SECURITY SITUATION IN KARBALA: MALIKI - 1 SADR - 0

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 HILLAH 000039

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/6/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: SECURITY SITUATION IN KARBALA: MALIKI - 1 SADR - 0

REF: HILLAH 00034

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CLASSIFIED BY: Donald J. Cooke, Team Leader, PRT KARBALA, DoS.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




CLASSIFIED BY: Donald J. Cooke, Team Leader, PRT KARBALA, DoS.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (U) This is a PRT Karbala reporting cable


2. (C) SUMMARY: Maliki and his supporters in the provincial
government were the clear winners in the latest clashes between
insurgents and the government in Karbala. Government forces
continued effective operations against JAM that had started
before the government's moves into Basra and Baghdad. The
unique political make-up of the province and recent events,
including the recent bombing in Karbala City, combined with
effective action by the government increased government support
and decreased sympathy for the militants. These events only
emphasize the importance of moving a fully-staffed PRT into
Karbala Province as soon as feasible. END SUMMARY


3. (C) Karbala is a PIC province with a Dawa governor (Dr.
Aqueel Khazali). Security forces are effective and led by the
politically reliable commander of the Karbala Operations Center,
Iraqi Police Maj. Gen. Ra'ad. Both the governor and Ra'ad have
ties to and the support of PM Maliki, in what the PM tends to
think of as his "home" province. The Provincial Council,
chaired by the nominally-independent Yassiry, is divided among a
number of parties where no one group appears to have effective
control. Home to the Hussein Shrine, the province, while not
off-limits to violence, has not seen widespread insurgent action
since the security crackdown during Shabaniyah last August. One
reason for the lower level of activity is the understanding by
most insurgents that popular support for them could wane if they
cause trouble in the Holy Province. PRT Karbala noticed a large
populace backlash against militias after Shabaniyah which has
made it difficult for militia operatives to work in the province.


4. (C) The province's Emergency Response Unit (ERU) is led by
recently-promoted Lt. Col. Ali. In the run-up to the
government's assaults in Baghdad and Basra, Ali has been
spearheading a concerted effort against insurgents and Special
Group (SG). A measure of Ali's effectiveness in the previous
year is that he has been the subject of at least one, and
possibly two, assassination attempts in the last month. The SGC
(and Sadrists in general) resent Ali's actions; they consider
them a violation of the cease-fire with the government and
believe (perhaps correctly) they are politically motivated in
the run-up to October elections. In that vein, Karbala
Provincial Government officials do not publicly refer to the
insurgents as Sadrists, JAM or even militias, using less
political terms like gunmen, armed groups or assassins. We
believe this to be a clear attempt to depoliticize, or at least
give the appearance of depoliticizing, actions against militias.
In private, these same officials make no secret of their belief
that these insurgents are supporters of or sympathizers with
Sadr.


5. (S) A further part of the backdrop occurred on March 17,
when a bomb exploded in a cafi near the Hussein Shrine, killing
over 50 people and wounding scores more. While various
scenarios have been put forth (reftel),the one undisputed
conclusion is that this bombing was condemned by all and was a
blow to Sadrist interests in the province. It is noteworthy
that no one has claimed "credit" for the blast and most people
blame Sadrist sympathizers. Comment: MG Ra'ad arrested 100
people after the bombing and cases against 10 will apparently
move forward. End Comment.


6. (S) MG Ra'ad had, in fact, used the backdrop of the bombing
to press libel charges against his nemesis, Abdul - Hadi
Al-Mohammadawi, OMS director in its Karbala office. At the time
of the assaults in Baghdad and Basrah, MG Ra'ad claims he had a
request in to the Ministry of the Interior for an additional
1500 police in order to arrest Abdul - Hadi Al-Mohammadawi.
Instead of getting his 1500 police reinforcements, MG Ra'ad and
LTC Ali were ordered to Basra with 1500 police and 450 Iraqi
Army soldiers to reinforce government operations there. (MG
Ra'ad has subsequently tried to execute the warrant, but
Mohammadawi has fled to Najaf).


7. (S) Feeling intensely frustrated at the state of events,
and seeing MG Ra'ad and LTC Ali's departure as an opportunity,
JAM/SGC lost no time taking advantage of Sadr's purported
statement legitimizing actions "in self-defense" and raising the
level of violence and attacks against government targets. While
they may have been part of a larger JAM effort, we believe these

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actions were taken locally without central orchestration and
were largely ineffective. In fact, what the JAM/SGC failed to
count on was the decisive action taken by acting KOC commander
Emad in cordoning off and dealing with JAM/SGC neighborhoods.
The police used curfews, cordons and arrests to disrupt
insurgent action. The pace of IP actions picked up after the
return of MG Ra'ad, LTC Ali and their 1500 men.


8. (S) In one action north of Karbala city in the town of
Hussaniyah, close to the 4/8 IA Infantry Division, insurgents
being driven out of Karbala attacked a police checkpoint with
small arms fire. IA forces quickly reinforced the checkpoint
and defeated the attackers. The IA then remained the rest of
the night with the IP officers to secure the check point and to
show joint cooperation. IA officers described this as a
successful practical test of joint exercises that they had
undertaken with the IP. The credit for this IA/IP interactivity
goes to the 840 MiTT team who has worked hard to integrate many
of the command functions and operations. It was very clear at
the onset that this type of integration training has paid. As
far as we can determine, there were no defections from the ISF
and all IP checkpoints held.


9. (C) Provincial officials were acutely concerned that
transportation disruptions and curfews were limiting normal life
and preventing people from obtaining access to food, etc. They
were concerned they would pay a political price for the
hardships. The prevailing public attitude, however, especially
in the city center and northern parts of the province, was that
the JAM/SGC and Sadrist sympathizers were responsible for the
problems and that it was time for the government to take action
against them. The fact that the ISF was seen as effective in
dealing with these groups only enhanced support for the
government. While we have heard that many people believe they
lost some of their freedoms with respect to lack of movements
and curfew, almost all welcomed the crackdown.


10. (S) Christened by MG Ra'ad as Operation Knight's Defense
(Playing off the name used in Basrah Operation),the IP ran
cordon and search operations concentrating in the southern
neighborhoods of Karbala City where insurgent activity was most
prevalent. While lacking some of the finesse that we would
associate with coalition forces, ISF was, nonetheless,
effective. The one criticism of the operation that was brought
to our attention was the belief that MG Ra'ad's ISF was not
showing sufficient concern for human rights. We understand that
this criticism of MG Ra'ad has become a point of contention
between PM Maliki, Governor Aqueel and MG Ra'ad. Apparently
feeling substantial political heat, the PM has asked Gov. Aqueel
to intervene with MG Ra'ad so that he will only arrest people
who have committed crimes or who take up arms against the ISF.
Gov. Aqueel responded that MG Ra'ad was refusing to take
direction from him and that Maliki would have to approach him
directly. Comment: The relation between Ra'ad and Aqueel has
been strained, both have national ambitions. For the time being
they need each other and we expect this rift to be temporary.
End Comment.


11. (S) In a discussion of the security situation with the
Karbala Team Leader, PC Chair Yassiry raised the issue of human
rights. Without mentioning any names, he came down clearly on
the side of MG Ra'ad saying that in the fight against
terrorists, accusations of human rights abuses were to be
expected. PCC Yassiry also said that he had been touring the
province with the press and that the public supported the ISF's
actions against the insurgents. He also made a disparaging
comparison with Najaf Province, where government officials were
in discussion with Sadrists, saying that in Karbala, "We don't
negotiate with terrorists." When asked about Iranian influence,
PCC Yassiry twice deflected the question saying that all of
Iraq's neighbors are interfering in Iraq to promote their own
interests.


12. Comment: In the final analysis, the recent government
actions in Basra and Baghdad gave both the Karbala Provincial
Government and local Sadrists an opportunity to demonstrate
their strength. In Karbala, this first round goes to the
government. The Sadrists demonstrated that they can cause
disruptions, but little more. The government intensified
harassment and raids against insurgents. We expect those raids
to continue. IP and IA forces demonstrated over the last year
that they can work together under the command of the Karbala
Operations Center. Given the sphere of influence and projection
of security forces throughout Karbala city and surrounding areas
we believe the Karbala "Green Zone" has expanded. Government
supporters control the shrines and the fees that are collected
there. There are indications that the public has been
traumatized by the ISF's heavy handed tactics. ISF tactics of
mass arrests, curfews, and neighborhood raids while effective
are not without substantial political and economic cost. Public

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fear that future OMS incitements could lead to a repeat of those
ISF tactics might well provide OMS with a degree of leverage in
future dealings with PM Maliki and even elicit a degree of
sympathy for non-violent OMS followers that could benefit their
efforts in the upcoming provincial elections. Round two is the
fight for hearts and minds and superior military power does not
guarantee success. It will be interesting to see if ISF and
provincial officials are capable of broader counter-insurgency
strategy.


13. (C) Comment Continued: The current situation provided a
timely opportunity for the Karbala PRT. Continued support for
the government depends on our support for economic development
and good governance. We will also be working to increase
professionalism and respect for the rule of law in the ISF.
This may be our chance to open a dialogue with more moderate
Sadr supporters. The PRT looks forward to pushing out into the
province to continue this important work. End Comment.
COOKE