BABIL'S SOI TRANSITION: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 HILLAH 000084

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/26/2018
TAGS: MARR PINS PGOV PINR IZ
SUBJECT: BABIL'S SOI TRANSITION: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

REF: HILLAH 79

HILLAH 00000084 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Kenneth M. hillas, PRT Leader, Babil PRT, Dept
of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (S) Summary: In meetings September 10-20 with Sons of Iraq
(SOI) leaders, tribal sheikhs, Iraqi Army and Police commanders,
local councilors, Babil Governor Salam, Provincial Council Chair
Messaoudi and PRT, EPRT and 4/3 ID Brigade leadership, leaders
in North Babil underscored potentially serious concerns about
the transition of the SOI program from Coalition Forces (CF) to
and Iraqi Army (IA) management. A perceived sectarian bias and
the disposition of approximately 500 current SOIs with active
arrest warrants - mostly Sunnis - highlight concerns with a
transition plan that continues to evolve. Recent events in
North Babil have contributed to a growing sense of unease among
Sunnis who were formerly active or passive supporters of Al
Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) or Jaish al Islami (JAI). The transition
process will require a degree of sensitivity and deftness that
provincial security and government leaders have not displayed to
date, but Babil has the advantage of following Baghdad in the
SOI transition process and may be able to gain from that
experience. In addition, PM Maliki has shown that he wants to
work with SOI leaders to make the transition a success. End
Summary.


2. (S) Following Prime Minister Maliki's August 28 announcement
of the GOI's intention to transition SOIs to IA management, the
PRT, EPRT and 4/3 ID brigade conducted intensive engagements
with Governor Salam, PC Chair Messaoudi, IA brigade and
battalion leaders, provincial and district Iraqi Police (IP)
commanders, North Babil local councilors, and SOI and tribal
leaders. As reported in reftel, the transition plan calls for
approximately twenty percent of North Babil's current 6,800 SOIs
to join the IA or IP, with the remainder absorbed into other
civilian GOI jobs. The IA leadership seemed caught off guard by
the announcement and, in the the last week of September, had
received little guidance from the MOD concerning transition
procedures, budgeting, organization or operational orders. The
transition process will include a careful vetting of current
SOIs against lists of individuals with active warrants. SOI and
tribal leaders believe as many as 500 SOIs have current arrest
warrants, many for terrorist activities dating back to 2004 and

2005. Babil Provincial Director of Police BG Fadhil Raddad has
said that SOIs with warrants will be arrested.


3. (S) The prospect of facing Iraqi justice is a significant
issue for Sunnis in North Babil. Many known to have actively or
passively supported AQI and JAI activities willingly joined the
SOIs. Local residents proclaim that they were lied to and
misled by AQI and there is a general recognition that the
boycott of the 2005 provincial elections was a major blunder. A
tacit understanding has emerged that those who agree to forego
insurgency will be allowed to participate in all aspects of
political and community life in North Babil without regard for
prior affiliations. As a result, the Nahiya Council and City
Leadership in Jurf as Sukr, Babil's only Sunni-majority Nahiya,
is peppered with reconciled suspected AQI and JAI members, and
many in the community are enthusiastic members of the SOIs. The
Nahiya, once home to intense anti-coalition and anti-GOI
insurgency, has enjoyed a period of calm for the past ten months
enabling IDPs to return and reconstruction efforts to flourish.
The arrest of these SOI members as part of the transition of the
program to IA management threatens to destabilize the area again.


4. (S) Jurf as Sukr SOI leader and suspected former JAI leader
Hedi Abbas Maki cited employment through the SOI program as well
as changes in the IA initiated by PM Maliki as significant
factors in the reconciliation of formerly active JAI members.
Meeting with the EPRT Leader and 4/3 brigade Commanding Officer
September 17, Maki repeated the request that as many SOIs as
possible be absorbed into the IA and IP. He also questioned the
need to disarm Sunni organizations given the widely perceived
presence of armed Badrist and Sadrist militias. Maki voiced
concern about sectarianism in the Iraqi justice system, claiming
that Sunnis in North Babil are targeted based on flimsy evidence
and secret informers. While crediting the dynamic local (Shia)
police chief with helping to restore order in North Babil, Maki
said there is no trust among Sunnis toward the IPs or IA. He
said that if the issue of the outstanding warrants 'is not dealt
with wisely there will be trouble.' The GOI has an active
warrant for Maki's arrest.


5. (S) Several recent events in North Babil have contributed to
a growing sense of unease among Sunnis. An August 30 combined
IP and IA operation, with CF overwatch, arrested 26 Sunni SOI
members with outstanding warrants. According to CF officers
present during some of the arrests, IPs from the provincial
capital were particularly rough on detainees and their families.
When 19 of the detainees were released shortly after the raid,
they described maltreatment by the IPs and were not permitted to

HILLAH 00000084 002.2 OF 002


retrieve their weapons which were retained by the police. In
addition, the guilty verdict and death sentence announced
September 18 against Fadilia Sunni SOI Ahmed Zaki for his role
in a terrorist killing of a dozen Shias in 2005 is perceived to
have been an unfair trial tainted by sectarianism. (Note: The
PRT has looked closely at this case and has found no basis for
questioning the judiciary's handling of this case, but
perceptions have their own reality.) Finally, disappointment
over anticipated IA and IP hiring of SOIs, more than 4,200 were
cleared for the IP and IA and have been awaiting word about
employment since early 2008, has bred cynicism about the GOI's
assurance that SOIs will receive government or ISF jobs.


6. (S) Implementation of the transition will largely fall to
second Battalion/31st IA commander COL Saeed. Generally
considered able, non-sectarian and effective by CF counterparts,
Saeed told the EPRT Leader that in the absence of guidance from
the MoD or Division leadership, he intends to treat SOIs like
regular IA soldiers with monthly pay and standing operational
orders. In fact, IA 31st brigade commander BG Abdul Ameer has
outlined a comprehensive implementation plan building on
relationships developed in recent months which partnered IA
company commanders with CF counterparts in organizing and paying
the SOIs. Saeed admitted that the November 1 transition target
date is ambitious. He is also aware of the concerns of current
SOIs and believes it is essential that CF counterparts play an
active role in the transition process. Saeed said that 'at
least AQI leaders and the worst criminals' should be arrested.
Saeed repeated prior concerns that his unit is short of
equipment, specifically citing vehicles-he has 21 and needs
37-as hampering his ability to effectively implement SOI
transition. Unlike some IP, COL Saeed's troops generally
received passing marks for their part in the August 30 raid.


7. (S) In meetings with Sunni and Shia SOI leaders in the
Musayyib, Khidr and Jurf as Sukr areas of North Babil, an
additional if unstated concern was control of the lucrative SOI
contracts. Typically, SOI leaders are responsible for staffing,
arming and managing SOI groups of 100-200, with each SOI earning
eight dollars per day. Paid monthly, CF paymasters disburse
$200 directly to each SOI and the remaining $40 per SOI to SOI
leaders. It is widely believed that SOIs kick back a further
amount to SOI leaders who thus end up collecting $4,000 -
$10,000 monthly thanks to the SOI program. SOI leaders have
voiced their concern that this lucrative arrangement will be
reduced or eliminated. CF believe the pending reduction in this
stipend may inspire SOI leaders to engineer 'attacks' in order
to demonstrate the necessity of maintaining the current SOI
management arrangement.


8. (S) With Provincial Iraqi Control of Babil expected before
November 1, the security challenges posed by SOI transition loom
large. Provincial leaders have not effectively engaged Sunni
SOI and community leaders in North Babil. In a meeting with
North Babil tribal leaders September 16 (reftel),and in a
security coordination meeting with the PRT, EPRT and Brigade
leadership September 20, the Governor, Provincial Council Chair,
and BG Fadhil (all ISCI or ISCI-friendly) reiterated their
intention to arrest SOIs with outstanding warrants. While
acknowledging the role of SOIs in establishing security, all
said that SOI leaders with arrest warrants would be arrested.


9. (S) Comment: While confirming the need for reconciliation,
Provincial leaders have not indicated that North Babil SOIs
merit leniency, nor have they shown a willingness to turn the
page on this chapter of the province's history. They have also
failed to leverage the relatively good relations built by the IA
with North Babil's Sunnis. If the GOI and Provincial Government
does not accommodate SOI concerns about arrest warrants, employ
many Sunnis in the ISF (and perhaps buy off their leadership),
and demonstrate a non-sectarian approach to dealing with
warrants and employment, Sunnis will perceive SOI transition as
an unacceptable marginalization. Given that the SOI are
believed to retain arms caches, there is a real potential for
the current peace to be disrupted.


10. (S) Comment Cont: There will no doubt be bumps in the road
as the SOI transition takes place in Babil, but the Iraqis here
will be able to draw upon experiences gained in Baghdad, which
will go first. In any event, SOI transition may take longer
than the current Iraqi timeline of November. CF efforts to get
the GOI to prepare for this process have started to bear fruit.
PM Maliki has issued an order not to arrest SOI leaders, and he
has met with SOI leaders to try to ease concerns. Not least of
all, Baghdad Operations Command plan to work side by side with
CF battle space commanders to oversee contract transition.
HILLAS