GUYANA/CARICOM SECURITY ASSESSMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L GEORGETOWN 000309

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

WHA/CAR FOR MICHAEL FORTIN, WHA/FO FOR GIOVANNI SNIDLE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/2018
TAGS: PTER PREL MASS MOPS XL GY
SUBJECT: GUYANA/CARICOM SECURITY ASSESSMENT

REF: A. STATE 51747

B. GEORGETOWN 188

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Karen L. Williams, for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d)


1. (C) Guyana Summary: As demonstrated by two mass killings
by gangs earlier this year and general homicide rates across
the country, Guyana is ill-equipped to address its modern
security challenges. Historically, security has been hindered
by limited financial and human resources, poor training
regimens, an antiquated legal system, widespread corruption,
and minimal political will to fight crime. The tragic events
earlier this year, however, had a visible impact on the GoG's
posture regarding security sector assistance and reform, and
the GoG has begun committing resources and political will to
reform. The U.S. can encourage and support this new reform
effort by 1) responding, where feasible, to GoG requests for
closer cooperation and information sharing with U.S. law
enforcement; 2) supporting the U.K.-led Security Sector
Reform project with complementary training programs,
particularly in the area of defense force training; and 3)
using diplomatic and program means to encourage the GoG to
articulate a long-term national security strategy. End Guyana
summary.


2. (C) CARICOM Summary: Growing regional concern about
security prompted recent special meetings of the CARICOM
Heads of Government as well as joint Chiefs of Police and
Chiefs of Defense meetings. The result was for CARICOM to
establish Security as the fourth pillar of its policy
foundation and add specific responsibility for security to an
Assistant Secretary General's portfolio. The focus of these
initiatives is to foster cooperation between CARICOM members
as well as support from major regional actors, and to build
upon and expand security intiatives begun for Cricket World
Cup 2007, including the Advance Passenger Information System
(APIS). The U.S. should continue to encourage closer
regional cooperation on security by supporting expansion of
APIS and greater information sharing, and can also assist by
offering strategic planning facilitation. End CARICOM
Summary.

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GUYANA
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3. (SBU) For a variety of reasons related to resource
limitations and the transnational nature of criminal threats
in Guyana, the government's security activities have long
involved contributions from both the Guyana Police Force
(GPF) and Guyana Defense Force (GDF). While spotty
coordination, turf battles, and constitutional limits on the
GDF's activities diminish their combined effectiveness, the
so-called "Joint Services" complement each other in certain
areas (e.g., the GDF maintains an air wing, albeit a modest
one, while the GPF does not),and the GoG seeks to enhance
the level of their collaboration, including joint training,
as a means to maximize their efficiency. Training regimens,
however, especially on the police side, are weak, and very
few scenario-based simulations that would hone the skills of
either new or veteran officers are carried out.


4. (SBU) Through its $6 million Security Sector Reform (SSR)
Program that commenced in 2007, the British Government is the
lead international partner for the GoG on security reform.
While certain macro elements of the SSR involve the GDF, the
bulk of the activities -- expert training, capacity-building,
provision of modern, non-lethal equipment -- are/will be
directed towards the police. (Note: Post's British
counterparts relay that Guyana's expenditures on the police
force as a percentage of total government spending constitute
by far the lowest total in the region; immediate figures were
not available. End Note.) The British will be carrying out
various training activities throughout the remainder of this
year (on intelligence analysis, tactical response, and
firearms),and also will hand over certain forms of the
aforementioned non-lethal equipment, e.g., night-vision
goggles, radios, and GPS systems.

5. (SBU) Embassy Georgetown's Military Liaison Office (MLO)
is the primary external actor providing resources and
training activities for the GDF. International Military
Education Training (IMET) funding provides professional
training opportunities for key personnel; Foreign Military
Financing (FMF) funds the purchase of essential long-range
communications and encryption equipment; and visiting U.S.
military forces conduct exercises with GDF counterparts to
sharpen their counterterrorism skills.


6. (C) Opportunities and Challenges: In the aftermath of the
Lusignan and Bartica gang attacks, and with the Guyanese
public clamoring for action, the GoG has been actively
pursuing tangible and immediate assistance from the
international community to address its security sector
deficiencies. After months of rigorous British lobbying that
the GoG needed to design and implement a broad security
sector strategy in order for the SSR program to be reasonably
effective, President Jagdeo recently acknowledged this vacuum
to British High Commissioner Wheeler and agreed to pursue
such a strategy. President Jagdeo also asked A/S Shannon
during his March 26 visit to Guyana about the possibility of
law enforcement assistance to help address ongoing threats
(Reftel B). The challenges, however, are also daunting: in
addition to its geographic characteristics (a
lightly-populated country with 1,800 miles of land borders,
250 miles of coastline, and vast uninhabited and
unpatrollable areas),Guyana's outdated cyberinfrastructure,
lack of a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with the U.S.
(although Guyana recently ratified the Inter-American
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters),and
series of government/law enforcement officials whose
trustworthiness with sensitive information is in question,
present significant impediments to efforts at reform.


7. (C) U.S. Assistance Opportunities/Comment: In addition
to the military training and professionalization we already
support, the U.S. should closely coordinate with the British
to provide complementary law enforcement training/development
opportunities; respond, where feasible, to law enforcement
information-sharing requests; and implement
information-sharing systems. The GoG has also, repeatedly,
requested a permanent presence of both DEA and FBI. (Note:
The current MSP calls for a DEA presence here by FY2010.)
U.S. diplomatic and programmatic efforts to reinforce the
need for long-term strategic planning is also key. The
challenge to providing any assistance on security, especially
sensitive assistance such as information sharing, is finding
non-corrupt partners and overcoming decades of broken
institutions. President Jagdeo has instituted some measures
to 'clean up' certain offices, such as polygraphing the
Customs and Anti-Narcotics Unit and seeking independent
investigators in a major customs scandal, but in the current
government structure, the Presidency is the only avenue for
change -- which means reform only moves quickly when it has
his full attention and direct action. End Comment.

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CARICOM
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8. (C) While still in its nascent stages, CARICOM's evolving
approach to regional security issues holds some promise.
CARICOM recently designated Dr. Edward Green, Assistant
Secretary General for Human and Social Development -- the
directorate that oversees the offices that deal with crime,
drugs, and human trafficking -- as the Secretariat's point
person for security matters. (Note: As with other senior
Secretariat officials, ASYG Green is frequently traveling
outside of Guyana, and has not been available to meet with
post reps. Post will report back after meeting with him
during the first week of June. End Note.) This comes after
CARICOM's designation of Security as the fourth pillar of its
policy objectives (along with Economic Integration, Foreign
Policy Coordination, and Functional Cooperation). ASYG Green
is responsible for coordinating regional security policy and
measures. While CARICOM's structural approach is still a work
in progress, the Secretariat has referred on multiple
occasions to the collaboration that took place in advance of
the 2007 Cricket World Cup (CWC) as a foundation that can be
built upon. Press reports further indicate that the bodies
specifically established in advance of the CWC -- the
Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS) and the
CARICOM Operational Planning and Coordinating Staff (COPACS)
-- will continue to operate and may even expand. CARICOM
officials have also repeatedly expressed their interest in
expanding the U.S. APIS system.


9. (SBU) CARICOM's convocation of police and military chiefs
of its member states for a March meeting in Georgetown
reflected its recognition that joint activities and
information-sharing among security agencies are critical for
the success of security-related endeavors, as well as a
mindset similar to Guyana's that security is more than a
police issue. The meeting was considered a useful enough
forum that the security chiefs are expected to gather again
in the near future.


10. (C) U.S. Assistance Opportunities/Comment: The U.S.
should follow up on CARICOM's offer to expand APIS to all
member states instead of just the Cricket World Cup
participants. Barring large amounts of funding for actual
operational activities such as counter-narcotics, the U.S.
should seek out ways to support CARICOM's security
coordination efforts among its member states. CARICOM's weak
point, traditionally, has been in long-term planning and
implementation. The U.S. has a well-respected reputation in
planning, particularly in security, and should try to foster
a similar regard for planning within CARICOM's new offices on
security. SOUTHCOM is already beginning to include CARICOM
Secretariat officials in regional security meetings (Dr.
Green is scheduled to brief at CANSEC in June). Inclusion of
the Secretariat in other regional security fora, whether
State, DHS, USCG, DEA, DoJ or DoD would help CARICOM
institutionalize its new fourth pillar of Security, and
reinforce U.S. partnership objectives for the region. Post
will offer additional ideas once ASYG Green returns and we
can gain further insight into the Secretariat's plans for
dealing with its new mandate. End Comment.

WILLIAMS