INTERNAL DISSENT HAMPERS HONG KONG DEMOCRATIC PARTY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 HONG KONG 000053

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

NSC FOR DENNIS WILDER
DEPT FOR EAP/CM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2033
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PREL SOCI CH HK MC
SUBJECT: INTERNAL DISSENT HAMPERS HONG KONG DEMOCRATIC PARTY

REF: A. HONG KONG 2855

B. HONG KONG 1447

C. HONG KONG 2949

D. HONG KONG 3008

E. HONG KONG 458

F. HONG KONG 3118

G. HONG KONG 3103

Classified By: E/P Chief Laurent Charbonnet. Reasons: 1.4(b,d).


1. (C) Summary: "Reformist" members of the Hong Kong
Democratic Party (DP) recently sent an internal memorandum to
the party's leaders, expressing deep concern over the party's
poor showing in the November 18 district council election
(ref a) as well as its overall strategic and policy
direction. The reformers also were disappointed that they
were not included in an internal review of the party's
performance in the election. Calling for a thorough review
of "inadequacies" in the party, the group offered eight
recommendations for recruiting young political talent,
improving the organization of the party, and directly linking
funds to community-oriented programs. End summary.


2. (C) Comment: The existence of the internal DP memorandum,
and the fact that two members of the "reformist" group
provided it to us, suggest that the party's poor showing in
the district council election has sharpened internal, largely
generational differences over strategy and tactics. While
the victory of independent pro-democracy candidate Anson Chan
in the December 2 Legco by-election may have temporarily
soothed some of Hong Kong's pan-democrats, that situation in
many ways was unique and may not reflect any broader or
longer term improvement in the ability of the democratic camp
to coordinate and cooperate against their better organized
and funded rivals in the DAB. Indeed, the Democratic Party
seems to have dissipated whatever momentum Anson Chan's
election might have brought. In the wake of the December 29
National People's Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC)
decision authorizing Hong Kong to move ahead toward universal
suffrage (refs f, g),and concurrently the run-up to the
hugely important September 2008 Legco general election, the
ability of the DP to heal itself and to work with like-minded
colleagues in the pan-democratic camp will be crucial.


3. (S//NF) Comment, continued: The challenges to the
pan-democratic camp are stark -- Beijing seems to have scored
a public relations coup with the NPCSC decision ruling out
universal suffrage in 2012 but establishing the possibility
of full suffrage for the chief executive election in 2017.
Chinese University conducted a public opinion poll shortly
after the NPCSC decision and found that 72 percent of
respondents found the decision "acceptable," even if a
majority would have preferred 2012; 69 percent believed that
Beijing is sincere about implementing universal suffrage and
is responsive to Hong Kong's aspirations for democracy.
Perhaps more telling for the pan-democrats, 56 percent of
respondents did not support continued struggle for universal
suffrage in 2012, in the aftermath of the NPCSC decision.
(Septel will analyze this and other local reactions to the
NPCSC decision.)


4. (C) Comment, continued: We are not certain of the
reformists' motivations in revealing to us internal
Democratic Party documents. Clearly, they were trying to
spin us and get us involved in the internal factional
disputes of the Democratic Party -- which we have no
intention of doing. During a meeting in August, the same
contacts appealed to the U.S. Government for help in "saving
the party from its own demise," and explicitly asked that we
speak well of them to DP Chairman Albert Ho and former DP
Chairman and sitting Legislative Council (Legco) member
Martin Lee. Similarly, at our meeting in early December,
they asked if we had met with party leaders following the
district elections and if we could shed light on what the
leadership's sentiments were following the party's widespread
defeat, and asked that we convey or otherwise endorse their
views when meeting with DP leaders. Regardless of their
motivations, the memorandum provides detailed insight into
the divisions in the party organization and weaknesses of its
policy approach which are widely seen in Hong Kong as
damaging to the party's efforts to fight for increased
democracy for the Hong Kong people.

End comment.

Reform or Bust
--------------


HONG KONG 00000053 002 OF 003



5. (S//NF) Hong Kong District Councilor and Democratic Party
(DP) member Jimmy Wong (strictly protect) and the party's
public relations consultant Raymond Luk (strictly protect)
recently told us that in the wake of the DP's failures in the
district council elections on November 18 (ref a),reformists
in the party -- led by Chan King-ming, founding member and
former party vice chairman -- sent an internal memorandum to
the party "central leadership" to express their deep concern
over recent failures as well as the overall direction of the
party. (Note: Wong and Luk passed a copy of the memo to
poloffs at a lunch meeting. End note.) The following DP
members drafted the letter and identified themselves as "The
Reformist Faction of the Democratic Party": Chan King-ming,
Fan Kwok-wai, Ho Suk-ping, Kwan Wing-yip, Kwong Kwok-chuen,
Lee Wai-man, Lo Yun-ming, Luk Yiu-man (Raymond),Wong
Chun-wai (Jimmy),Yum Kai-bong, and Yung Ming-chau. During
our meeting with them on December 11, Wong and Luk also
posited that a DP-Civic Party merger, which has been publicly
suggested since the establishment of the Civic Party in March
2005, would have certain merits.

Background on DP Divisions
--------------


6. (S//NF) In recent years, the Democratic Party has been
plagued by division into two main camps: "the mainstreamers"
and "the reformists," though smaller, yet divisive factions
also exist within the party leadership. Political pundits in
Hong Kong often cite these divisions as the root cause of
weakness in the DP. In March 2006, responding to concerns
that "PRC infiltrators" had penetrated the party in an
attempt to gather information and possibly disrupt party
activities, the Democratic Party's Central Standing Committee
assembled a five-member "special panel." After an
eight-month investigation, the panel's report to the party
(released internally in November 2006 -- see ref b) labeled
Chan King-Ming, Jimmy Wong and Raymond Luk as "PRC
infiltrators." The report included copies of emails between
Luk and contacts on the mainland, which it characterized as
clear evidence that Luk was an "infiltrator." For example,
the report asserted that Luk had reported minutes of
politically sensitive DP meetings to contacts on the mainland
immediately after they were held. Chan King-ming also was
singled out for attending many meetings with mainland
officials -- including from propaganda, public security and
liaison departments/offices -- without properly reporting his
contacts as stipulated in DP by-laws. (Comment: The DP
report on infiltration, while compelling, does not provide
completely solid evidence that mainland functionaries have
infiltrated the DP. It may have served as a tool for
political jockeying within the DP, possibly in an attempt to
deter efforts by reformists to oust the party's more
"mainstream" senior leadership. End comment.)

Shape Up or Ship Out
--------------


7. (C) Among other concerns, the reformist faction, in its
letter to central party leaders ("mainstreamers"),expressed
"extreme disappointment" over not being invited to a DP
meeting to review lessons learned after widespread defeats in
the November 18 district council elections. They claimed
this lack of coordination reflected the leadership's
"perfunctory attitude, and lack of sincerity and commitment."
The group also called for a thorough review of
"inadequacies" in the party, and stressed that party leaders
should be introspective rather than put blame on factors
external to the party. The document noted the steady decline
in the "July 1 effect" (alluding to political momentum the
pan-democratic camp enjoyed following widespread
demonstrations held on July 1, 2003, protesting national
security legislation and advocating universal suffrage):
"Following the conclusion of the last district board
election, we simply must not take a passive stance dreaming
for such miracles as the 'July 1' incident to occur again.
If the leadership had had vision, they would have been aware,
three or four years ago, of the adverse battle scene today in
the absence of the 'July 1 effect,' and they ought to have
been a lot more cautious about the election." The drafters
also questioned whether the DP central leadership had ever
seriously attempted to foster party development at the
community level, especially in light of the magnitude of
resources at the disposal of the pro-establishment parties in
Hong Kong.


8. (C) The authors argued that increasingly savvy Hong Kong
voters will tend to cast their ballots in accordance with the
actual attributes of individual candidates, rather than

HONG KONG 00000053 003 OF 003


strictly along party lines. They provided a table showing
the percentage of votes secured in select constituencies in
the district council election and the Hong Kong Island Legco
by-election held on December 2 (ref C),indicating that
voters did not vote along party lines. The average
percentage of votes earned by the DP candidates in the
district council elections was approximately 40 percent,
whereas Anson Chan, the pro-democracy candidate in the Legco
by-election, earned an average 57 percent in the same areas.

A Way Ahead
--------------


9. (C) The authors suggested that the "rival camp" (Hong
Kong's pro-establishment parties) has been successful largely
because it has focused on recruiting young political talent,
maturing the organization of the party, and directly linking
funds to community-oriented programs. They offered eight
"concrete suggestions" for the DP leadership to consider.
The party should:

a) Begin a "rejuvenation" of party leaders and power
decentralization;
b) Not allow party members to hold concurrent seats in Legco
and district council from 2011 onwards;
c) Reconstitute a party school to attract and train young
members;
d) Set up a district strategic development task force to
prepare for the 2011 DC election and fine tune the party's
long-term election strategy;
e) Allocate resources for overseas travel by district
councilors to study campaign strategies in other democratic
countries;
f) Enhance communication with non-democrats;
g) Strengthen the party's Youth Committee and enhance liaison
with young students;
h) Review the DP's district policies (especially in the areas
of education, welfare, medical and conservation) to focus on
community concerns.


10. (S//NF) In August 2007, when Wong and Luk sought meetings
with us to voice concerns over the leadership and direction
of the party, Wong speculated that the pan-democrats stood to
lose many seats in the district council elections (this came
to pass),and that those losses together with the party's
perceived failures over the Green Paper (electoral reform)
consultation process would lead to huge losses in the
September 2008 Legco election. He also said he was satisfied
with the substance and function of the Green Paper, and
suggested that the Hong Kong people were more than capable of
using it as a platform to decide how best to move forward
with universal suffrage.
Cunningham