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Created
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08GENEVA991
2008-11-20 12:54:00
SECRET
US Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

JCIC-XXXIII: HEAD OF DELEGATION MEETING ON THE

Tags:  KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ 
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S E C R E T GENEVA 000991 


DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR HAYES
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2018
TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ

SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXIII: HEAD OF DELEGATION MEETING ON THE
EXTENTION OF THE START TREATY (ARTICLE XVII MEETING),
NOVEMBER 17, 2008 (U)

REF: A. STATE 112253 (JCIC-DIP-08-007)

B. GENEVA XXXX (JCIC-XXXIII-014)

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.
Reasons: 1.5(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 000991


DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR HAYES
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2018
TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ

SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXIII: HEAD OF DELEGATION MEETING ON THE
EXTENTION OF THE START TREATY (ARTICLE XVII MEETING),
NOVEMBER 17, 2008 (U)

REF: A. STATE 112253 (JCIC-DIP-08-007)

B. GENEVA XXXX (JCIC-XXXIII-014)

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.
Reasons: 1.5(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is JCIC-XXXIII-013.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 17, 2008
Time: 3:45 P.M. - 5:15 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) A Heads of Delegation (HOD) Meeting was held at the
U.S. Mission on November 17, 2008, to consider whether the
START Treaty would be extended for a period of 5 years. The
Parties agreed that there was no requirement for a decision
at this meeting of the Parties, which was, as provided for in
Paragraph 2 of Article XVII of the Treaty, held "...no later
than one year before the expiration of the 15-year period,"
i.e., before December 5, 2009. All the Parties were
present; Belarus, Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan lauded the
role of START in promoting strategic stability and fulfilling
Article VI provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) and encouraged continuation of work to maintain
strategic stability after December 5, 2009, and to work
toward a post-START agreement. Russia agreed with the U.S.
position, based on Paragraph 2 of Article XVII of the START
Treaty, that no decision on extension was required at this
meeting; the other three Parties did not press this issue.
Ukraine, concerned about continuation of START, introduced
the possibility of "reconsideration" of its 1994 commitments
in connection with START entry into force and other
international obligations, including NPT, which elicited
requests for clarification and push-back from both the U.S.

and Russian sides.

--------------
CONSENSUS-START IS A SUCCESS
--------------


4. (S) U.S. JCIC Representative Taylor welcomed the
Delegations and offered that the purpose of the meeting today
was to discuss the Article XVII requirement to discuss
whether the START Treaty would be extended for a period of 5
years. Belarusian HOD Ugorich, Deputy Director of
International Security Division of the Belarusian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MFA),noted that not only has the START
Treaty made a genuine contribution to arms control, with an
actual reduction of more than 30 percent of strategic nuclear
armaments, but has also created an atmosphere of strategic
stability, confidence, trust and verification that has stood
the test of time. He noted that through the Lisbon Protocol
the Republic of Belarus renounced its right to nuclear
weapons, a decision based on the continuation of nuclear
disarmament, opining that it is important that a vacuum not
be created after the expiration of START in December 2009.
The Parties must take decisive steps either to extend the
Treaty or work on a new treaty in order to guarantee the
irreversibility of nuclear reductions and send a clear
message to the international community with regard to
strategic offensive arms. Ugorich cited the April 6, 2008,
Sochi declaration of President Bush and then-President Putin,
praising the bilateral commitment to work toward a legally
binding post-START agreement. He urged a positive outcome,
and as a consequence, early practical implementation of that
declaration, adding that the new agreement should have
effective verification. Ugorich expressed willingness for
Belarus to participate actively in such work.


5. (S) The Head of the Kazakhstani Delegation, Permanent
Representative of the Republic of Kazakhstan to International
Organizations in Geneva, Amazhol Zhankuliyev, reconfirmed his
country's position that this agreement on strategic offensive
arms needs to be maintained and developed, and that it has
provided stability. START is an important step towards
nuclear disarmament and a tangible contribution to
fulfillment of Article VI of the NPT; Zhankuliyev also
welcomed the bilateral Sochi declaration on reducing weapons
down to minimal levels and urged continued work on a
legally-binding instrument to follow the START Treaty, noting
that achieving this treaty would promote strategic stability.


--------------
ANTONOV CLAIMS AMATEUR STATUS IN JCIC
--------------


6. (S) While belaboring and excusing his status as a
"novice" at JCIC meetings, Russian Head of Delegation,
Director of the MFA's Department of International Security
and Disarmament, Anatoliy Antonov, noted the constructive,
pointed, and result-oriented discussions that are held among
the Parties in order to find solutions. According to
Antonov, history will judge the full value of the START
Treaty, but even so, no one, not even the harshest critics
such as the New Agenda Coalition during the NPT Review
Conference (RevCon),doubted the important role it played in
reducing strategic offensive arms. He noted that START
achieved all of what we wanted to accomplish and served its
purpose; all Parties have met their ceilings on schedule,
having established a new atmosphere of trust among nuclear
and non-nuclear treaty Parties. He said that it was
important to note that none of the non-nuclear Parties ever
violated any of its obligations, adding that "we" have
obtained commitments that those Parties would maintain their
non-nuclear status. He stressed that it is especially
important that this result is not just based on Article VI of
the NPT and that START strengthens basic elements of the
nonproliferation regime. This was also particularly
important as we deal with questions of whether the Treaty
will expire in 2009 or will be extended for 5 years, and the
RevCon in 2010. Antonov stated that Russia is committed to
preserving an atmosphere of continued transparency, mutual
trust, and predictability, as outlined in the provisions of
the START Treaty; Russia is thus interested in continuing
nuclear disarmament even after START expiration, pursuant to
NPT Article VI, and on that basis approached the United
States 3 years ago with the offer to conclude a treaty to
supersede START. He noted that we have engaged over time,
admittedly with different approaches, and that while he saw
nothing terrible in these differences in recent years, there
was a presidential-level agreement on its status. He assumed
that the Obama team would be interested in pursuing a new
understanding. He acknowledged that Russia is in receipt of
the U.S. draft text for a post-START agreement, as announced
by Acting Under Secretary Rood, and that Russia had responded
to the United States that it was studying it. Once Russia
decided on its position, it would be prepared to meet with
U.S. colleagues to continue discussions. He sought the views
of Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan.

Noting that this meeting was the first official exchange
among START Parties to consider the fate of the Treaty, in
accordance with Paragraph 2 of Article XVII, Antonov agreed
that there is no need to take a position while observing that
he generally agreed with the U.S. position expressed in the
2006 Rice-Lavrov Note Verbale (06State 78113) nor to make a
decision today, and that there was still enough time. He
also thanked the United States for being straightforward in
stating its belief that no position needed to be taken during
the meeting. Antonov opined that the comments of the
Belarusian, Kazakhstani, and Ukrainian HOD revealed similar
concerns, and on that basis, Russia is prepared to continue
discussion in the context of informal events, away from any
negotiating table, without reporting to capitals, and
preferably over drinks. Such an approach, in his opinion,
would promote greater understanding. Citing again his
newcomer status, he realized that he may have breached
formality while promoting an approach he considered conducive
to resolving the concerns of all Parties at the table.

--------------
UKRAINE MIGHT "RECONSIDER" NPT COMMITMENT
--------------


7. (S) Ukrainian Acting HOD, Anatoliy Shevtsov, of the
National Space Agency of Ukraine, noted that regardless of
its outcome, the act of holding today's meeting fulfilled the
requirements of Paragraph 2 of Article XVII of the Treaty.
He elaborated the Ukrainian position as follows: 1) Ukraine
had complied fully with its Treaty obligations and those of
the January 14, 1994, Trilateral Statement of the Presidents
of the United States of America, Ukraine and the Russian
Federation; 2) the full elimination of solid rocket motors
(SRMs) of disassembled SS-24 ICBMs was expected in 2011, and
until that time, such items continued to be accountable under
the Treaty; 3) Ukraine called for an extension of the Treaty
as a guarantee of elimination of SRMs; 4) absent Treaty
extension, or under conditions of termination/supersession,
uncertainty would emerge in connection with the 1994
Trilateral Statement; and 5) Paragraphs 2-29 of Article V of
the Treaty would still be valid in the future in any event.
In summary, Shevtsov promoted extension of START for 5 years
as the easiest means to attain these goals in a manner
consistent with Ukrainian security requirements. If a new
understanding or agreement were to be worked out, Ukraine
would wish to contribute to its negotiation and
implementation. If START were not to be continued, Ukraine
would need reaffirmation of the December 1994 assurances from
the nuclear weapon states in a legally-binding formulation,
as these guarantees were required for Ukraine to agree to
START and the Lisbon Protocol, and accede to the NPT as a
non-nuclear weapon state. Shevtsov said that if its
interests were not observed, Ukraine reserved the right to
reconsider its position vis-a-vis the NPT.

--------------
U.S. POSITION, REACTION TO
UKRAINIAN NPT "RECONSIDERATION"
--------------


8. (S) Taylor thanked all the Parties for their comments and
views, noting that they would be reported back to Washington.
Deploying U.S. points and the substance of the referenced
Note Verbale (Ref A),he stated that the U.S. believed that
the START Treaty should not be extended, although some
provisions of the Treaty might be carried forward,
emphasizing that its views would be guided in the future by
the results of senior level discussions regarding this issue.
He noted that today's meeting was being held to fulfill the
requirement of Paragraph 2 of Article XVII of the Treaty to
meet prior to December 5, 2008, to "consider" whether the
START Treaty will be extended for a period of 5 years. He
also noted that there is no Treaty requirement for the
Parties to make a decision to extend the START Treaty at this
meeting, and they would be at liberty to discuss this issue
at future JCIC sessions, and that a decision on this issue
could be made up until the date of expiration of the Treaty
on December 5, 2009.


9. (S) Turning to the comments of the Ukrainian Delegation,
Taylor noted his grave concern over the possibility of
Ukraine reconsidering NPT, citing its central role in nuclear
security. The United States and Russia, as nuclear weapon
states, continue to strive toward nuclear disarmament and
take these responsibilities seriously; even to cite the
possibility of reconsideration is frightening and should not
be taken lightly. Further informal assessments of the
statement of the Ukrainian position, and attempts to clarify
it, were expressed at the reception at the Mission of the
Russian Federation later that evening (Ref B).

--------------
RUSSIA ON UKRAINE'S POSSIBLE
"RECONSIDERATION" OF NPT
--------------


10. (S) In response to Taylor's deployment of points on the
U.S. position, Russian Representative Antonov responded that
naturally our political chiefs will take the correct
position, but let's help them through the analysis and
information that we will provide them. He stated that he
understood the U.S. position and he knew which START
provisions were to be carried forward. Turning to the
Ukrainian statement, Antonov sought amplification,
particularly regarding the possibility of uncertainty of the
Budapest Memorandum of December 1994, if the Treaty were to
cease to be in force, questioning the nature of such
uncertainty. Would those be economic problems, issues of
political independence? Shevtsov attempted to clarify the
Ukrainian view that three simultaneous events were
represented in the Budapest Memorandum, those being Ukraine
submitting its instrument of ratification of START, its
confirmation of the Lisbon Protocol as an integral part of
the Treaty, and the Rada's decision to support accession to
the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. The Rada, however,
views the security assurances from the nuclear weapon states
as pre-conditions for these actions, as set forth in the
Trilateral Statement. Thus the question arises, what would
be the future status of such assurances, would they be
reconfirmed? According to Shevtsov, with regard to START
extension, there is an internal debate as to whether Ukraine
did the right thing-should we have acceded to NPT and signed
START?


11. (S) Antonov responded that the security assurances
question is a simple one-Ukraine is a non-nuclear weapon
state Party to the NPT, with all rights and obligations
stemming from the spirit and the letter of that international
instrument. Ukraine received all positive and negative
assurances from all NPT states Parties; with regard to the
positive assurances, policy outlined in United Nations
Security Council Resolution 984 still stands; it relates to
Ukraine as well as to Belarus and Kazakhstan. On that basis,
in Russia's view, there should be no problem with security
assurances, nor any uncertainty with regard to the Budapest
Memorandum. Antonov expressed his continued concern with the
Ukrainian statement on reconsidering its status under NPT.
The NPT is a sacred cow of international security and should
not be underestimated, noted Antonov (while hoping that as a
"novice" he was not boring session participants),and no one
has the right to undermine it. Antonov said that he proceeds
from the understanding that Ukraine always complied with its
Treaty obligations under the NPT, but that he would be
concerned if Kyiv were even one one-thousandth of one percent
serious about reconsideration of NPT status, especially given
the current situation on nonproliferation issues with the
DPRK, Iran and Syrian portfolios, noting that Russia was
aware of U.S. concerns about Syria. Any signal of
reconsideration would be serious, and whatever the fate of
START, we must reconfirm our commitment to nonproliferation
and the importance of the NPT, particularly among START
parties.

--------------
SHEVTSOV: WHAT I MEANT TO SAY WAS...
--------------


12. (S) Shevtsov attempted to clarify yet again that Ukraine
was not going to "reconsider" but just to examine the
possibility of "exiting" from commitments, which would not
affect NPT, noting that it had other obligations, such as the
Lisbon Protocol and accompanying statements. (Begin Comment:
Please see (Ref B) on the reception at the Russian Mission
for elaboration on this issue. End comment.)

--------------
IMPROMPTU ANTONOV: NEWBIE HAS MORE IDEAS
--------------


13. (S) Changing the subject and identifying this as a
"personal proposal," Antonov said that he wanted to "enliven"
the discussion of a post-START instrument, proposing again
to hold meetings "without notes, and with smiles" in a
workshop or seminar mode with the concerns of all Parties to
be aired in order that they be effectively conveyed to
capitals. (Begin Comment: Perhaps due to his "novice"
status in JCIC, Antonov did not seem to notice his internal
contradiction of informing capitals without taking notes.
End Comment.) He said that Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine
might wish to know what the United States and Russia are
doing bilaterally, and this might make it easier in our
efforts to work on a new instrument. He posited that he
might be fired for saying such things, as he was uncertain of
what was happening at home while attending meetings in
Geneva, but he did say that this was the position of his
department. (Begin Comment: He did seem to be probing for
an informal mechanism to apprise the three other Treaty
partners of the course of any activity in bilateral
post-START discussions, while not directly involving them.
End Comment.)



14. (S) Representative Taylor thanked the Parties for their
views at the session, and accepted Antonov's offer to attend
the reception for all Delegations at the Russian Mission that
evening, thus bringing the meeting to a close.


15. (U) Documents provided: None.




16. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Taylor
Ms. Bosco
Mr. Brown
Lt Col Comeau
Mr. DeNinno
Mr. Dunn
Maj Edinger
Mr. Fortier
Mr. Hanchett
Mr. Johnston
Mr. Kuehne
Mr. Miller
Mrs. Nash
CDR Rust
Mr. Smith
Mr. Vogel
Mr. Yaguchi
Ms. Gross (Int)

BELARUS

Mr. Ugorich
Mr. Ponomarev

KAZAKHSTAN

Mr. Zhankuliyev
Mr. Kasenov
Mr. Torekeldi
Col Akhmetalin

RUSSIA

Mr. Antonov
Mr. Koshelev
Mr. Kashirin
Mr. Bolotov
Mr. Artem'yev
Mr. Bolotov
Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Serov
Capt(1st Rank) Kuz'min
Maj Gen Nikishin
Col Novikov
Col Zaytsev
Ms. Sorokina
Mr. Cheykin (Int)

UKRAINE

Dr. Shevtsov
Mr. Bondarenko
Mr. Arguchinskiy
MGen Fedotov
Mr. Makhonin
Mr. Galushchenko


17. (U) Taylor sends.
TICHENOR


NNNN




End Cable Text