Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08HONGKONG213
2008-02-01 05:43:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Consulate Hong Kong
Cable title:  

HONG KONG: CHINA'S FIRST DEMOCRACY?

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR SOCI HK CH 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6767
OO RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHHK #0213/01 0320543
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 010543Z FEB 08
FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4051
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 HONG KONG 000213 

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NOFORN
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DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/CM
NSC FOR DENNIS WILDER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2033
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR SOCI HK CH
SUBJECT: HONG KONG: CHINA'S FIRST DEMOCRACY?

REF: A. 07 HONG KONG 03118

B. 07 HONG KONG 03103

C. 07 HONG KONG 02949

D. 07 HONG KONG 02855

E. BEIJING 0206

Classified By: Consul General James B. Cunningham; Reasons 1.4 (b, d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 HONG KONG 000213

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NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/CM
NSC FOR DENNIS WILDER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2033
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR SOCI HK CH
SUBJECT: HONG KONG: CHINA'S FIRST DEMOCRACY?

REF: A. 07 HONG KONG 03118

B. 07 HONG KONG 03103

C. 07 HONG KONG 02949

D. 07 HONG KONG 02855

E. BEIJING 0206

Classified By: Consul General James B. Cunningham; Reasons 1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) Summary: The December 29 National People's Congress
Standing Committee (NPCSC) decision setting the timetable for
implementation of universal suffrage has refocused the
political debate in Hong Kong, deftly defusing the issue.
The Hong Kong Government (HKG) appears confident that it has
secured Beijing's backing and that the majority of the public
accepts the decision. In recent weeks, Chief Executive (CE)
Donald Tsang has encouraged the Legislative Council (Legco)
and the people of Hong Kong to "focus on what is possible,
rather than what is not." Secretary for Constitutional and
Mainland Affairs Stephen Lam told the Consul General that the
process of preparation, public consultation, and legislative
approval of a new reform proposal for the 2012 CE and Legco
elections could extend into 2010. The pro-Beijing Democratic
Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB)
also appears satisfied with the NPCSC decision and focused on
preparations for the crucial September 2008 Legco election.
DAB leaders believe Beijing's decision has defused the
universal suffrage debate in Hong Kong considerably, leaving
them free to focus on grass-roots socio-economic issues and
to benefit from their strong advantages in financial and
human resources. Similarly, the pro-business Liberal Party
(LP) has publicly endorsed the NPCSC decision as a "unique
opportunity to be the first part of China to enjoy full
democracy."


2. (C) Summary, continued: The pan-democratic parties, in
contrast, are struggling to reconcile sharply disparate views
on strategy and tactics. Mainstream leaders continue
publicly to demand full reform by 2012, but some privately
acknowledge the pragmatic need to get the best deal possible

for that year while also ensuring that "true democracy" is
realized in 2017 and 2020. More radical elements view the
official legislative and policy process as increasingly
useless and appear intent on shifting the battleground to
public opinion and the media. Democrats of all persuasions
fear that the central and Hong Kong governments might
carefully structure political reform to produce "fake
democracy" in 2017 and 2020. While continuing to work on
constitutional reform over the next decade, however, the
democrats also must focus on the more immediate and equally
crucial issue of the September Legco elections. If the
"pro-Beijing united front" realizes a net gain of two or
three seats, the democrats could lose their ability to block
unacceptable amendments to the electoral procedures contained
in the Basic Law.


3. (C) Summary, continued: Several moderates with
cross-factional ties, including Anson Chan and Allen Lee,
have publicly encouraged the two sides to compromise and
cooperate. Others are working in private, behind the scenes,
where any real discussion will have to take place. Just
prior to the NPCSC decision, Chan told the Consul General she
believed real progress could be made by 2012, even if
universal suffrage was excluded. Since then, she has said
she was prepared to accept some compromise on universal
suffrage in the near term (i.e., 2012),if doing so could
help forge a consensus for 2017 and 2020. Lee worries that
the fragmented democratic side, encumbered by their
continuing distrust of the central government, might be
unable to seize this opportunity for universal suffrage.
Successful resolution of the reform debate within the NPCSC
framework will require compromise, which in turn depends upon
a degree of mutual trust among the concerned parties and the
Hong Kong public that does not presently exist. End Summary.


4. (C) Comment: In the two years since they triumphantly
maintained a united front to block CE Tsang's previous
proposal for political reform, which would have marginally
improved the electoral mechanisms for the 2007 CE and 2008
Legco elections, Hong Kong's pan-democratic parties have
suffered from inter- and intra-party bickering over political
strategies, candidate selection, and substantive policy
issues. In large part due to this often-public squabbling,
as well as their general unwillingness to move much beyond
their traditional focus on democratization and human rights,
their public images also have suffered. Faced with impending
disaster, most of the democrats were able briefly to set
aside their differences to support Anson Chan's successful
run in the December 2 Legco by-election (ref c). For the

HONG KONG 00000213 002 OF 007


next eight months, however, the democrats must find a way to
regain that common sense of purpose and work together for the
September Legco election. Lack of coordination and failure
to address the concerns of Hong Kong's common citizens could
lose them some of their 19 geographical constituency seats
(they also hold seven functional constituency seats) to the
pro-establishment camp, costing the democrats their one-third
minority blocking power for new proposals.


5. (C) Comment, continued: By contrast, the HKG and the
pro-establishment political parties appear content, for good
reason, to project images of competence, rationality, and
reasonableness to the famously pragmatic Hong Kong voters.
On electoral reform, they feel they have plenty of time to
devise achievable targets acceptable to Beijing and the Hong
Kong people for upcoming elections in 2012 and beyond. Anson
Chan recently noted to the Consul General that she saw a
tendency in both the HKG and the "left" (DAB and its allies)
to aim for a system dominated by one party, somewhat like
Singapore, which means eroding the democrats and pushing them
into obstructionism, to which they (the democrats) already
are prone. At the same time the political parties,
especially the DAB, will continue to work assiduously at the
local and district levels to prepare for the September Legco
election. Their policy platforms likely will frame the
political reform debate in their terms, while also
publicizing well-developed positions on the full range of
socio-economic issues - education, health care, environment,
infrastructure, benefits for the elderly - that most voters
care about, perhaps even more than democracy. They
accurately note that Beijing now has set the timetable for
implementation of universal suffrage, albeit with some
potential gaps, and it is Hong Kong's responsibility to
produce a roadmap to reach that destination. If Hong Kong
fails to complete any of the various stages of that task,
then the eventual achievement of full democracy in some form
would be pushed further into the future. In that case, the
HKG, its political allies, and perhaps even the public would
again blame the pan-democrats. We belive many democrats,
including leaders like Martin Lee, understand this dynamic,
and are grappling with how to respond to both the challenges
and opportunities created by the NPCSC decision. End Comment.

Timetable Set, Roadmap to Follow
--------------


6. (C) The December 29 NPCSC decision (refs a, b) authorizing
limited electoral reform in Hong Kong for 2012, and some form
of universal suffrage for the CE election in 2017 and the
Legco election sometime thereafter (presumably 2020),has
refocused the political debate in Hong Kong. Although many
pan-democratic leaders, supported by a significant minority
of the public, continue publicly to demand full universal
suffrage in 2012, most of them realize that the NPCSC almost
certainly will not liberalize the schedule any further. As
Civic Party (CP) Secretary General Joseph Cheng recently told
us, the democrats continue to hope for a "small miracle,"
perhaps through a leadership change in Beijing. More
realistic, however, are recent comments by NPC deputy, Basic
Law Committee member, and former DAB Vice Chair Maria Tam,
who said that "every single word" of the NPCSC decision was
legally effective, and any lingering doubts about the
decision's validity could only further delay implementation
of universal suffrage. As "South China Morning Post" (SCMP)
columnist Frank Ching (a long-time supporter of democracy)
wrote shortly after the decision was announced: "It is
pointless, now, to continue insisting on dual universal
suffrage in 2012: that is not going to happen."

HKG Relaxed, Plans Consultations in 2008
--------------


7. (C) Given this clarity, the HKG now appears relaxed and
confident, knowing that Beijing has set a timetable and has
asked Hong Kong to produce a roadmap. Secretary for
Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Stephen Lam likened the
pressures the government felt in the run-up to the NPCSC
decision to "cowboys being encircled in the wild west, where
it is very important to stick to your guns and wait for the
cavalry." "In some ways," he told the Consul General on
January 28, "the universal suffrage timetable is the
cavalry." According to Lam, the HKG plans to spend most of
2008 "exploring more ideas" to produce a plan for
implementation of universal suffrage according to the time
frame set by the NPCSC, focusing on interim reforms for the
2012 CE and Legco elections. A task force under the
Commission on Strategic Development (CSD) will begin meeting
in February and by the fourth quarter of this year, Lam hopes

HONG KONG 00000213 003 OF 007


to have the HKG plan ready for another round of public
consultations. He dismissed as "too simplistic" any proposal
to put the rejected 2005 plan back on the table for
consideration. "We need to get the various sectors and
political parties interested in putting forth what they think
would be in their interest to either expand the membership of
the election committee or make changes to the electorate base
so it would be even more representative compared to what we
have now or what we proposed previously." While Lam has said
that the HKG would present its proposal sometime in 2009 to
the Legco members, two-thirds of whom must approve it before
submission to the NPCSC, he told the Consul General that the
process easily could be pushed back to 2010. If the NPCSC
then concurs, Hong Kong could proceed with actual amendment
of the Basic Law in time for the 2012 elections. Lam made it
clear that the HKG would prefer to push concrete work on
electoral reform for the 2017 CE election until after the
2012 election. In other words, details for actual universal
suffrage for the CE won't be hammered out within the next
five years.


8. (C) Since the NPCSC decision, CE Tsang has encouraged the
people of Hong Kong to "focus on what is possible, rather
than what is not." On January 17, he urged Legco to accept
the political reality of the NPCSC decision and to stop
bickering over impossible demands. He told the legislators
that continuing skepticism of the sincerity of the central
and Hong Kong governments was "uncalled for and
unconstructive." Tsang said the timetable established by the
NPCSC decision was "unbreakable" and he urged the
pan-democrats not to view the decision with suspicion. The
election of the CE in 2017 would be under a "one person, one
vote" system in line with the principles of universal
suffrage. He divided the path to democracy into four
inter-related steps: first, reform of the electoral systems
for CE and Legco in 2012; second, further reform for the 2016
Legco election; third, implementation of full universal
suffrage for the CE in 2017; and fourth, universal suffrage
for Legco in 2020. Tsang acknowledged, however, that failure
to realize universal suffrage for the CE in 2017 could delay
full reform for Legco beyond 2020.

Key Issues: CE Nomination, Legco Functional Constituencies
-------------- --------------


9. (C) The democrats complain that the NPCSC decision leaves
some key issues unresolved. They fear the central and Hong
Kong governments might carefully structure political reform
to produce "fake democracy" in 2017 and 2020. For the CE
election, their principal concern is what nominating
mechanism would replace the existing Chief Executive Election
Committee (CEEC),a complicated system under which various
groups elect 800 members, who then select the CE by open
ballot. The democrats fear that a similar system, even with
substantially broader participation, could be designed to
"filter" potential candidates and exclude those whom Beijing
would find unacceptable from even running. As Martin Lee
told the Consul General on January 19, the pan-democrats want
a system under which an Alan Leong or an Anson Chan could run
for Chief Executive - even if they could not win.


10. (SBU) For Legco, the democrats continue to demand
abolition of the functional constituencies (FCs),which
currently elect half of Legco's sixty members, because they
view them as fundamentally undemocratic. In his December 12
report to the NPCSC, CE Tsang noted that there was no
mainstream view on resolution of this issue and offered
several reform options, but most democrats continue to insist
on complete abolition of the FCs. Stoking the democrats'
suspicions, Deputy Director Zhang Xiaoming of the State
Council's Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office recently opined
that the FC seats were valuable because they represent 97
percent of Hong Kong's gross domestic product.

Polls: Majority Satisfied, Sizable Minority Persists
-------------- --------------


11. (SBU) Public opinion polls conducted since the NPCSC
decision seem to support the HKG's growing confidence,
although it is clear that a sizable minority of the people
continue to prefer universal suffrage in 2012. A Chinese
University of Hong Kong poll conducted in early January found
that 72 percent of respondents considered the NPCSC decision
"acceptable," versus 21 percent who found it "unacceptable."
Significantly, only 36 percent supported continuation of the
fight for universal suffrage in 2012, while 69 percent
believed the central government was "sincere" and responsive
regarding universal suffrage for Hong Kong. A few days

HONG KONG 00000213 004 OF 007


later, a survey by the Hong Kong Research Association found
that 65 percent of respondents were satisfied with the NPCSC
decision, up six percentage points since a poll by the same
group at the end of December. A third poll, commissioned by
the pro-democracy "Apple Daily" newspaper and with questions
framed somewhat differently, found that 43 percent continued
to support universal suffrage for 2012.

Pro-Establishment Parties Confident
--------------


12. (C) Like the HKG, the DAB appears confident and content
to concentrate on preparations for the September 2008 Legco
election. Its leaders believe Beijing's decision has boosted
their already strong prospects for that contest, because that
decision has largely defused the universal suffrage debate in
Hong Kong. Relieved of much of the burden of defending and
justifying Hong Kong's lack of progress toward democracy in
the decade since reversion, the party and its allies can
utilize their strong advantages in financial and human
resources, and grass-roots organization, to mobilize their
supporters for the election. (Note: This is good news for
the DAB. In a story he related to Martin Lee just before the
NPCSC decision, former DAB Chairman and key strategist Jasper
Tsang Yok-sing said he had told Beijing officials: "If you

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don't give us something positive in 2017, then you can run
for re-election in Hong Kong, not me!")


13. (SBU) The pro-business Liberal Party (LP) has publicly
endorsed the NPCSC decision and urged other political parties
to seize the opportunity to advance democratization. In a
January 22 "SCMP" column, LP Chairman James Tien
characterized the situation as "a unique opportunity to be
the first part of China to enjoy full democracy." Hong Kong
now had a "clear timetable for democracy and the chance to
determine our own political future" that would include
"positive change" for the 2012 CE election, followed by
"expanding the base of FCs for the 2012 and 2016 Legco
elections." Separately, Tien told the "SCMP" on January 20
that the FCs (of which his party holds eight, as well as two
GCs) should be scrapped by 2020, a controversial statement as
Tien's party is widely viewed as the greatest beneficiary of
the FC structure. Taking these steps would enable Hong Kong
to realize universal suffrage in 2017, which Tien described
as "an opportunity that is by no means guaranteed." He also
urged the democrats and
the public not to focus excessively on details, such as
whether the CE nominating committee had 1,200 or 1,600
members, which he said would have no effect on the outcome of
the election.

Democrats Struggle to Respond
--------------


14. (C) Long before the December 29 decision, the democrats
had struggled to maintain a united front for the December 2
Legco by-election, in which pro-democracy independent Anson
Chan defeated pro-government independent Regina Ip (ref c).
In the months before that race, the various factions had
argued over their choice of candidate, with the more radical
members eventually agreeing to support Chan because she
appeared to be the only one capable of defeating Ip, who
benefited from strong support from the pro-establishment
parties and, allegedly, the central government in Beijing.
That sense of unity had grown stronger when the DAB and its
allies soundly thrashed the democrats in the November 18
district council election (ref d); the democrats, near panic,
coalesced around Chan and energized enough of their
supporters to turn out and elect her.


15. (C) The post-election holiday for the pan-democrats was
brief. On December 12, CE Tsang culminated the extended
"Green Paper" process with his formal request to the NPCSC
for a decision on proceeding with political reform. Although
some democrats complained that Tsang had inaccurately
conveyed Hong Kong's true public sentiment on
democratization, most conceded he had told Beijing frankly
that a majority of the Hong Kong people preferred to have
full democracy as soon as possible. By this time, the
pan-democrats were clearly on the defensive, striving to
maintain their unity and clarity of purpose in the face of a
rapidly evolving situation.


16. (C) Along with most of Hong Kong, the democrats were
taken by surprise when the December 29 NPCSC decision
essentially provided a full timetable for political reform,
albeit with some significant areas of vagueness. Some
democrats criticized the decision's lack of detail as leaving

HONG KONG 00000213 005 OF 007


room for further postponements, but others acknowledged that
the NPCSC clearly had put the burden on the people and
government of Hong Kong to produce a reform package - or
rather a series of packages for 2012, 2017, and beyond - that
could gain the endorsement of the CE and at least two-thirds
of Legco, before being returned to the NPCSC for final
approval, as required by the Basic Law.

"Walk On Two Legs"
--------------


17. (C) Civic Party Secretary General Joseph Cheng told us
recently that the pan-democrats were encouraged and heartened
by their January 13 demonstration, during which core
supporters - led by Anson Chan, Martin Lee, other
legislators, "Apple Daily" publisher Jimmy Lai, and Cardinal
Joseph Zen - turned out in better-than-expected numbers
(10-12,000),and also were "relatively generous" with
financial contributions to the cash-strapped parties. The
"theme" of that demonstration was "persisting with dual
universal suffrage in 2012, no fake democracy in 2017."
Cheng admitted, however, that the pan-democrats remained
divided and coordination among the parties was "difficult,"
so they had decided to pursue a "walk on two legs" strategy.
This approach had become essential to accommodate the
conflicting views of moderates and radicals and keep the
fragile alliance together.


18. (C) First, Cheng said the democrats would "fight very
hard" and "not give an inch" - publicly - on their demand for
dual universal suffrage in 2012. As Democratic Party (DP)
legislator Cheung Man-heung told CE Tsang during his January
17 question-and-answer session at Legco, "to us, 2012 is
still the best . . . we won't give up until it has become
hopeless." Second, they simultaneously would work to
maximize the speed and scope of democratization within the
framework established by the NPCSC decision, seeking to
ensure genuine universal suffrage in 2017 and 2020. For both
"legs," the democrats will strive to influence public opinion
through demonstrations and the media. Cheng said that
overall he was "slightly optimistic," in that he believed the
Hong Kong public understood the importance of democracy as
well as the "loopholes" left by the NPCSC, but he feared the
media might lose interest, which would be "dangerous."


19. (C) Leaders of the two main democratic parties revealed
at a January 19 luncheon with Senate staffer Paul Grove at
the Consul General's residence just how far apart they were
on fundamental electoral strategy. Alan Leong of the Civic
Party insisted that the democrats had to offer more than just
democracy to Hong Kong's common voters, particularly the less
well-off: "They have to see they are benefiting materially
from our platform." Martin Lee, former chair and current
moral leader of the Democratic Party, stated clearly that was
not the DP's goal: "Our job is to fight to establish a truly
democratic system in Hong Kong - that's what we stand for."


20. (SBU) Several of the more moderate democrats, including
Confederation of Trade Unions (CTU) Legco representative Lau
Chin-shek and Association for Democracy and People's
Livelihood (ADPL) acting chairman Bruce Liu, already have
publicly called for compromise on electoral arrangements for
2012, to pave the way for introduction of universal suffrage
for the CE in 2017. Lau called on all the political parties
to avoid a repeat of 2005, when the democrats' blockage of CE
Tsang's reform package left Hong Kong voters saddled with the

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existing, unsatisfactory system. Liu said the "NPCSC
decision is a reality" and "more rallies and hunger strikes
will not change it."

Radicals Want Action
--------------


21. (C) The more radical democrats, led by the LSD, the Civil
Human Rights Front, and The Frontier, are angry and seemingly
have abandoned the legislative arena and consultation
process. LSD Chairman Wong Yuk-man has promised to sever
ties with the other pan-democratic parties if they back away
from their demand for universal suffrage in 2012. Shortly
after the NPCSC decision, LSD Legco member Albert Chan urged
democrats to abandon their rational, non-confrontational
approach, and instead vote against all government bills and
proposals in Legco and boycott all elections, to attract
international attention. Chan told us recently that the
democrats had been "too rational for twenty years," that the
NPCSC decision was a "slap in the face," and that they should
break the law if necessary to create international news.
Chan said he and the LSD wanted to move the "battleground"

HONG KONG 00000213 006 OF 007


from Legco to Hong Kong society at large. Another activist
group, the "Democratic Development Network" led by Reverend
Chu Yiu-ming, also has announced they would reject any HKG
reform proposal for 2012 that would not pave the way to a
genuine one-person, one-vote system for the CE in 2017 and
Legco in 2020. Chu questioned the recent opinion poll
finding that more than 70 percent of Hong Kong residents
accepted 2017-20 for implementation of full suffrage, opining
that "people accept because they feel helpless," a situation
he believed was "not conducive to governance." (Comment:
While the democrats' stubborn sticking to the demand for
universal suffrage in 2012 - despite the clear NPCSC decision
to the contrary - seems fruitless, even irrational, veteran
political commentator Allen Lee told the Consul General the
democrats fear that giving up this demand will split their
ranks even further and alienate the minority core of their
staunchest supporters. Others believe that sticking on 2012
with no sign of movement will reinforce the "obstructionist"
image and lose moderate voters. End Comment.)

September Elections Crucial
--------------


22. (C) Joseph Cheng of the Civic Party told us that for the
next eight months, in addition to working for universal
suffrage, the pan-democrats also must prepare for the
"crucial battle" of the September Legco election. If the
"pro-Beijing united front" is able to gain two or three seats
at the expense of the democrats, they then might be able on
key issues to sway two or three democrats to switch sides, in
which case the pan-democratic camp would be "marginalized,"
as it would lose the ability to veto and block new proposals.
At this time, however, it is not at all clear that the
various groups within the pan-democratic camp will be able to
field a coordinated slate of candidates. If they fail to do
so, they risk splitting the pro-democracy vote and losing
seats to the pro-establishment parties, which are almost
certain to work together to maximize their success.
Recently, leaders of both the Civic Party and the LSD
indicated publicly that the democratic parties already were
finding it difficult to agree on joint candidates in some of
the geographic constituencies, although the FCs appear less
problematic.

Who Can Mediate?
--------------


23. (C) Several moderates with cross-factional ties,
including pro-democracy independent Legco member Anson Chan,
NPC delegate and former LP leader Allen Lee, and Executive
Councilor Anthony Cheung, have publicly encouraged the two
sides to compromise and cooperate. Just prior to the NPCSC
decision, Chan told the Consul General she believed real
progress could be made by 2012, even if universal suffrage
was excluded. Since then, she has publicly challenged the
HKG and the democrats to work together. During a January 20
talk show appearance, Chan said she was prepared to accept
some compromise on universal suffrage in the near term (i.e.,
2012),if doing so could help forge a consensus for 2017 and

2020. She urged the HKG to listen sincerely to the views of
different sectors in Hong Kong, then produce a universal
suffrage proposal including a clear roadmap that would be
acceptable to all political parties. Lee worries that the
fragmented democratic side, encumbered by their continuing
distrust of the central government, might be unable to seize
this opportunity for universal suffrage. Cheung,
acknowledging the public's strong demand for universal
suffrage and its disappointment with the long timeframe set
by the NPCSC, has urged all parties to reach a "historical
compromise" and use 2012 as a "midway station," with a
broader electoral base for the CE Election Committee and an
increase in GC seats for Legco, on the way to full
democratization in 2017 and 2020.

Lack of Trust Impedes Compromise
--------------


24. (C) Successful resolution of the reform debate within the
NPCSC framework will require compromise, which in turn
depends upon a degree of mutual trust that does not presently
exist. In a recent radio broadcast, CE Tsang observed that
"political progress in Hong Kong is about building trust,"
which he said "takes much time and effort, and can be easily
shattered." The central government certainly does not trust
most of the pan-democratic leaders, some of whom still are
not allowed even to travel to the mainland. Beijing also may
be somewhat leery of CE Tsang and his team, most of whom were
trained by and worked for the British colonial

HONG KONG 00000213 007 OF 007


administration. The HKG, which is hampered by its own
limited political power base, does not trust many of the
pan-democrats, especially the radicals, whom it fears are
intent on blocking anything short of immediate full
democracy. The DAB, the LP, and the HKG, although they
cooperate on many issues including electoral reform,
constitute an uncomfortable alliance due to their
fundamentally different power bases and ideologies. The
pan-democrats do not trust the HKG, which they believe is at
best excessively bureaucratic and resistant to change, and at
worst completely subservient to the central government in
Beijing. Finally, the general public often views HKG
officials as arrogant, inaccessible and divorced from
reality. One recent study found that many people viewed
talking to officials like "talking to the wall."
Cunningham