DAWA INSIDER DISCUSSES SOUTH-CENTRAL IRAQ POLITICAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HILLAH 000060

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/1/2018
TAGS: PGOV PINR IZ IR
SUBJECT: DAWA INSIDER DISCUSSES SOUTH-CENTRAL IRAQ POLITICAL
DYNAMICS

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CLASSIFIED BY: Kenneth M. Hillas, Babtil PRT Leader, Babil PRT,
State Dept.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) Summary: In a May 29 meeting, PM Maliki's Personal
Representative in the South-Central Region (and Babil Dawa
Chair),Ali Jabur Hassun (Abu Ahmed al-Basri),said that:

-- PM Maliki had obtained a pledge from Grand Ayatollah
al-Sistani not to support a specific party in the provincial
elections, from which Dawa believed it would benefit;
-- ISCI wanted to delay or cancel the provincial elections, and
Dawa was dissatisfied with ISCI's governance in the provinces;
-- Dawa will try to build on PM Maliki's strong popular support
to reach out to non-sectarian voters in the provinical election
campaigns, with half of Dawa candidates for the Babil Provincial
Council (PC) being non-party members;
-- Dawa hoped to win as much as one-third of the Babil PC seats
and that Abu Ahmed himself was under pressure from the PM to run
as a candidate in Babil;
-- Babil GEO (Governorate Election Office) Director Hussein abd
Ali Khalaif was linked to the Sadrist Trend and should be
removed;
-- he would contact the OMS (Office of the Martyr Sadr) Director
Sheik Saddiq to encourage him to open a dialogue with the PRT;
and
-- the release of key Sadrists, such as recently detained Sheik
Sabbah, would promote political reconciliation. End Summary.


2. (C) Just back from one of his regular meetings with the PM in
Baghdad, Babil Dawa Party Chair Ali Jabur Hassun (Abu Ahmed
al-Basri) spent two hours with the PRT Leader discussing the
political situation in the South-Central region, focusing mostly
on Babil. He predicted that the provincial election will have a
direct effect on the 2009 national parliamentary elections. He
asserted that most of the opportunistic, incompetent and corrupt
politicians had been exposed over the last three years and that
ISCI stood the most to lose in the provincial vote. He praised
U.S. willingness to step back and let IHEC run the election with
UNAMI assistance. While the GEOs would have more independence
than in 2005, he had doubts about Babil GEO Director Hussein,
whom he accused of favoring of the Sadrist Trend. Abu Ahmed
repeatedly stressed the need to remove Mr. Hussein, but leveled
no specific complaints of misconduct. (Comment: This is the
first allegation we have heard that Hussein is affiliated with
the Sadrists and biased toward OMS. It is possible that Abu
Ahmed thought that by levelling this accusation, he could get
the US to seek the replacement of the GEO Director, opening the
door for someone ready to cooperate with Dawa. End Comment)


3. (C) Abu Ahmed was very satisfied with the PM's meeting last
weekend in Najaf with Grand Ayatollah Sistani. He said that
Sistani had pledged not to endorse any political party during
the provincial election campaign. ( Note: Sistani subsequently
issued a statement to this effect.) Abu Ahmed said Dawa
believed it would be the principal beneficiary of Sistani's
decision. Dawa planned to invest in publicizing this message to
the Iraqi public "so that other poltical parties will not try to
exploit Sistani," as was done in the 2005 COR elections, in
which ISCI was seen as having Sistani support.


4. (C) Abu Ahmed described the Dawa strategy for the
provincial elections as aimed at building on Maliki's popular
support, claiming that Maliki's popularity had nearly doubled
over the last two months to reach 70%, and that Maliki was
viewed as a non-sectarian leader representing the country's
interests, capable of restoring public order and not corrupt.
These were the themes that Dawa would stress in the provincial
elections. To give this meaning, Abu Ahmed said that 17 of 32
of Dawa's canidates for the Babil PC were non-party members.
Although there are no Sunnis on the Dawa slate, he made clear
that the goal was to have Dawa's candidates seen as non-partisan
and competent. He said that he himself was under pressure from
the Dawa national leadership, including the PM, to stand as a
candidate for the PC. He was giving this consideration, since
the next PC would have increased powers. Abu Ahmed added that
Dawa's leaders at all levels are dissatisfied with ISCI's
governing style. He accused ISCI of trying to marginalize Dawa,
and said that in the provinces it controls, ISCI forces
incompentent and corrupt persons into Director and Director
General (DG) positions, placing loyalty above qualifications.
He added that Governor Salim al-Muslmawi tries to micro-manage
all provincial officials for his own gain. (Comment: This
tracks with the remarks of many other Babil observers. End
Comment.) Abu Ahmed was rather optimistic about Dawa's
prospects in Babil, assessing that Dawa could win of one-third
of the PC's 32 seats, which would certainly put Dawa in the
driver's seat in Babil.


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5. (C) Turning to the issue of the Sadrist role in the upcoming
elections, Abu Ahmed said the Government stood solidly behind PM
Maliki's decision that Jaysh Al-Mahdi (JAM) would have to
disband as a miltia and lay down its heavy weapons if OMS was to
be able to participate as a party in the elections. He
acknowledged that many OMS officials were nontheless registering
independent political entities that could run as OMS surrogates.
He expressed his support for the PRT's efforts to reach out to
the Sadrist Trend to establish a dialogue and urged the CF to
release "moderate" Sadrist detainees to promote political
reconciliation. He specifically named a recently detained
Sadrist, Sheik Sabbah, as an example. The PRT Leader said that
he would not seek Sheik Sabbah's release at this time, but that
if a dialogue with the Sadrists advanced poltical
reconciliation, the opportunities for detainee releases would
grow.


6. (C) Abu Ahmed voiced suspicions that ISCI is seeking to
"quash the provincial elections," or to at least delay them
until early in 2009. He said ISCI fears losing control of
several provinces in the south-central region. He predicted
that ISCI would fail in this effort, because the public pressure
is overwhelming.
HILLAS