GOC PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN TARGETS OPPOSITION, USINT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HAVANA 000397

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/2013
TAGS: CU PGOV PHUM PINR PREF
SUBJECT: GOC PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN TARGETS OPPOSITION, USINT

REF: A. (A) HAVANA 391

B. (B) HAVANA 278

HAVANA 00000397 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: COM Michael Parmly for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) The GOC wrapped up a three-day marathon of attacks on
the dissident community and on USINT with a second press
conference at the Foreign Ministry (MINREX) led by FM Perez
Roque. The campaign had been launched at another MINREX
conference on Monday, May 19 (REF XXX). Perez-Roque devoted
most of his remarks to a recapitulation of the final edition
of the full story broadcast on the nightly Mesa Redonda
(Round table) television program, which focused on the
activities of USINT. He then concluded his statements by
demanding that the State Department conduct a full
investigation of the actions of its employees in Havana and
punish them accordingly.


2. (C) The GOC used the Mesa Redonda program over a three
day period to make its case that (a) dissident leader Martha
Beatriz Roque (MBR) was being funded by the "renowned
terrorist" Santiago Alvarez and his Miami-based organization
Fundacion Rescate Juridico (Judicial Rescue Foundation),(b)
that Alvarez was a close associate of accused terrorist Luis
Posada Carriles, and that (c) USINT COM Parmly served as a
courier to bring money from Alvarez to MBR. The third
evening's broadcast lasted two hours and was devoted to
alleged activities by USINT employees, past and present, with
an emphasis on COM Parmly. Using intercepted phone
conversations and e-mail exchanges, videotapes of encounters
between USINT personnel and Cuban dissidents, and
appropriately-timed injections of innuendo, the Mesa Redonda
hosts built what they called "overwhelming proof" that USINT
has been supplying what it refers to as "mercenaries" with
money and materiel provided by the Miami Cuban-American
community for some time over the energetic protests of
MINREX.


3. (C) Though most of the story is built on otherwise
unrelated facts held together with dubious suppositions and
distortions, some key "facts" are simply false. While
showing a video of COM Parmly and PolCouns Benson getting
into the COM's car with MBR and Vladimiro Roca, the
announcers state that, during the car ride, the dissidents
were supplied with money to hold a meeting of dissidents to
discuss the "Agenda Minima" unity proposal organized by MBR
(REF B). In fact, the two did ask for USINT support for the
meeting during the ride, arguing that their Miami contacts
had refused to provide them with the funding needed to hold
the meeting in a hotel. At the time, however, COM had argued
back that it would be a bad idea for USINT to be involved
directly with the meeting, either in providing funding (which
it did not have in any case) or a venue.


4. (C) In response to several questions from members of the
international press, both Perez Roque and MINREX Americas
Division chief Josefina Vidal steered clear of any suggestion
that the GOC might attempt to break relations with the US or
PNG USINT staffers. Instead, they called upon the USG to "do
the right thing" and investigate the charges that USINT
personnel are supporting terrorist activities and mete out
appropriate punishments. Given the vehemence of the
denunciations made at the two press conferences and
throughout the three days of Mesa Redonda programs, the
international journalists realistically assumed that, if the
story were true, the only option would be to expel the
offending diplomats. That Cuban officials did not seem
interested in considering such an option says much about
their faith in their own story.


5. (C) On the other hand, we do not believe that USINT was
the main target of this exercise. It is clear that the GOC
wanted to get a good number of body punches into USINT in the
process, and lump as much discredit on outgoing COM Parmly as
possible before he leaves, but we believe its real focus was
elsewhere. One possible target was the Cuba Solidarity Day
activities on May 21. A journalist at the May 19 conference
asked about any connection to the May 21 activities and
MINREX Americas chief Vidal reminded him somewhat harshly to
stay on task and pay attention to the issue at hand. There
was to be no mention of Cuba Solidarity Day. Also, GOC
officials were undoubtedly aware that a Congressional
Notification document had gone forward on the FY 2008 foreign
assistance budget for Cuba and they may hope this incident
will delay or derail that process.


6. (C) On balance, however, we believe the real target was
MBR and other dissidents. Reports we have received regarding
the first "Agenda Minima" meeting and its follow-up indicate

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that the participants have achieved an unusual amount of
success in creating unity among the usually fractious
opposition groups. The central theme of the television
campaign, which was clearly directed at a domestic Cuban
audience, was that MBR and other members of the opposition
are dangerous mercenaries in league with the fearsome
terrorist Posada Carriles through his acolyte Santiago
Alvarez. Much of the material presented appears designed to
discredit MBR as thoroughly as possible in the eyes of the
Cuban people. Moreover, the content of the second day of
Mesa Redonda repeated several critical statements MBR had
made about other dissident leaders in an apparent attempt to
sow discord among the opposition as well. That MBR and the
other dissidents may have begun to achieve some sort of unity
at the same time that the USG was approving significant
amounts of money for the island may have convinced the GOC
officials that it was time to act.


7. (C) Having instituted some changes which, while they are
by no means radical, have served to feed a desire for further
change, the Raul Castro regime has taken risks. Raul and
company appear to believe they can institute changes to the
Cuban economy, but to do so while maintaining the level of
control they desire, they must ensure that any incipient
political liberalization is stifled quickly. A hard hit at
MBR and the other leading dissidents built on a campaign to
discredit them in the eyes of the Cuban people and other
international audiences may be part of that process. That
USINT is tarred in the process is probably seen as an extra
added benefit.


8. (C) We do not believe the GOC was interested in expelling
any USINT staff as they feared the potential losses to their
own operations conducted from CUBINT. As a result, most of
their vitriol was targeted at COM Parmly, whom they know is
leaving in a matter of weeks anyway. In the same way, we do
not believe they intend to arrest MBR or any of the other
dissidents, though many of the latter have pointed out to us
that the 2003 crackdown began in a very similar fashion.
Now, however, such arrests would not play well in Europe and
the Cubans are counting on a change in the EU common position
in the near future. Rather, they will likely remain content
in trying to ruin MBR's reputation and exacerbate splits that
historically have existed among the Cuban opposition.


9. (C) USINT intends to continue its regular contacts with
all members of the dissident community and maintain a
"business as usual" attitude in our activities.

PARMLY