shahrudi and the
Supreme Leader's advisor Ayatollah Nateq-Nuri would advise
caution and counsel the Supreme Leader not to engage in war with
the US. Some in the IRGC--but not all--would also counsel
stepping back, Sazegara said. Asked what the "Gang of 7" would
likely advise, Sazegara punted the question, saying that in
addition to their advice, Khamenei would seek the assessment of
the IRGC Strategic Studies Bureau. Ultimately, Sazegara said he
thought the chances were even that Khamenei would decide to
either counter-attack or negotiate.

Human rights and civil society

--------------

8.(S//NF) Asked about the effectiveness of USG statements in
support of detained or imprisoned Iranian activists, Sazegara
said that they are helpful because they bring international
attention to specific cases. Sazegara recounted his own
experience as a political prisoner in the infamous Evin prison,
saying that the catalyst that led to his release was the death
in detention of Iranian-Canadian photojournalist Zahra Kazemi,
because the case brought greater international attention to
Iran's human rights abuses.

9.(S//NF) Sazegara characterized the relationship between the
Supreme Leader and the Iranian people as defined by two
absolutes: Khamenei's absolute control, and the people's
absolute weakness. Sazegara said that civil society groups have
become fractured and marginalized and said that he and others
are working to unify the groups and bring them back into
relevance.

Block Iran's oil revenue, then negotiate


RPO DUBAI 00000027 003.2 OF 003


-------------- ---

10.(S//NF) Citing Iranian economist Mohammad Tabibian, Sazegara
asserted that Iran's oil revenue is its key financial weakness
and that though the banking sanctions are having an effect, for
the sanctions to be truly effective, they must directly target
Iran's oil revenue. Sazegara suggested that once Iran's
financial access to its oil revenue has been blocked, the
international community should offer Iran a negotiations process
similar to the Helsinki process, through which Iran would be
allowed access to a specified percentage of oil revenue if it
takes certain actions. However, Sazegara cautioned against
establishing parameters for how the Iranian government spends
that revenue. Do not repeat the "Oil-for-Food" program that was
implemented with Iraq, he warned.

11.(S//NF) Sazegara asserted that the first item on the proposed
negotiations agenda should be Iranian civil society rather than
the issues of Iran's nuclear program or support for terrorism.
In order of importance, Sazegara said that the conditions for
releasing Iran's oil revenue should be that Iran: 1) issues a
general pardon for all detained and imprisoned civil society and
rights activists, political dissidents, and journalists; 2)
allows for a free press (i.e. discontinues censorship of
publications and arrests/intimidation of journalists and
editors); 3) holds a free election without candidate
qualification by the government. He stressed, however, that the
general pardon was the most important item. Asked what would
prevent the Iranian government from simply re-arresting or
otherwise threatening the activists who would be released under
the proposed general pardon, Sazegara had no recommendation and
instead emphasized the importance of the general pardon for
mobilizing civil society.


12. (S//NF) Comment: Mohsen Sazegara is unabashedly a proponent
of fostering a "velvet revolution" in Iran and claimed be
working with other activists among the US and European diaspora
to mobilize Iranian civil society toward that end. IRPO is
unable to assess his access, but some of his information tracks
with other reporting. Sazegara served as an IRGC officer in the
years after the 1979 revolution and held several government
posts in Iran until 1989. He later embraced the reform movement
and published several reformist newspapers. He was arrested and
imprisoned in 2003 and upon his release he left Iran for the UK,
and then the US. Sazegara is currently a scholar at the
Washington Institute for Near East Policy and also recently
started a new think-tank called the Research Institute for
Contemporary Iran. In addition, he has set up two
FARSI-language websites, www.rahbordonline.com and
www.pishraftonline.com; the first is targeted toward students,
and the second contains translated articles related to
economics.
ASGARD