Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08HAVANA187
2008-02-25 23:36:00
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
Cable title:  

CUBA: REACTIONS FROM RAUL CASTRO'S SPEECH

Tags:  ECON PGOV PINR PREL CU 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HAVANA 000187 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR WHA/CCA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2018
TAGS: ECON PGOV PINR PREL CU
SUBJECT: CUBA: REACTIONS FROM RAUL CASTRO'S SPEECH

REF: A. HAVANA 182


B. HAVANA 183

Classified By: Charge: Buddy Williams: For reasons 1.4 b/d

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HAVANA 000187

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR WHA/CCA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2018
TAGS: ECON PGOV PINR PREL CU
SUBJECT: CUBA: REACTIONS FROM RAUL CASTRO'S SPEECH

REF: A. HAVANA 182


B. HAVANA 183

Classified By: Charge: Buddy Williams: For reasons 1.4 b/d


1. (C) SUMMARY: Average Cubans seem unconvinced that Raul
will be able -- or willing -- to improve their daily lives,
but most seem to be willing to wait and see if changes
materialize. Members of Cuban civil society are decidedly
more negative about the future. End Summary.


2. (C) Most well-known members of Cuban civil society were
interviewed by the international press, either through
correspondents on the island or by phone from overseas.
Their views overall reflect a belief that very little is
going to change in Cuba, as reinforced by the hard-line
makeup of the new Council of State.


3. (C) Poloff spoke to Vladimiro Roca, who had been flooded
with interview requests (from Los Angeles, New York, New
Jersey, and Florida, from Spain, Colombia, Mexico and
Argentina). Roca stressed that he sees no possibility of any
major changes. He also said that as long as Fidel is alive
that there will be no significant new directions in foreign
or domestic policy and even if he were to die the government
would still preserve continuity. That said, he does think
that there will be "minimal" economic reforms. He does not
believe Raul gets on well with Chavez and believes Raul wants
to direct more effort in getting Brazilian and Mexican
investment, but believes that this intention will encounter
difficulties. He added the government will probably try to
expand private ownership of land and may try to build homes
in the countryside to stem the tide of people leaving for the
cities. As far as the portion of Raul,s speech dealing with
diversity of opinion, he stated that Raul in general is more
willing to listen to others than Fidel, but he did not expect
the government to entertain a broad range of proposals. On
human rights, Roca does not expect the government to do more
than a few token releases of prisoners to keep up the hopes
of the Europeans. He believes that the government will

continue the tactic of using short term detentions (that last
a few hours or days) rather than long term arrests. As other
persons have indicated, Roca believes arrests of young people
for "peligrosidad" (dangerous behavior) have increased
significantly in the last year. Just in his neighborhood, he
has heard of six cases recently of people prosecuted for
"peligrosidad."


4. (C) COM Parmly spoke to Martha Beatriz Roque (MBR) who
felt the speech was a reaffirmation of the regime,s hardline
stance and that the election of the old guard to the Council
of State confirmed that same reality. She felt that the call
for a critical debate is strictly meant "for the
revolutionaries" and that there will be no tolerance of real
dissent whatsoever. Asked whether the dissidents would be
tempted to "take Raul at his word" and speak out, MBR replied
that the last time she tried that, she got three-and-a-half
years in prison as a result. MBR thought the GOC is frenetic
in their pursuit of the dissidents and recommended to "lay
low for a while and see if the GOC ends up doing anything."
She anticipates some, very minor economic steps, but repeated
her long-standing position that re-uniting the two currencies
would be too hard. She thought there would be some, very
minor steps towards agriculture reform, but it would go
nowhere near addressing the main problem. MBR did not think
the GOC feels itself in a weak position, and explains, in her
view, the confidence with which the hard-liners took control.
MBR also thought that Fidel is running the entire show and
that Raul,s language should be taken at face value: He will
consult (and submit to the judgment of) Fidel on every little
detail of governing.


5. (C) Poloff spoke to Elizabeth Guerra Garcia of the
Movimiento Cubano por la Liberacion Homosexual, a dissident
organization that frequently reports on discrimination
against homosexuals. Before the speech, Guerra and all of
her friends expected a larger organizational change. After
Raul,s speech and not seeing what they expected, neither she
nor her friends expect any significant changes. She did not
think that the part of the speech about different opinions
was a signal that the government would try to accommodate

HAVANA 00000187 002 OF 002


truly diverse points of view. She thought that decision
making will be as closed as ever.


6. (C) PD Counselor asked 15 Cuban independent journalists,
during a previously-scheduled training event, for their
reactions. Some of their responses follow:

-- Raul clears away some of the dust and cobwebs, but the
room remains the same.

-- The Council of State is mostly formed from the dried up
old historic revolutionary guard. It is doubtful that they
intend to restore the economic base of the country.

-- Raul is not Fidel and his plans for the short and long
term will be to dismantle the reins of power.

-- The speech was a contradiction for Raul because those
named to the Council stand for orthodoxy, meaning that Fidel
is still in charge.

-- More of the same.

-- The new Council does not represent anything that will
benefit the people of Cuba and was not directly elected by
them.

-- Cuba's future is dark and repression against opposition
figures will grow.

-- The speech was media-driven.

-- This amounts to nothing more than the continuation of the
dictatorship.

-- The events of February 24 represent the first step toward
a preconceived dialectic and the beginning of sweeping change.

-- The powers within the regime are maneuvering for survival.

-- The regime will continue to maneuver and make the promises
it is obliged to make, but in reality it will try to maintain
total control and continue the failed totalitarian model.

-- This was a succession of the Castro brothers that was
manipulated from the start and demonstrates the lack of
democracy in our government. I don't expect, nor does the
population, that any change in the policies will follow.

-- There is a marked skepticism on the streets of Havana with
regard to the "supposed" new government.

-- The new Council is made up of hard-liners who are close to
Raul and as a result should have no trouble imposing their
political designs. There are expectations of economic
modernization and other reforms that benefit the public, but
no political reforms.

-- We can only hope that what Raul has promised, he will
fulfill; but only time will tell.


7. (C) USINT's Drug Interdiction Specialist reported a
significant lull in migration departures since Fidel Castro's
February 19 resignation announcement. There has been no
variation to this lull since Raul's speech.


8. (C) Comment: The international press interviewed a
fairly representative cross-section of Cubans about the
events of February 24. Their reactions seemed to fall mostly
into two attitude categories: Pessimistic more-of-the-same
and cautiously optimistic wait-and-see. Among members of
civil society the reaction has been decidedly less
optimistic. The vast majority fall into the more-of-the-same
category, although acknowledge the possibility of some
economic reforms. Very few, however, entertained positive
interpretations about the new composition of the Council of
State and none believe political change is being
contemplated. As was the case after Raul's July speech, we
suspect that the temporary lull in migration departures will
soon subside and resume normal levels.
PARMLY