SNAPSHOT OF CUBA ON THE EVE OF FIDEL'S ANNOUNCEMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L HAVANA 000164

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2013
TAGS: CU, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, PINS
SUBJECT: SNAPSHOT OF CUBA ON THE EVE OF FIDEL'S ANNOUNCEMENT

REF: A. (A) 07 HAVANA 0717
B. (B) 08 HAVANA 028
C. (C) 08 HAVANA 023

Classified By: COM Michael E. Parmly for reasons 1.2 (b) and (d)

THE FOLLOWING WAS DRAFTED ON 16 FEBRUARY, BEFORE FIDEL'S
ANNOUNCED STEP DOWN. WE HAVE EDITED IT SLIGHTLY TO TAKE
ACCOUNT OF THE FIDEL ANNOUNCEMENT, BUT OTHERWISE TRANSMIT IT
AS DRAFTED.

1. (C) SUMMARY: The newly "elected" Cuban National
Assembly will meet on February 24 to select a new Council of
Ministers and a new Council of State creating speculation
about whether or not Fidel Castro will be elected President
again. We believe that, regardless of the DECISION OF THAT
BODY, there will be no substantive change in Cuban
government management in the short term, or at least until
Fidel Castro dies. Nevertheless, while the government may
only change the players but not the rules, the rest of Cuba
is moving. Voices of opposition are being heard more loudly,
individual Cubans are preparing themselves to succeed in a
new regime, and all segments of society are beginning to
focus on a Cuba without Fidel. Still, trapped by the
ever-present image of Fidel hovering over it, the government
is neither able to respond to this movement in a way that
satisfies the frustrated Cuban population, nor is it able to
stop the movement. Movement toward change at various levels
of Cuban society--and with little or no coordination among
them--is likely to continue and grow. The probable result in
the medium term will be a gradual opening of the economy, but
a stagnant political landscape. More radical scenarios are
possible, and certain areas, such as illegal migration, are
certain to deteriorate. End Summary

The Question of Succession
====================

2. (C) The newly elected National Assembly will meet for the
first time on February 24, and, in accordance with the Cuban
constitution, will select a new Council of Ministers (the
cabinet) and the new Council of State (the ruling executive
body). As a member of the National Assembly Fidel Castro can
be elected again as President in the Council of State. HE
NOW HAS ISSUED A SHERMAN STATEMENT DEMURRING FROM SUCH AN
ELECTION. ALREADY in Cuba there HAD DEVELOPED a widespread
view that he wOULD not/not emerge as President this time.
There are many possible scenarios for this, including his
election by an overwhelming majority followed immediately by
his refusal to take the job. Some other names have surfaced
as possible presidential candidates, including current
National Assembly President Ricardo Alarcon and VP Carlos
Lage. In our view, whatever artifice is designed by the
powers that be and given to the National Assembly to rubber
stamp, as long as he draws a breath (or as long as one neuron
fires as one dissident leader put it),Fidel Castro will
retain the ultimate authority. If an arrangement is devised
that creates a new head of government, that decision will
become more interesting once Fidel is dead and gone, but in
and of itself, it will not change overall policy. Even those
Cubans who speculate about the various interesting
permutations agree that no matter what happens, Castro will
retain the real power--his ego will not allow anything less.

Moving Toward Change on the Island
===========================

3. (C) As we have noted in previous reporting, Raul Castro
set the tone for change, principally in his July 26, 2007
speech (REF A),but even in his much more conservative
December 28 address to the outgoing National Assembly (REF
B). In his own words he has described failings that all
Cubans recognize and he has called on Cubans to discuss these
problems. However, in spite of his trumpeting of 5 million
participants in the "debates" he set in motion, there have
been no changes implemented that address the needs of the
Cuban people. Recent actions such as the imposition of an
income tax on the informal hard currency earnings of a small,
but potentially influential, part of Cuban society (REF C)
focus only on further control rather than opening new
opportunities. Measures to open the agricultural sector,
improve investment, and permit freer travel are discussed but
never implemented.

4. (C) The result of this has been twofold. In the first
place, ordinary Cubans are losing whatever ability they may
have had to accept their lot in life. Generations have faced
scarcity of basic goods, and lack of freedom to speak and act
as they pleased, but they survived and found a way to
"resolver" the problems of daily life. There is now much
greater frustration about the government's failure to create
the conditions necessary to improve the economy, and
willingness to accept the status quo is evaporating.
Secondly, thanks to Raul's call to debate, Cubans are
becoming much bolder and more willing to criticize the
government for its inability or unwillingness to provide them
access to goods, and the most basic of rights such as the
ability to travel freely, even domestically, and find a
suitable place to live. This growing public pressure
combined with less-focused government efforts to suppress
individual activity is leading many in Cuba to simply take
matters into their own hands and do whatever they deem
necessary to take care of their own needs.

5. (C) At the moment anyway, there is no central focus to
these efforts. Some individuals have come together in
organizations, but by and large these groups are disparate
themselves and unable to attract large followings in what is
still a very repressive society. Dissident leaders continue
to expand their activity in the face of occasional
crackdowns, and challenge the regime to shut them down. But
none of the dissident leaders is poised to take on a broader
leadership role. Several political parties, in fact several
Liberal Parties alone, have begun to work quietly, though
none of them can claim any significant membership. Even
societal groups with close connections to the regime, such as
artists and intellectuals, are becoming more open to meeting
with USINT (though not with other groups, especially
dissidents present),and clearly are preparing for a time
when they will no longer need to bow in the direction of the
regime. All recognize that the real chance to flourish in
their field will come through contacts with colleagues in the
U.S., and that the opportunity to do so is closer than ever.

What is Going on Inside the Regime?
===========================

6. (C) With years of practice at secrecy and deception, the
regime and its internal workings remains an enigma. But just
as many ordinary Cubans have begun to move beyond Fidel in
spite of his continued manipulation of events, it appears
that many in more privileged positions near the center of
power also are beginning to look beyond mere dependence on
the benefits that accrue to occupants of those positions.
The departure of celebrities like Carlos Otero (and possibly
singer Silvio Rodriguez next),diplomats and artists is one
manifestation of this. Numerous sources close to or in the
regime have told us of actions by various friends and
neighbors that indicate that they are trying to find a way to
protect themselves and their families from fallout when
Castro does die.

7. (C) While we do not believe any serious change will come
out of the National Assembly meeting on February 24, there
nevertheless appear to be machinations taking place among
potential leadership. We found it odd, but certainly not
coincidental, that a Politburo member like current National
Assembly President Ricardo Alarcon would appear, and be very
professionally recorded, while being roasted by a hostile
audience of students--even if those students did come almost
exclusively from the nomenklatura itself. Adding to the
puzzle was the clearly put-up drama of the supposed detention
of one of the students and his subsequent recanting of his
grilling of Alarcon. Somebody is being set up to be
embarrassed and possibly run out of their job--clearly
Alarcon being one--but it is not clear whose hand is behind
the conflicting shows. Obscure, but highly critical articles
have appeared in the official press in the past week--mostly
in Juventud Rebelde--attacking "liars within the Party" and
individuals who promote change without understanding that
change is in the nature of the revolution. We assume the
targets of these screeds know who they are, though their
identity is in no way clear to us. All of these actions
would seem to be those of individuals or groups within the
ruling structure struggling either to position themselves to
take power, or to grab what is left and run. In neither case
do these forces appear to be planning anything that will
address the fundamental ills of Cuban society.

Outlook for the Rest of 2008
=====================

8. (C) The sum of all of these disparate indicators is an
island that is beginning to burst with suppressed
expectations and frustration. To be sure, there are large
swaths of the population, especially outside of Havana, with
no access to any information except that provided to them by
the regime. These people are no less in need, and no less
frustrated by the difficulties of their lives, but with
nothing else to go on, they are more willing to accept the
government propaganda that all of the ills in their lives can
be blamed on the U.S. embargo. By the same token, however,
they are not likely to remain so content when Fidel does pass
on and life continues as before, or worsens as internal
factions struggle over the "right" path to take. Those more
"in the know," like the employees of ACCOREC and CUBALSE who
now find themselves taxed and receiving no services in
return, are likely to be emboldened to protest even more
strongly. They represent a tiny segment of the population,
but as several Cuban intellectuals have reminded us, it is
the segment that has traditionally started revolutions on the
island. If genuine protests by students were to begin to
spread, something the regime clearly fears and acts to
suppress at every opportunity, the challenge to the
government could become even greater.

9. (C) More important than the upcoming National Assembly
meeting would be an as-yet-unscheduled Communist Party
Congress. These are supposed to be held every five years,
but there had not been a PCC Congress in ten years. One of
the last sub-congresses, UNEAC, the union of artists and
intellectuals is scheduled to have its meeting April 1. If
the Federation of Cuban Women (FEM) formerly headed by Raul's
wife Vilma Espin before her death in 2006, holds a meeting
soon -- and the 18 february edition of the daily "Juventud
Rebelde" reported that preparations have begun, the way would
be clear to hold another full Party congress. That body
might actually take actions that could change the course of
GOC policy. But such a congress has not been scheduled, it
is not clear if Fidel would be around when it occurs, and
life and frustration go on. The GOC may believe, as CUBINT
chief Bolanos told the press, that it can wait until there is
a new administration in Washington and then bet everything on
negotiations with the U.S. that Raul has called for, but as
time goes by without action, such a policy will only
contribute to further frustration on the island that will not
be sated by calls for greater labor discipline.
Nevertheless, however much the country may need new
leadership and a new direction, our bet would be that those
in the current power structure will focus all of their
efforts on retaining power and take only those remedial
actions that they might view as supportive of that higher
goal. Economic measures may be announced, political
prisoners may even be released, but all will be done in an
effort to buy time, not to make the fundamental political and
economic changes that are needed in Cuba.

10. (C) While pressure on the island is building, our view
is that WIDESPREAD VIOLENCE IS NOT/NOT LIKELY ON THE ISLAND,
no matter what transpires on February 24, or whenever Fidel
dies. However, WE CANNOT EVEN BE FULLY CERTAIN OF THAT. One
thing that does seem SURE: absent any change or hint of
change, Cubans will increasingly vote with their feet and
head north, or anywhere that will get them out. We expect
that defection by Cubans traveling legally will continue to
rise (the comportment of Cubans at the Beijing Olympics will
be interesting to watch),but so will the numbers willing to
risk all and throw themselves into the sea in the hopes of
improving their life.

PARMLY