Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08HAVANA852
2008-11-06 16:08:00
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
Cable title:  

U.S. ELECTIONS GENERATE INTENSE INTEREST IN CUBA

Tags:  PGOV PREL SOCI PINR EAID CU 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHUB #0852/01 3111608
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FM USINT HAVANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3858
INFO RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L HAVANA 000852 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL SOCI PINR EAID CU
SUBJECT: U.S. ELECTIONS GENERATE INTENSE INTEREST IN CUBA

Classified By: COM Jonathan Farrar for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L HAVANA 000852

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL SOCI PINR EAID CU
SUBJECT: U.S. ELECTIONS GENERATE INTENSE INTEREST IN CUBA

Classified By: COM Jonathan Farrar for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: As with many things about the U.S., Cubans
were captivated by the U.S. election process this year. Even
official media devoted significant time and space to covering
the primary and final elections (until the final election
itself was over that is). USINT hosted an election night
event that attracted 200 people including civil society
members, international press, the diplomatic corps and U.S.
students studying in Cuba (and pointedly was boycotted by
Cuban officials). Cubans held distinct views about who they
thought should win: anecdotal evidence and a straw poll taken
at the election night revealed mixed opinions. However, in
the end, civil society groups are already pointing to the
election of Barack Obama as a guide for Cuba itself. If such
historic change is possible in the U.S., they argue, it
should be possible in Cuba where it is needed even more.
Official reaction to the election results has been muted so
far, but will likely develop quickly as the GOC makes up its
mind and seeks to set forth its position before a new
administration can develop a response. End Summary


2. (C) Cuban contacts in the academic/intellectual community
often tell us that they believe Cubans are more like
Americans than any other nationality in the hemisphere, and
that because of this when relations improve, ties will be
renewed quickly across a wide range of social, religious,
commercial, athletic, and cultural areas. Because of
connections maintained with family members in the U.S. and
access to pirated media from U.S. sources, Cubans follow
developments in the U.S. every bit as closely, and sometimes
more closely, than do U.S. citizens themselves. The historic
presidential election of 2008 was no exception to this.
Cubans were beside themselves with anticipation about what
might transpire on November 4.


3. (C) Somewhat surprisingly, the official media covered the
primary and final election processes quite closely, if not in
a fair and balanced way. Official propaganda about why the

candidacy of Barack Obama would never get off the ground had
to be modified constantly to keep up with developments in the
U.S. Still, some of the official analysis, especially that
done by former CUBINT chief Ramon Sanchez Parodi, was as good
as any being published in op-ed sections of U.S. newspapers.
Nevertheless, in spite of banner headlines in Granma and
Juventud Rebelde announcing the elections on the morning of
November 4, the results were relegated to page 5 (of an 8
page newspaper) on November 5, and had virtually disappeared
by November 6.


4. (C) In this atmosphere of anticipation, USINT hosted an
Election Night event at the Chief of Mission Residence (COMR)
and invited nearly 400 guests including members of the
diplomatic corps; the international press; religious leaders;
artists;, a broad range of Cuban civil society members
including independent journalists and librarians; and a
significant number of official Cubans, including staff from
the foreign ministry (MINREX) and academics from universities
and officially sanctioned institutions. We also invited a
number of U.S. citizen students from colleges and
universities who are studying for a semester in Cuba.


5. (C) In the end, more than 200 people attended the event.
Notable by their absence were the 38 invited Cuban government
officials and academics. Late on November 3, USINT received
a dipnote from MINREX returning the invitations and accusing
USINT of taking "provocative and threatening" measures by
inviting official Cubans to an event where it was likely that
"mercenaries" would be present. Artists and religious groups
were very lightly represented, but the civil society people
came out in force.


6. (C) Those present were an enthusiastic bunch. As part of
the evening's presentation, USINT carried out a mock election
open only to Cubans from outside the Section and the
smattering of third country nationals. Results of the mock
election were announced just after 1000 EST. Out of 93 votes
cast, 51 went to John McCain, 39 to Barack Obama, and 3 voted
for both. The straw poll vote contrasted with anecdotal
information picked up in conversations throughout the evening
that indicated strong support for the candidacy of Barack
Obama. Dissident leader Oswaldo Paya came with almost his
whole family and sat glued to the television most of the
evening. While there, he and Afro-Cuban independent
journalist Jorge Olivera did extensive on-air interviews with
Radio Marti. Like many other Afro-Cubans in attendance,
Olivera said the election of Obama was an historic event for
Cuba too, since it gave hope to black Cubans who also are
marginalized at the same time that it robbed the GOC of a
propaganda weapon it has been using for 50 years. Even the
staunchest supporters of Senator Obama also expressed great
admiration for the concession speech delivered by Senator
McCain, which they described as an example of how politics in
a true democracy should work.


7. (C) Cuban civil society wasted little time in following
up on the election. The organization of most of the liberal
parties on the island, led by Hector Palacios and Francisco
Chaviano, held a news conference early on November 5 to
deliver a formal declaration on their views regarding U.S.
policy toward Cuba and to present a letter to President-elect
Obama (transmitted to WHA/CCA). The declaration called on
the USG to lift restrictions on the travel of Cuban-American
family members to the island, open up the transfer of
remittances, and allow individual Cuban-Americans to support
dissident groups directly. In answering press questions,
Palacios complained (inaccurately) that none of the $45
million in foreign assistance funding appropriated for Cuba
for FY 2008 had reached anyone on the island yet. He said
that some process needs to be devised to get these funds into
the hands of those who want to build democracy, but also
emphasized that opening remittances so that individuals on
both sides of the Florida Straits can begin to get funds to
Cubans at the grass roots level is even more important as it
will be harder to stop and more effective in the long run.


8. (C) COMMENT: The very possibility that Barack Obama
could be elected president of the United States had caused a
sensation in Cuba, and his ultimate election has had a
profound effect on all Cubans with whom we speak. Many cite
President-elect Obama's call to lift travel restrictions and
limits on remittances as a key reason they supported his
candidacy. But a reflective Oswaldo Paya suggested late last
week that Cubans simply long for change and that, unable to
realize any change at home, they are reveling vicariously in
the change taking place in the U.S. In spite of Fidel
Castro's seeming praise of Obama in his November 3
"Reflecciones" piece, most Cubans believe the GOC is not
pleased with the result and is uncertain as to how to
respond. Just as the concept of change thrills ordinary
Cubans, it threatens a regime that depends on maintenance of
the status quo for its survival. Many of our contacts
predict that the GOC will attempt to provoke some sort of
crisis with the U.S. over the next weeks or months in hopes
of forcing a new Obama administration into a more
conventional (and confrontational) stance vis a vis Cuba that
is more to its liking. We agree that this is a prospect for
which we must be prepared.
FARRAR