Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08HAVANA434
2008-06-06 19:28:00
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
Cable title:  

GOC TIGHTENS THE SCREWS ON OPPOSITION ACTIVITY

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM CU 
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VZCZCXRO7653
OO RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHUB #0434/01 1581928
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 061928Z JUN 08
FM USINT HAVANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3330
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HAVANA 000434 

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y -- CLASSIFICATION REASON ADDED

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM CU
SUBJECT: GOC TIGHTENS THE SCREWS ON OPPOSITION ACTIVITY

REF: A. HAVANA 397

B. HAVANA 426

HAVANA 00000434 001.3 OF 002


Classified By: COM Michael E. Parmly for reasons 1.4 (B,D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HAVANA 000434

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y -- CLASSIFICATION REASON ADDED

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM CU
SUBJECT: GOC TIGHTENS THE SCREWS ON OPPOSITION ACTIVITY

REF: A. HAVANA 397

B. HAVANA 426

HAVANA 00000434 001.3 OF 002


Classified By: COM Michael E. Parmly for reasons 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) In REF A, we commented that we believed that the May
19-21 media campaign centering on USINT's relations with
various dissidents was directed primarily at the dissidents.
Events in the succeeding days seem to support that thesis as
the GOC has ignored our statement that they should make a
formal complaint through appropriate channels if they have an
issue with USINT behavior. Moreover, while our day-to-day
activities proceed normally, contacts in civil society have
told us they are under much greater pressure and overt
harassment and surveillance.


2. (C) If, as we suspect, the goal of the GOC was to stifle
any criticism of the regime, how successful have they been?
The answer is: somewhat. Civil Society members may be taking
greater care and moving more deliberately, but they continue
to move. COM and PolEcon Counselor met June 3 with Martha
Beatriz Roque (MBR) and Vladimiro Roca to see how they were
getting along and ask if they were still moving forward with
their proposals. MBR, who has not come back to USINT to use
the internet since the media campaign, was comparatively
subdued, but told us that she was going forward with plans to
distribute up to 3000 copies of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. The "Agenda Minima" unity effort begun by
Roque and Roca, now called the "Agenda de Transicion,"
remains active and they intend to keep it on schedule. Both
stated that they had not changed their views on assistance
from the USG, hoping that they could begin to receive direct
grants for projects they develop. MBR presented a letter
addressed to POTUS to COM (REF B) in which she suggests that
opening remittances is also an important way to get resources
to the opposition in the future. While both Roca and Roque
seemed undeterred, they did comment that surveillance had
been increased and made much more visible.


3. (C) Likewise, leading member of the Damas de Blanco Laura
Pollan complained that her house is virtually surrounded and

that the Damas have been followed overtly during their
regular Sunday walk as a group and individually.
Nevertheless, Pollan also mentioned a series of activities
the Damas have planned for the next few weeks that are
essentially the same as actions they have taken in the past.


4. (C) While MBR has not come back to USINT yet (we believe
she will, however),other members of civil society have been
turning out in force in spite of regime pressure. The DCM
hosted a dinner for the US National Bar Association on June 2
and invited several leading members of civil society as well.
Though some commented that they had been visited by state
security agents that afternoon asking about their attendance
at the dinner, all of those invited attended and contributed
to a lively discussion.


5. (C) We are pleased to say that some of our European
colleagues also have stepped up their contacts with civil
society members. The German DCM hosted a reception that
included virtually all of the leading dissidents, and
attracted even the usually hyper-cautious Oswaldo Paya. The
Italian DCM has a similar event planned for June 9.


6. (C) While civil society members may not be totally
cowed, it is clear that the GOC is stepping up acts of
intimidation and surveillance. In addition to the points
noted above, a rock was thrown at the front door of Oswaldo
Paya's residence on June 1. On June 3, police broke up a
meeting at 1230 a.m. at an apartment the Vedado section of
Havana and detained 12 individuals including Jorge Luis
Garcia Perez (Antunez). All were returned to their
homes--including those from outside Havana--and released with
a warning that they should cease "counter-revolutionary"
activity. Notably, the meeting had been arranged by word of
mouth and set for the middle of the night for security
reasons, but police came to break it up only 15 minutes after
it started.


7. (C) COMMENT: After a spate of "reforms" had been
announced by the GOC over the course of several weeks,
nothing similar has come out for almost a month. The regime
may be trying to gauge the impact, both among the population
at large and among forces within government leadership
itself, of the changes that were announced. Press and the
Havana rumor mill indicate that newly allowable goods are

HAVANA 00000434 002.3 OF 002


being sold as quickly as they are made available, and that
demand far outstrips the supply of anything that has a
market--which is to say virtually everything.


8. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: We believe that the regime wants
to be sure that no one in civil society is able to capitalize
on this pent up demand and accompanying frustration by
forming a political alternative. Therefore, it is making an
all out effort to neutralize opposition members. In previous
years they might have simply arrested and imprisoned all they
thought to be ring-leaders. Several dissidents have noted
that the actions of May 19-21 echoed a similar campaign just
prior to the March 2003 "Black Spring" when 75 dissidents
were imprisoned. However, we believe the GOC is taking a
more careful approach at the moment in part in hopes that the
June EU COLAT meeting will result in a lifting of sanctions.
If the EU takes no action to lift the sanctions, the GOC may
re-think its "softer" approach to the civil society members.
At the moment, however, those individuals seem to be taking a
deep breath and then jumping right back into their previous
activity. In support of that activity, we plan to continue
our own efforts to stay in frequent contact with opposition
members and assist them where we can.
PARMLY