SUPPORTING "FRIENDS OF AMERICA" IN IRAN (IPRO PD YEAR 1,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 IRAN RPO DUBAI 000001

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/16/2018
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SUBJECT: SUPPORTING "FRIENDS OF AMERICA" IN IRAN (IPRO PD YEAR 1,
PART II)

REF: 2007 RPO DUBAI 70

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CLASSIFIED BY: Jillian Burns, Director, Iran Regional Presence
Office, Dubai.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (C) Summary: As reftel details, the Department restarted
US-Iran official exchanges in August 2006, featuring the
flagship USG exchange program, the IVLP. The Iranian government
became aware early on of USG funding for the IVLP and, even for
the first program in November of 2006, issued written and oral
warnings against IVLP participation. Iranian government
attention continued in varying degrees, largely depending on the
subject matter and institutions involved, throughout the year.
Attrition for various reasons, particularly anxiety over Iranian
government reaction, thinned the participant field for some of
the programs. Despite these obstacles, Iranians participated in
record numbers and spread the word widely about their positive
experience with America after returning home. Some alumni faced
IRIG retaliation for being "friends of America", but continued
to strongly support the positive impact of continued US-Iran
exchanges. The experience of returning alumni also helped
reveal fissures within Iranian society which can help inform
future PD programming. End summary.




2. (C) As soon as IRPO was anounced, generalized IRIG paranoia
about IRPO and US policy towards Iran led them to label our
exchange programming as part of US "regime change" efforts aimed
at fostering a "velvet revolution" in Iran. (As recently as
November 2007 the Iranian government specifically referred to
the US government's Dubai office as the focal point of the USG
regime-change program.) Given this context, and the novelty of
reestablishing such exchanges after a 27-year hiatus, the number
of Iranian IVLPs in our first year nonetheless exceeded
expectations to become the top IVLP program in the NEA region
and third worldwide (see ref). Program participants have been
effusive in their praise of the quality and value of their
exchange programs, and have been key supporters of further
engagement with the Iranian people. Alumni have both suggested
future participants and volunteered to help organize future
programs. In addition, they have spoken in glowing terms about
the American people they met and institutions they visited.




3. (C) We expect IRIG scrutiny to remain in FY2007, possibly
increasing or decreasing based upon the state of bilateral
tensions and the subject matter of the program. We also expect
Iranians to continue to participate, although recruitment under
current conditions will remain challenging. To offer a more
textured view of the impact of and challenges to US-Iran
exchange programs, we offer the following in-depth discussion
with an IVLP alumnus detailed below. It offers useful insights
into how exchanges can help to mobilize and empower "friends of
America" within Iran and help identify and exploit fissures
within Iranian society to advance USG policy goals.



"Friends of America" - An IVLP Case Study

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4. (C) In late November 2007, one of last year's International
Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP) participants, Dr. Farhad
Towfighi (strictly protect) came to Dubai to discuss his
post-exchange experience with IRPO. Tofighi had been an
employee of the Iranian Red Crescent Society's Relief Services
branch. He played an active role in delivering emergency
medical care after the 2003 Bam (Iran) earthquake and the 2004
Samarra (Iraq) mosque bombing. Nonetheless, the IRC leadership
retaliated forcefully against him after he participated in the
April/May 2006 Disaster Response Management IVLP. On the other
hand, other government officials and organs were neutral to
supportive of Dr. Towfighi and the program generally, reflecting
nuanced diversity among different elements of the Iranian
government towards engaging with the US.




5. (C) As told to IRPO, when Dr. Towfighi - then still an IRC
employee - was invited to the IVLP, he arranged to meet with the
IRC President, Dr. Seyed Massoud Khatami (no relation to former
President Khatami),to explain the program and solicit his
support. He even brought a copy of the IVLP program description
for review. The IRC Ministry of Information and Security (MOIS)
liaison officer was present. A representative from President

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Ahmadinejad's Office, Dr. Biroudian (FNU),also attended. While
Dr. Biroudian was "very supportive" of the program, IRC
President Khatami angrily rejected any such engagement with
America and remained opposed to the program. He was reportedly
skeptical about the intent of the "L" (leadership) in IVLP,
asking why the Americans were trying to recruit leaders in Iran.
(Note: Tofighi suggested dropping the L from future program
materials if possible.) Dr. Towfighi noted to IRPOff that
Khatami was a former IRGC officer, and like the rest of the
senior government officials with IRGC backgrounds appointed
under Ahmadinejad, he was ideologically hostile to the US.




6. (C) Despite the IRC President's opposition to the program,
Towfighi went ahead and secured official leave to participate in
the program, based somewhat on reassurances from Dr. Biroudian.
He also briefed the Ministry of Health regarding the program and
was told that the MOH had "no reaction". The MFA was apparently
supportive. During the first week of the IVLP in Washington,
Dr. Towfighi and his colleagues attended a dinner with the head
and deputy head of the Iranian Interests Section. At this
event, Dr. Rahmanian of the Interests Section (title unknown)
told the group that the communication offered by the program was
"interesting", and that he was "very supportive" of the program.





7. (C) According to Towfighi, the IRC remained angry about his
participation and waited to retaliate after his return to Iran
in early May. First, he was summoned to the IRC security office
and coercively interrogated for nine hours. A few weeks later
he was required to appear at an administrative hearing which
resulted in him being fired him from his position with the IRC
and banned from teaching. The authorities also forced him to
repay all income he had derived from teaching over the past year
(upwards of 15,000 USD, a large sum in Iran, even for a doctor).
According to Tofighi, the IRC security officials offered him
more lenient treatment if he agreed to denounce another IVLP
participant, Dr. Noorbala, who was the President of the IRC
during President Khatami's administration and the de facto
leader of the IVLP group. Dr. Towfighi refused to do so. When
IRC officials asked him specifically about his exchange
experience, he described the trip as professionally useful, and
the Americans he met as professional, kind, generous and
friendly. The IRC President grew even more displeased.




8. (C) Taking their retaliation a step further, the IRC then
reportedly banned possession or distribution of any of the eight
books Dr. Towfighi had written on disaster relief operations,
including sending notices to all 600 IRC offices throughout
Iran's 30 provinces to remove these materials. The IRC even
visited IRC offices countrywide to ensure his books were removed
from shelves. He learned later from colleagues that while
removing the books, IRC security officials warned staff that
"this is what happens to friends of America".




9. (C) Dr. Towfighi fought back. He hired a lawyer and appealed
the IRC's ruling to the Supreme Administrative Court. The
Supreme Court awarded him damages for lost income from the
banning and removal of his books. He is currently appealing the
other aspects of the IRC ruling as well. Dr. Tofighi's story
confirms that at least some means of redress are available
through the Iranian courts. Also, he reported that lobbying
influential government and NGO officials can be at least
somewhat effective in curbing hardliner conduct. Dr. Towfighi
said that he had argued his case with the Swiss Embassy, the
MFA, the International Red Cross, and the Ministry of Justice
about his case. In addition, he was planning to speak with the
Presidential Office official who had been supportive of the
exchange at the outset. Dr. Towfighi reported that ICR
colleagues had responded very negatively to the ICR's crackdown
on such a long-serving and respected member of their ranks
(Towfighi had worked for IRC for 23 years),and many within the
organization were rallying to his support and against the IRC
President. He claimed that a teaching colleague had even thrown
a student out of his class when he learned that the student was
an IRC employee in anger over Towfighi's plight. Towfighi now
works in a low-profile part-time teaching position.



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10. (C) Comment: Towfighi's case is not the only example of
problems faced by returning IVLP participants. A few other
participants have lost their positions or had their passports
confiscated upon return. Fortunately, they seem to be the
exception rather than the rule, and even some of these people
continue to keep in contact with us and help organize further
exchanges. The Towfighi case offers key insights into methods
of suppressing dissent, or even engagement with the outside
world, used by hardliners in Iran. It further illustrates that
redress through the courts and lobbying with influential figures
can be effective to some extent in defending one's rights.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it suggests that
attitudes towards engagement with the West, in particular the
US, vary within the government, both among (and within)
different Ministries, and between senior leadership and the rank
and file. We should use our public diplomacy tools to
strengthen the hand of those supportive of engagement. The
primary fault line exists between the mass of the Iranian people
and even a large portion of Iranian officialdom who want
engagement with the outside world versus hardliners and their
supporters opposed to any opening which risks their monopoly on
power and their vision of a pure Islamic society. As the
Towfighi case illustrates, PD tools can meaningfully influence
changes within Iranian society of benefit to American policy
goals. Part III of the IRPO PD Year 1 series will offer
concrete recommendations for most effectivly using these tools
to advance our Iran policy goals in 2008 and beyond.
BURNS