Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08HILLAH53
2008-05-08 12:09:00
SECRET
REO Hillah
Cable title:  

BABIL AND THE POLITICS OF SECURITY

Tags:  PGOV PTER PINR IZ IR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8474
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHIHL #0053/01 1291209
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 081209Z MAY 08
FM REO HILLAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1080
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHIHL/REO HILLAH 1146
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 HILLAH 000053 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/8/2018
TAGS: PGOV PTER PINR IZ IR
SUBJECT: BABIL AND THE POLITICS OF SECURITY

REF: (A) HILLAH 29; (B) 2007 HILLAH 169 (C) BAGHDAD 43; (D) 2007 HILLAH 176; (E) 2007 HILLAH 139

HILLAH 00000053 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Kenneth M. Hillas, Team Leader, PRT Babil,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 HILLAH 000053

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/8/2018
TAGS: PGOV PTER PINR IZ IR
SUBJECT: BABIL AND THE POLITICS OF SECURITY

REF: (A) HILLAH 29; (B) 2007 HILLAH 169 (C) BAGHDAD 43; (D) 2007 HILLAH 176; (E) 2007 HILLAH 139

HILLAH 00000053 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Kenneth M. Hillas, Team Leader, PRT Babil,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (U) This is a PRT Babil cable.


2. (C) SUMMARY: The ISF emerged from the late March clashes
with Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) with a renewed sense of strength,
demonstrating an ability to better coordinate IP and IA actions.
It has not been able, however, to build on that success,
largely due to the Governor prioritizing political control over
enhancement of the ISF's capabilities. The political neutrality
of the ISF is threatened, and the few strong ISF commanders
increasingly feel targeted for removal or elimination. Iranian
intelligence infiltration of the ISF in recent months - promoted
by the Governor - poses a serious challenge. Together with
continued shortfalls in equipment and manning and with the
potential for ISCI/Badr and Dawa to pack two new IP Battalions
with their personnel, the transition to PIC faces real problems.
END SUMMARY.


3. (C) The ISF conducted itself fairly well in the March 25-30
clashes around the province (Hillah, Hashimiya, Hamza and Kifl)
with JAM partisans, although the presence or proximity of U.S.
forces probably played a key role in stiffening ISF resolve.
The IP and IA showed an improved ability to coordinate their
actions, and the ISF emerged from this test with a sense of
renewed strength and increased public support. (Ref A) That
support, however, was not matched by the province's political
leadership. There is a rising sense of dissatisfaction within
the ISF's ranks with its leadership, which is viewed - with a
notable exception - as weak or politically controlled by the
Governor.

ISCI's Iran Ties
--------------


4. (S) Despite the fact that in recent weeks the public has
become much more aware and critical of Iran's role in promoting
instability through funding, training and arming of JAM and
other criminal groups, there has been virtually no effort to
address Iranian influence on the ISF. The IP Director of
Intelligence, a high-ranking Badr leader, COL Majid al-Shimmary

(Abu Ahmad al-Shayabani),is known to have ties to Iranian
intelligence, as is Abu Muhammad al-Issawi, Babil's Deputy ISCI
party leader. Majid's profile and power increased significantly
after the assassination of then PDOP Gen Qais Hamza Abud
al-Mamuri in December 2007, who had previously limited the
intelligence department's authority. (Ref B) Indeed, Col Majid
may well have had a direct hand in Qais' murder. (Ref C)
Another known Iranian agent of influence is the Governor's
personal advisor, LTC Thamir Ghazala (Abu Huda). Both these
individuals are in positions that allow them to exercise a
malignant influence on ISF commanders.

How the ISF Is Kept Under Wraps
--------------


5. (C) The Governor and his ISCI/Badr surrogates have succeeded
in recent months in subordinating the ISF. His tools have been
intimidation, dependency, elimination and micro-management. BG
Abd al-Amir, who was a strong and politically independent IA
commander, seems domesticated by comparison and no longer
willing to resist the Governor's directives. The change can be
dated to the December assassination of PDOP Qais.


6. (S) MG Fadhil Raddad, on the other hand, whose nomination and
appointment as PDOP is embroiled in controversy, has not been
officially recognized by the Provincial Council (PC). (Ref D)
Fired as PDOP two years ago for incompetency and never renowned
as a strong leader, he has met expectations as a weak and
dependent IP commander. Independent journalist Ali al-Rubai was
in police headquarters during the initial clashes on March 25.
He reported that Fadhil did not give orders when needed; that he
responded slowly if at all; and that he refused to talk to the
press because he "had nothing to add to the governor's remarks."
Moreover, none of the PRT's contacts attribute the ISF success
to Fadhil's leadership or operational prowess. Deputy
Provincial Council Chairman Dr. Na'amah Jasim said that the
current peace is only because Sadr is in a "state of
recalculation."


7. (C) Fadhil has been a tool of the Governor in reducing the
independence of SWAT Commander Abbas, who technically is a part
of the IP but has always had a great deal of independence
because of the effectiveness of his forces, which have been
trained and equipped by the CF. Abbas now believes he is being
targeted for removal or, like Qais, elimination. In recognition
of the solid performance of two of Babil's SWAT companies under

HILLAH 00000053 002.2 OF 003


Abbas' command in the Basrah fighting in early April, the
Minister of Interior has put SWAT under his direct command,
according to Abbas, who sees this as a mixed blessing.


8. (S) During the late March clashes with JAM, Governor Salam
Salih Mahdi al-Muslimawi directly managed ISF operations in the
province. However, he was not suited to the role. At the first
sign of trouble - even before the onset of any real fighting -
the Governor called the PRT seeking "American air cover" to save
his home town of Kifl from a JAM "uprising." His panicked
reaction to events throughout the week was reflected in his
efforts to micro-manage operations, at times creating
coordination problems with the CF.


9. (C) When it was not the Governor, it was Provincial Council
Chairman Muhammad Ali Hussayn al-Massudi (PCC) calling the PRT
with frantic requests for air support, weapons, and vehicles.
According to the PCC, the ISF were out-gunned, out-numbered, and
lacked the vehicles to quickly move forces from one part of the
province to the next. The latter was in fact true, but the
PDOP's response to this has been to try to take newly provided
MOI vehicles away from SWAT, one of the most effective combat
forces in the province. The Governor and PDOP want to weaken
Abbas, and have proven incapable of communicating their own
needs to MOI.


10. (S) A man with a fifth grade education and little natural
intelligence, Governor Salam's influence over the ISF appears to
have only grown in the wake of the clashes. It was made
abundantly clear in late March that the IP in the south (Hamza,
Hashamiyah, Kifl and Qasim) were heavily infiltrated by militias
and incapable of handling the limited militia threat. One of
the lessons the Governor drew from the experience was that he
needed to fill the ISF with politically reliable cadres - and he
has embarked on that path. According to several PRT sources
including Abbas, Deputy PDOP BG Faris, and IP Brigades
Operational Commander BG Abd al-Rahman Thayaban Mirza, the
Governor and Dawa provincial party leader Abu Ahmed al-Basri are
in the process of dividing up the positions to be filled in
creating two new IP battalions that have been authorized by the
MOI. Currently, the only way to enter a Babil IP Academy class
is with the signature of either Abu Ahmad or Abu Muhammad, the
Dawa and ISCI party leaderships respectively, on your
application.

DAWA and ISCI Differences
--------------


11. (C) Notable differences remain between provincial Dawa and
ISCI leaders regarding how to deal with OMS/JAM and Iran. While
repudiating JAM and supporting Maliki's call for militias to lay
down their arms, the governor surrounds himself with many who
have known ties to Iranian intelligence. Moreover, COL Majid
was allowed to emplace his men at checkpoints on the eastern
border of the province during the late-March fighting, despite
his ties to Sayid al-Shuhada (Office of the Lord of the
Martyrs). Na'amah has made clear to us his concern over the ties
that the Governor and his cronies have with Iran, which Na'amah
recognizes as working against Iraq's interests.


12. (SBU) The IP's weak leadership and the possible outflow of
criminal elements from Baghdad as a result of pressure there,
may have contributed to a string of targeted abductions and
robberies in Babil linked to the IP. On April 10, Dr. Muhammad
al-Ta'i, a prominent surgeon and teacher, was abducted from his
home by men in police uniforms, driving police vehicles, and
eventually released for USD 120,000 in ransom. On April 17,
Babil University Professor Dr. Sa'ad's home was broken into by
men in police uniforms who took money and gold before driving
off in police vehicles. Dr. Sa'ad told the PRT that he
immediately called Fadhil to inform him of the incident, but
that the PDOP seemed disinterested and unaffected by the crime.

Ready for PIC?
--------------


13. (C) The ISF and provincial leaderships' shortcomings pose a
challenge for transitioning to PIC. In September 2007 the
Governor was provided a laundry list of needs prior to the
province accepting control of the security portfolio. (Ref E)
The list included completion of the Joint Operations Center and
complete formation and outfitting of the provincial IP. There
has been minimal progress in these areas.


14. (C) BG Abd al-Rahman argued that without proper border
security or any aerial reconnaissance assets Iran poses a
significant problem to Babil. Governance Center Security
Director Colonel Fadhil Ali echoed these concerns, telling us
that there is no provincial border security and weapons come
flooding into the province from Iran without any restraints.
The fact that the Governor replaced the Hashamiyah IP Chief with
a Badr member, and that COL Majid has taken control of staffing

HILLAH 00000053 003.2 OF 003


the eastern provincial checkpoints, compounds this problem. COL
Fadhil gloomily predicts that within two years all the IP will
be affiliated with Iran. There are politicians who share these
concerns. Even some politicians with pro-Sadrist leanings, such
as Provincial Council member Murtada Kamal, agree that Babil is
not yet ready to take over the security file.
HILLAS