Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08HILLAH12
2008-01-26 08:54:00
CONFIDENTIAL
REO Hillah
Cable title:  

KARBALA GOVERNOR AQEEL DISCUSSES PROVINCIAL SITUATION

Tags:  IZ PGOV 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHIHL #0012/01 0260854
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P 260854Z JAN 08
FM REO HILLAH
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INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHIHL/REO HILLAH
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HILLAH 000012 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/26/2018
TAGS: IZ PGOV
SUBJECT: KARBALA GOVERNOR AQEEL DISCUSSES PROVINCIAL SITUATION

REF: HILLAH 0000010

HILLAH 00000012 001.2 OF 002


Classified by PRT Leader Angus T. Simmons by reason 1.4(b) and
(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HILLAH 000012

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/26/2018
TAGS: IZ PGOV
SUBJECT: KARBALA GOVERNOR AQEEL DISCUSSES PROVINCIAL SITUATION

REF: HILLAH 0000010

HILLAH 00000012 001.2 OF 002


Classified by PRT Leader Angus T. Simmons by reason 1.4(b) and
(d).


1. (U) This is a PRT Karbala Cable.


2. (SBU) Summary: On January 21, 2008, BG Cardon, 3ID DCS,
members of his staff, PRT Leader and PRToffs met with the
Karbala Provincial Governor and the Provincial Chief of Police
(PCOP) for a general discussion regarding events in Karbala
Province. A key topic of discussion with the Governor was his
recent meeting with representatives of the Office of Muqtada
al-Sadr (OMS) to discuss conditions for an open dialogue with
OMS. The Governor described the substance of those discussions
with the Sadrists. He also mentioned for the first time to the
PRT Leader his strong interest in a south central Iraq regional
airport project (Central Euphrates Airport Project). End
Summary.


3. (C ) On January 21, 2008, BG Cardon, members of BG Cardon's
staff, PRT Leader and PRToffs met at FOB Huseiniyah with Karbala
Provincial Chief of Police, BG(P) Ra'ad Shaker and Provincial
Governor Aqeel Ghazali. Much of the discussion concerned
Karbala's recent success in handling over two million visitors
(Septel) over the Ashura period.


4. (C) PRT Leader mentioned to Governor Aqeel that the PRT
Leader had read a press account of talks between the Governor
and OMS that reported resulted in a 19 point agreement between
the attendees of that meeting. The Governor stated that he had
attended such a meeting but said there had been no written 19
point agreement. He said the purpose of the meeting was to
encourage a principle of open doors for dialogue on any matters
within the law and the constitution. Governor Aqeel stated that
the central government encourages dialogue that promotes
cooperation at all levels. He said that he has attended a few
meetings with representatives of OMS to both demonstrate
willingness towards cooperation and to explore a framework for
cooperation. The Governor said the parties discussed as
preconditions to further dialogue that: (1.) OMS must accept
that the government will move equally against all groups that
have unlawful intentions. (2.) There would be no discussions
regarding detainees or the removal of persons from lists of

persons wanted by the government. (3.) The Governor must
receive a written letter of authorization by Muqtada al-Sadr for
any persons claiming to negotiate on behalf of OMS before he
would sign any agreement with the group. (4.) Sadrists would
not carry weapons openly. (5.) OMS must not operate any sharia
courts. (6.) OMS would not make any announcements intended to
inflame or incite the people. According to Governor Aqeel, the
meeting lasted for four hours. He said the OMS representative,
Sheik Hamed Alawi, called the Governor stubborn but the OMS
reaction appeared positive. The Governor reports that these
matters have now been submitted to all parties for further
discussion. The Governor cautioned that there are rogue
elements of JAM who will not be controlled by any agreement with
OMS. Team Leader noted that it was positive to dialogue with
all groups that accepted the Iraqi Constitution and the rule of
law and asked in a quiet aside whether it would be helpful for
him to meet with the Sadrists as well. Governor Aqeel responded
that he did not think they would be willing to meet with USG
representatives.


5. (C ) Team Leader then asked about the status of the
(Sadrist) Deputy Governor Hasnawi and other PC members who were
apparently under Karbala arrest warrants for terrorist
activities but were sometimes quoted in the Baghdad press
claiming charges against them were politically motivated and
running around trying to have their indictments quashed. The
Governor said the Karbala warrants were valid in Karbala but had
no jurisdiction in Baghdad. He said these individuals are
probably hiding out in COR members houses. Governor Aqeel said
they could not return to Karbala and the PC would soon vote to
replace them.


6. (C ) Governor Aqeel raised for the first time in a meeting
with PRToffs Karbala's his interest in the Central Euphrates
airport project which would be based in Karbala and serve
south-central Iraq. Governor Aqeel is clearly feels concerned
that the Najaf project could impact on his hopes for the future
Central Euphrates International airport project and called the
Najaf Airport an "illegal" airport project. Team Leader
acknowledged that PRT is working with the Najaf and GOI
authorities to ensure that the project is an ICAO compliant
airport. He also noted that he had heard about the Central
Euphrates airport project from newspaper articles but had never
once been briefed about the project by any Karbala official (and
did not even learn for certain where it would be located). Team
Leader noted that the Najaf airport could be made operational
relatively quickly, but it was his understanding that the green
field Central Euphrates Airport project would likely take a
number of years to bring on line. However, he welcomed a
briefing from provincial authorities about the project.


HILLAH 00000012 002.2 OF 002



7. Comment: Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the
Governor's discussions with the Sadrists is that those
discussions were apparently initiated with the encouragement of
the central government. It would appear the Central Government
is pleased to have provincial officials carry out negotiations
to reconcile with those Sadrists who are willing to act within
the frame of the Iraqi Constitution and the rule of law. The
Provincial Governor's demand for written authorization to
negotiate, signed by Muqtada al-Sadr, could also indicate that
the national government is simply weary of trying to negotiate a
deal with a group that speaks with too many voices.
SIMMONS