Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08IRANRPODUBAI12
2008-03-13 16:50:00
SECRET
Iran RPO Dubai
Cable title:  

IRAN: ELECTION EVE OBSERVATIONS

Tags:  IR PGOV PREL 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO4189
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHDIR #0012/01 0731650
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 131650Z MAR 08
FM IRAN RPO DUBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0237
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDHP/DIA DHP-1 WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0179
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0211
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHDIR/IRAN RPO DUBAI 0230
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 IRAN RPO DUBAI 000012 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

LONDON FOR GAYLE, BERLIN FOR PAETZOLD
BAKU FOR HAUGEN, ISTANBUL FOR ODLUM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/13/2018
TAGS: IR PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: IRAN: ELECTION EVE OBSERVATIONS

REF: RPO DUBAI 0008

RPO DUBAI 00000012 001.2 OF 004


CLASSIFIED BY: Jillian Burns, Director, Iran Regional Presence
Office, DoS.
REASON: 1.4 (d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 IRAN RPO DUBAI 000012

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

LONDON FOR GAYLE, BERLIN FOR PAETZOLD
BAKU FOR HAUGEN, ISTANBUL FOR ODLUM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/13/2018
TAGS: IR PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: IRAN: ELECTION EVE OBSERVATIONS

REF: RPO DUBAI 0008

RPO DUBAI 00000012 001.2 OF 004


CLASSIFIED BY: Jillian Burns, Director, Iran Regional Presence
Office, DoS.
REASON: 1.4 (d)

1.(C) Summary: With reformers largely vetted out of the March
14 Iranian Majles elections, the main competition is between
hardline conservatives loosely associated with President
Ahmadinejad, and the more pragmatic conservatives associated
with former National Security Council secretary Larijani, former
IRGC commander Rezaie, and Tehran mayor Qalibaf. The two main
conservative coalitions are the United Front of Principle-ists
(UFP) which is comprised of ultra-right hardline groups, and the
Broad and Popular Coalition of Principle-ists (BPCP),which
comprises the more pragmatic traditional conservative groups.
Although UFP contains some groups that support Ahmadinejad, it
also includes some of his conservative critics, such as Majles
speaker Haddad-Adel, Deputy Majles speaker Bahonar, and the head
of the Majles Research Center Tavakkoli. IRPO contacts expect
that the pragmatic conservatives will do well at the polls on
Friday and expressed mixed views about whether there was a
significant difference in the platforms of the two conservative
groups. If the BPCP dominates these elections as expected, they
may use the Majles forum to step up their criticism of
Ahmadinejad and prepare ground for the 2009 presidential
elections, although their ideological platform does not appear
to differ greatly from the ultra-right. That said, some
analysts have indicated they could seek better relations with
the international community. End summary.

Reformers-a spent force

--------------

2.(C) Having been heavily vetted out of the Majles elections by
the Interior Ministry and Guardian Council and facing
allegations of being Western lackeys, Iran's reformers are
essentially not competitive in the March 14 Majles elections.
The main reformist coalition, which includes two of the largest
reformist parties--the Islamic Iran Participation Front (IIPF,
also called Mosharekat) and the Mojahideen of the Islamic
Revolution (MIRO)--will reportedly only be able to contest 90 of

the 290 Majles seats. Former Majles speaker Mehdi Karrubi's
National Trust Party (also called National Confidence Party)
announced that it can contest 160 seats. The three reformist
lists for Tehran have several names in common. The news organ
of the National Trust Party, Etemad-e-Melli, reported March 9
that its party shares 15 names in common with the Reformist
Coalition list, and 18 names in common with the Popular
Reformist Coalition, which is close to the National Trust party
and run by Mehdi Karrubi's wife Fatemeh.

3.(C) In the last week before the elections, conservatives have
stepped up attacks against reformers. Contact with Western
diplomats and claims of expressions of support from the US
administration have exposed Iran's reformers to accusations of
disloyalty. Hardline daily Keyhan attacked former deputy Majles
speaker Mohammad Reza Khatami this week for meeting with the
German ambassador to Tehran. According to AFP, Keyhan printed a
purported partial transcript of the conversation in which
Khatami expressed concerns about the Iranian nuclear program and
the Majles elections. Foreign ministry spokesman Hosseini
accused the US administration this week of trying to undermine
Iranian national unity through statements of support for
"certain political movements" (i.e. reformers). Intelligence
Minister Ejei accused reformist MP Noureddin Pirmoazzen of
treason for a March 9 interview on Voice of America in which the
MP criticized the disqualifications of reformist candidates
from the elections. (Comment: These high-profile attacks
against reformers on the eve of the elections may be intended to
paper over the appearance of conservative disunity caused by
pre-election infighting. They may also be designed to woo
undecided voters to the conservative side by portraying
reformers as traitors to the nation. End comment.)

4.(S) In any case, reformers in their current form are viewed by
some as a spent force in Iran. One analyst said the reformers
were too focused on appearing the victim to be able to project
an image of strength. He criticized reformers for not reaching
out to the lower-middle class, even as many in the provinces had
become disenchanted with the president for not living up to
promises made on his visits. The source said that in some
cases, Ahmadinejad's promises were left unfulfilled, in others
the results were mismanaged. This analyst had written off the

RPO DUBAI 00000012 002.2 OF 004


reformist IIIPF (Mosharekat) but thought the National Trust
Party may fare better. He noted that some reformist candidates
chose voluntarily to opt out of elections.

Conservatives-internecine squabbling

-------------- --


5. (S) Internal squabbling prevented the conservatives-who
increasingly refer to themselves as principle-ists-from unifying
on a single electoral list. The two main conservative
coalitions are the United Front of Principle-ists (UFP, also
called United Fundamentalist Front) which is comprised of
ultra-right groups, and the Broad and Popular Coalition of
Principle-ists (BPCP, also called Comprehensive Coalition of
Principle-ists),which comprises the more pragmatic traditional
conservative groups. A third coalition called the Progressive
Principle-ist Front was created by former Intelligence Minister
Ali Fallahian, according to domestic press reports. Fallahian
was reportedly first allied with the UFP, but broke with them in
mid-February after UFP reportedly declined to include him on
their electoral list. The Tehran-based analyst predicted that
an increasing number of former intelligence officials were
likely to enter politics.


6. (S) The UFP has been associated in the press with President
Ahmadinejad, and although it does contain some groups that
support him, it also includes some of his conservative critics,
such as Majles speaker Gholam Ali Haddad-Adel, Majles Research
Center head Ahmad Tavakkoli, Deputy Majles speaker Mohammad Reza
Bahonar, and MP Elias Naderan. (Note: Tavakkoli's public
criticism of the UFP list was mistakenly reported in RPO Dubai
0008 as his separation from the UFP list. Endnote.) The BPCP is
associated with former National Security Council secretary
Larijani, former IRGC commander Rezaie, and Tehran mayor
Qalibaf, who represent the more technocratic and pragmatic
conservatives. Ayatollah Mahdavi-Kani, the influential head of
the conservative Militant Clergy Association, failed in his
attempts to unify the conservatives and ultimately supported the
UFP. One Tehran-based analyst told IRPOffs that it was
significant that such an influential regime figure as
Mahdavi-Kani was unable to unify the conservative groups. He
implied that although divisions are deeper than they appear, the
divisions were not for the most part policy differences. When
asked why Bahonar would join the UFP list, given his clear
differences with the president, the analyst said that
longstanding social ties in Iranian society often trump
ideological differences. A Western diplomat posted in Tehran
also assessed that these divisions among conservatives are due
largely to personality differences and disagreements over
elections planning than to any ideological or major policy
differences among conservatives.

7.(S) The Tehran-based analyst suggested that Larijani opted to
run from Qom in order not to challenge (and potentially
embarrass) Haddad-Adel, who leads both conservative lists. A
US-based Iranian political analyst said separately that he
thought Larijani ran from Qom only because he felt he would get
a stronger electoral mandate there than in Tehran, given that
Larijani's father was a Qom-based ayatollah and seminary
lecturer. If both Larijani and Haddad-Adel are elected, it will
be noteworthy whether Larijani will try to challenge Haddad Adel
for the position of Majles speaker. Both analysts thought that
it was likely that Haddad-Adel would run for president in 2009,
and Larijani would then succeed him as Majles speaker.

8.(S) The economy is the biggest campaign issue for candidates
from all political groups, with official statistics putting
inflation at over 20%. Many conservatives are attempting to
distance themselves from President Ahmadinejad and his failed
economic policies by criticizing the government's economic
performance, and calling for different economic policies. The
US-based analyst said that the competition for seats in the
provinces and rural areas is focused more on local issues than
national political trends, but that in the large
cities-particularly Tehran-the competition is almost entirely
about national-level politics, especially the economy.

Electoral procedures and campaigning

-------------- -

9.(U) The electoral procedures for the Iranian Majles elections
contain some elements of proportional representation, but

RPO DUBAI 00000012 003.2 OF 004


Iranians ultimately will cast their votes for individual
candidates, although they can opt to select a list in its
entirety. The electoral lists that have been compiled by the
various political groupings are, in essence, voting guides. For
example, Iran's most important electoral constituency, Tehran,
has 30 seats in the Majles. On election day, each Tehran
resident chooses 30 candidates from among the reported 827
candidates who are running in Tehran. Once the results are
tallied, the seats go to the 30 candidates who received the most
votes. Interior Minister Purmohammadi said March 13 that the
Interior Ministry hopes to have final elections results before
the Iranian new year (Nowruz) on March 21. According to Iranian
press, if a second round of polling is required, those elections
may not take place until late April or early May.

10.(U) These elections will see the introduction of some
computerized counting. Deputy Interior Minister Mousapour told
Iranian press that there will be electronic vote counting
alongside hand counting, in order to test the electronic vote
counting technology. Reportedly, voters can choose to vote with
either a paper or an electronic ballot.

11.(S) Of the 290 seats in the Majles, five are set aside for
representatives of Iran's recognized religious minorities: two
seats for Armenian Christians, and one seat each for Assyrian
Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians. Polling is reportedly held
in community centers or places of worship of the respective
communities. There has been little press coverage of those
races. The US-based Iranian analyst asserted that the choice of
representatives for these communities is generally decided among
the respective communities before the elections, and the vote is
essentially a formality.

12.(U) Apart from limiting official campaign time to the week
prior to the elections, the government has introduced additional
restrictions, including banning the placement of photos or
posters in public places. Photos are reportedly only permitted
in fliers that are handed out during election week. There were
also rumors that the Internet would be blocked on election day,
which Interior Minister Purmohammadi denied, although a
reformist press website Norooz reported on March 11 that Yahoo
email and chat services were blocked by several internet service
providers.

13.(S) IRPO contacts report that public interest in the
elections is minimal. One Iranian reform-minded political
science professor said the timing of the elections-one week
before Iran's biggest holiday, Nowruz-has contributed to this.
People are too busy shopping, cleaning their homes, and visiting
relatives to pay much attention to the elections, he said. He
said he was so disenchanted with the election that for the first
time, he would not vote.

Electoral interference?

--------------

14.(S) IRPO contacts seem widely to expect that there will be
some degree of electoral interference. Contacts almost
invariably assume there will be a strong presence of Basij
forces at polling stations and suggest that other unspecified
interference is possible. The acting commander of the Basij,
Hossein Taeb, was quoted in the Iranian press in late February
saying that Basij should have a "maximum presence" in the
elections. The Supreme Leader's representative to the Basij
also said in press articles that the Basij should play an
important role in "preparing the ground for the maximum
participation of the people." When asked why IRGC Commander
Jafari would have openly called for support for principle-ist
candidates, one analyst suggested that Iranians in the public
sphere have a hard time remembering that their remarks reach
other audiences than the one in front of them.

15.(S) When asked how authorities may try to manipulate votes in
this election, the Tehran-based political analyst asserted that
there was low likelihood of overt technical interference in the
elections, but that local Basij leaders, clerics, and other
opinion leaders would exert influence in support of various
conservative candidates. (Comment: Given that both
conservative groups have factional support from the IRGC, it is
not clear which group would benefit most from IRGC/Basij
meddling. End comment) The US-based Iranian analyst said that
Majles candidates in the provinces often receive funds for
unofficial campaigning (e.g. hosting dinners for religious

RPO DUBAI 00000012 004.2 OF 004


ceremonies, helping the destitute, paying people's debts, etc.)
from organizations in Tehran, such as the bonyads, the IRGC, and
others with which they might be affiliated. He noted the
dominance of economic discourse in the campaigns, citing an
article this week in the conservative Jomhuri-ye-Eslami
newspaper which criticized candidates for not talking about
Islam enough. According to the article, there are very few
clerics running in these Majles elections compared to previous
rounds and that even the list of one of the best known clerical
organizations in Iran (not named) has only about 6% clerics on
the list. The article predicts a downward trend of clerical
participation in the future.

16.(S) Comment: Iranian elections often yield surprising
results; however, if the Broad and Popular Coalition of
Principle-ists dominate the election as many observers have
predicted, they may use the forum of the Majles to step up their
criticism of President Ahmadinejad and lay the groundwork for a
Qalibaf presidency. As laid out in reftel, electoral dominance
by this group is unlikely to result in major immediate shifts in
Iranian policy. However, their presence in the Majles-and
willingness to criticize the president--could act as a
counterweight to the ultra-rightists in the current
administration. The Tehran-based analyst predicted that
pragmatic conservatives would take control of the Majles this
year and the presidency next year. He said that judging by
Qalibaf's positive and technocratic leadership of the Tehran
municipality, this analyst reasoned that a Qalibaf presidency
could eventually produce more pragmatic shifts in policy and
increased outreach to the West and the international community.
That said, one Western diplomat posted in Tehran asserted that
the pragmatic conservatives are vulnerable to accusations of not
being sufficiently revolutionary, and may feel obliged to adjust
their statements accordingly. In any case, ultimate policy
decisions will remain in the hands of the Supreme Leader.
BURNS