A DAWA PARTY DIVIDED ON ENGAGING OMS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HILLAH 000035

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/31/2018
TAGS: PGOV IZ PINR
SUBJECT: A DAWA PARTY DIVIDED ON ENGAGING OMS

REF: HILLAH 00027; HILLAH 00029

HILLAH 00000035 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Kenneth M. Hillas, Team Leader, PRT Babil,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (U) This is a PRT Babil cable.


2. (C) SUMMARY: Efforts by Babil officials to establish a
direct dialogue with the Sadrist Trend in the province in order
to overcome the recent security crisis have been stymied by
Governor Salam's (and ISCI's) reluctance, by divisions within
Dawa and by the Najaf OMS leadership. Events, however, have
highlighted differences between ISCI and Dawa regarding
engagement of Sadrists - and perhaps even within Dawa. END
SUMMARY.


3. (C) Since the start of violent clashes between Jaysh al-Mahdi
(JAM) militias and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) began in Babil on
March 25 (see reftels),fitful efforts by both sides to
establish a channel of negotiation have proven unsuccessful. A
Sadrist effort to open an indirect channel of negotiation on
March 28 was rebuked by the Babil Governor Salam, and a
subsequent effort to restart talks led by Dawa provincial party
chief Abu Ahmad Al-Basri was shut down by the Office of Martyr
al-Sadr (OMS) leadership in Najaf, according to Abu Ahmad.


4. (C) The first attempt was initiated by a delegation of tribal
shaykhs from al-Qasim offering to act as an intermediary in
negotiating a peaceful resolution. They brought a list of
demands from the OMS office in Babil to the Governing Council
(GC),but Governor Salam Salah al-Mahdi al-Muslimawi and
Provincial Council Chair Muhammad ali Hussayn al-Massudi refused
to receive the shaykhs to hold even indirect talks with the
"band of criminals." However, a group of authorized
representatives, including Abu Ahmad, Deputy Provincial Council
Chairman Dr. Na'amah Jasim (Dawa),and Abu Muhammad al-Issawi
(ISCI),met with the shaykhs for nearly two hours. The shaykhs
conveyed OMS/JAM conditions for a ceasefire. These included: 1)
that ISF stop raids targeting Sadr elements; 2) the release of
Sadr affiliated detainees; 3) assurances that all crimes would
be adjudicated through the judiciary without any political
influence; and 4) a guarantee to keep Iraqi Army elements
outside of the cities.


5. (C) The GC representatives refused the demands and countered
with its own, insisting that JAM hand over all its weapons
immediately and turn in the criminals who killed ISF guards
outside the Hamza and Hashamiyah IP stations. The OMS was given
72 hours to accept the GC's terms for a ceasefire. Within a few
hours of the meeting's conclusion, the OMS head in Babil was on
al-Furatayn Radio denying the meeting ever took place. The
leadership in Najaf then informed the Hillah Sadrist leadership
that, "Hillah is not allowed to speak for the Sadr Current,"
putting an end to efforts to start talks.


6. (C) Governor Salam's reluctance to engage even moderate
Sadrists was on display during a March 26 meeting of ranking
provincial political and security officials, chaired by the
Governor, that included Provincial Council Chairman Muhammad
(independent),Deputy Provincial Council Chairman (DPCC) Na'amah
(Dawa),and Abu Ahmad. At that meeting attended by the PRT, the
Governor deflected questions about possible dialogue with
Sadrist moderates. He instead turned to DPCC Na'amah, who,
unlike the Governor, was rather supportive of the Sadr
engagement concept.


7. (C) The DPCC's sentiments were also echoed March 30 in a
meeting with the PRT by the newly confirmed Hillah Mayor Sabah
al-Fatlawi (independent) and the Hillah District Council
Chairman (DCC) Hussayn ali al-Tufali (independent with Sadrist
leanings). The DCC, a political independent and resident of the
heavily Sadr-influenced al-Thawra neighborhood endorsed
engagement of Sadr moderates. He said that, "We need to get
Sadr to use his influence the right way." He and the Mayor
agreed that the violence throughout south/central Iraq required
a political, and not a military solution - one that could only
be achieved through dialogue.


8. (C) Hours before Muqtada al-Sadr's March 30 call for a truce,
Abu Ahmad recognized a schism within Dawa. On one hand was
Maliki's insistence on controlling any ceasefire negotiations
with OMS. On the other was Dawa Party spokesman Ibrahim
al-Jaafari's encouragement for a direct dialogue between the
Babil GC representatives and the OMS Najaf leadership. Choosing
to follow the advice of Jaafari over Maliki, Abu Ahmad, DPCC
Na'amah, and Abu Muhammad were hoping to open a dialogue with
Najaf in the coming weeks.


9. (C) COMMENT: The week of violence involving OMS/JAM occurred
in the pre-election period - a fact noted by nearly all our

HILLAH 00000035 002.2 OF 002


interlocutors - and it has highlighted significant differences
in Babil between ISCI and Dawa on the question of dealing with
the Sadr Trend. Abu Ahmad's remarks about Jaafari encouraging
local engagement despite PM Maliki's views, suggest tactical
differences even within Dawa.
HILLAS