Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08GENEVA983
2008-11-19 08:16:00
SECRET
US Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

JCIC-XXXIII: (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON

Tags:  KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ 
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O 190816Z NOV 08
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7493
CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE
DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
S E C R E T GENEVA 000983 


DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR HAYES
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2018
TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ

SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXIII: (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON
THE RS-24 PROTOTYPE ICBM AND PEACEKEEPER SILO CONVERSIONS,
NOVEMBER 14, 2008 CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

REF: A. STATE 87779 ANC-STR 08-660/3 (U.S. NRRC
NOTIFICATION PK SILO CONVERSION)

B. RUSSIAN AIDE-MEMOIRE ON RE-DESIGNATION OF
PEACEKEEPER SILO LAUNCHERS OCTOBER 20
2008 (NO REPORTING CABLE)

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.
Reasons: 1.5(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 000983


DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR HAYES
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2018
TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ

SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXIII: (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON
THE RS-24 PROTOTYPE ICBM AND PEACEKEEPER SILO CONVERSIONS,
NOVEMBER 14, 2008 CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

REF: A. STATE 87779 ANC-STR 08-660/3 (U.S. NRRC
NOTIFICATION PK SILO CONVERSION)

B. RUSSIAN AIDE-MEMOIRE ON RE-DESIGNATION OF
PEACEKEEPER SILO LAUNCHERS OCTOBER 20
2008 (NO REPORTING CABLE)

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.
Reasons: 1.5(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is JCIC-XXXIII-011.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 14, 2008
Time: 3:30 P.M. - 5:00 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) A Heads of Delegation Meeting (HOD) was held at the
Russian Mission on November 14, 2008, to discuss U.S.
conversion of Peacekeeper (PK) ICBM silo launchers into
Minuteman III ICBM silo launchers and, U.S. concerns
regarding Russia's declaration of the RS-24 ICBM prototype as
a new type of mobile ICBM. All Parties were present.


4. (S) The Russian Delegation began by conveying Russia's
concerns that the procedure used to notify Russia that 50 PK
ICBM silo launchers had been converted to Minuteman III ICBM
silo launchers were not in accordance with the Treaty. Also,
results of an inspection at F. E. Warren ICBM Base increased
Russian concerns and created doubt as to whether the
conversion process had taken place. Russian inspectors
viewed the interior of a silo launcher and observed elements
of the silo launcher that it believed were characteristics of
a PK ICBM silo launcher. The U.S. side responded that it was
still studying the issue, and would take the information
provided by Russia back to Washington.


5. (S) The U.S. side outlined U.S. concerns regarding

Russian plans to declare the RS-24 prototype ICBM as a new
type. The U.S. side explained that the original SS-25
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) data had been changed when
the RS-12M Variant 2 (SS-27) was declared. All of the data
available to the United States indicated that the RS-24 was
very similar to the RS-12M Variant 2. The United States
questioned the Russian Federation's Treaty basis for using
the original versus updated MOU data as criteria for
declaring the RS-24 as a new type of ICBM. The Russian
Delegation said its response to this question has not
changed; however, requested a written copy of the points
expressed by the U.S. Delegation to bring back to Moscow.

--------------
PK SILO CONVERSION: A VIRTUAL REALITY
--------------


6. (S) Kashirin opened the HOD meeting at the Russian
Mission on November 14, 2008, and clarified Russian concerns
regarding a notification provided by the United States dated
August 15, 2008 (Ref A),declaring that 50 PK silo launchers
had been converted to Minuteman III ICBM silo launchers.
These actions by the United States are contrary to the Treaty
requirements (Paragraph 7 of Article III of the Treaty and
Section IV of the Notification Protocol). Specifically, the
United States did not notify the Russian Federation of its
intentions to begin the conversion process nor of its
intentions to install an ICBM of a different type into the
converted silos.

--------------
IF YOU LOOK AT THE TREATY
--------------


7. (S) Kashirin reminded the U.S. Delegation of U.S.
obligations under the Notification Protocol. The Party
carrying out such conversion is obligated: In accordance
with (IAW) Paragraph 1 of Section IV of the Protocol, to
provide notification, no less than 30 days in advance of the
initiation of the respective process of conversion, of the
intention to carry out such procedures; IAW Paragraph 2 of
Section IV of the Protocol, to provide notification, no later
than 5 days after the initiation of the respective process of
conversion, of the date on which the conversion process
began; and, IAW Paragraph 3 of Section IV of the Notification
Protocol, to provide notification, no less than 5 days in
advance, of the intention to install an ICBM of a different
type or a training model a different type in a silo launcher
of ICBMs if, during the conversion of such silo launcher of
ICBMs, the silo door was not removed. Russia provided an
aide-memoire on September 2, 2008 (Ref B),conveying these
concerns but had yet to receive a response from the United
States.

--------------
SO WHAT REALLY HAPPENED?
--------------


8. (S) Kashirin then spoke about the results of a Reentry
Vehicle Inspection conducted at F. E. Warren ICBM Base
(September 19-20, 2008),which increased Russian concerns.
As reported by Russian inspectors, a senior site official
declared that modifications of the PK silos had not been
carried out. Furthermore, the DTRA escort team chief
explained that the 50 silos had been re-designated as
Minuteman III Silo Launchers and authorities have this
information. (Begin Note: Upon further investigation by the
U.S. Delegation it was determined that the Wing Commander at

F. E. Warren actually made this statement during the
pre-inspection procedures. End Note.)


9. (S) Kashirin stated that Russian inspectors viewed silo
launcher P6 which formerly contained a PK ICBM. Russian
inspectors were unable to see any signs that a conversion
process occurred. In fact, the launcher still contained a PK
canister; the launch canister was braced by elements of the
suspension system. (Note: The canister mentioned is
actually a large sleeve placed within the PK silo to enable
cold launch of the ICBM. End Note.) The upper portion of
the metal shaft of the silo had been removed, which is a
characteristic feature of a PK ICBM silo launcher. (Begin
Note: PK silos were originally Minuteman silos. Prior to
START Treaty entry into force the USAF modified 50 Minuteman
silos to accommodate PK ICBMs by removing a portion of the
upper silo. End Note.) Therefore, Kashirin concluded, no
conversion took place and the virtual declaration to
Minuteman III ICBM silo launchers occurred in violation of
the Treaty. Kashirin asked for an explanation.


10. (S) Taylor responded that the United States understood
and that it was still studying the issue. Taylor said that
the new information presented by the Russian side would be
included in the U.S. evaluation of this issue.

--------------
THE RS-24 IS AN SS-27
ONLY IF YOU USE LOGIC
--------------


11. (S) Taylor stated that although the Russian Delegation
had provided some additional information during previous JCIC
sessions, the United States continued to have concerns with
respect to Russia's declaration of a prototype as a new type
of mobile ICBM and how the provisions of the Treaty would be
applied to that missile once declared to be a new type
missile. With recent statements in the Russian press by the
Chief Designer of the RS-24 ICBM, Yuri Solomonov, indicating
that the RS-24 ICBM will enter service in 2009, the United
States continued to seek additional information regarding
Russian Federation plans for the testing and deployment of
the RS-24.


12. (S) With respect to the Russian statement that the RS-24
will be a new type of missile, and based upon the information
provided by the Russian Federation to date, the United States
did not see how the RS-24 ICBM could be sufficiently
different from the current MOU data for the RS-12M to qualify
as a new type. This was further reinforced by the fact that
the acceleration profiles provided by the Russian Federation
for the flight tests of the RS-12M Variant 2 and the RS-24
appeared to be very similar.


13. (S) Considering that the Russian Federation changed the
size criteria for the RS-12M in JCIC Agreement Number 22 in
1994 and its throw-weight in 1999, all of which comprises the
current MOU data for the RS-12M, the United States would like
to better understand the Russian Federation's Treaty basis
for using the initial MOU data declared for the RS-12M as the
criteria for declaration of a new type of ICBM.


14. (S) The United States also urged the Russian Federation
to provide additional information regarding the physical
differences between the prototype RS-24 ICBM and the SS-27
ICBM beyond the transport cap being painted red and an
"identifier" placed on the left side instead of a unique
identifier on the right side of the missile canister so that
U.S. inspectors and monitors can differentiate between the
two missiles when the missiles are in an operational versus a
transport configuration.


15. (S) Additionally, the United States previously informed
the Russian Delegation that the current MOU photographs of
the SS-27 ICBM in its launch canister no longer corresponded
to the configuration of these missiles as they currently
exited Votkinsk and requested more updated MOU photographs to
better assist U.S. monitors and inspectors in differentiating
RS-24 and SS-27 ICBMs in the future. However, updated MOU
photographs had not yet been received.


16. (C) The United States looked forward to receiving
additional information regarding these concerns and were
prepared to work with the Russian Federation to find ways to
address these issues.


17. (S) Kashirin requested that the United States provide
Russia in writing the U.S points presented during the
meeting. Kashirin added that he would provide the U.S.
comments to Solomonov (RS-24 missile designer) and everyone
else concerned.


18. (S) Taylor agreed to provide the Russian Delegation with
his comments.


19. (S) Below is the official translation of the points
provided by the Russian Delegation on Re-declaration of PK
ICBM Silo Launchers at Warren. (Begin Comment: The Russian
Delegation paper was provided to the U.S. Delegation on
November 17, 2008, and is provided for clarity purposes. End
Comment.)

Begin text:
Official Translation

JCIC-XXXIII
Text of the Remarks
by the Representative of
the
Russian Federation at the
Plenary Meeting
November 14, 2008

Re-declaration of Peacekeeper ICBM
Silo Launchers at Warren

On August 15 we received START notification ANC-STR
08-660/3 from the United States of America through NRRC
channels; according to that notification 50 Peacekeeper ICBM
launchers are being reattributed as launchers converted for
Minuteman III ICBMs.

These actions by the United States of America are
contrary to the Treaty requirements (paragraph 7 of Article
III and Section IV of the Notification Protocol).

Specifically, the U.S. did not notify the Russian side
of its intention to carry out such conversion, of the
initiation of conversion, or of its intention to install
ICBMs of a different type in the converted launchers.

We would remind you that in accordance with the
Notification Protocol, the Party carrying out such conversion
is obligated:


1. Based on paragraph 1 of Section IV of the Protocol,
to provide notification, no less than 30 days in advance of
the initiation of the respective processes of conversion, of
the intention to carry out such procedures.


2. Based on paragraph 2 of Section IV of the Protocol,
to provide notification, no later than 5 days after the
initiation of the respective processes of conversion, of the
date on which the conversion process began.


3. Based on paragraph 3 of Section IV of the Protocol,
to provide notification, no less than five days in advance,
of the intention to install an ICBM of a different type or a
training model a different type in a silo launcher of ICBMs
if, during the conversion of such silo launcher of ICBMs, the
silo door was not removed.

The Russian side presented its concerns regarding this
problem in the document provided to the United States of
America through diplomatic channels on September 2, 2008.
However, there has thus far been no response to that document.

On September 19, 2008, the Russian side conducted a
reentry vehicle inspection of deployed ICBMs at Warren
Missile Complex ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs, under
paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty.

The results of that inspection only reinforced the
Russian concerns. We are referring to the following.

During the pre-inspection briefing the senior facility
representative responsible for Treaty implementation at the
base stated that no modification of the Peacekeeper ICBM silo
launchers at the base was conducted. This was noted by all
the Russian inspectors. The senior escort, an official from
the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, noted in this connection
that the U.S. side had simply "redesignated" these 50 silo
launchers and that only the diplomatic authorities have
complete information in this regard.

During the inspection of one of the launchers,
designated on the site diagram of the base as R-6, which had
previously contained a Peacekeeper ICBM, no signs were
detected that any conversion work had been done on the
launcher. In the silo the presence of a Peacekeeper launch
canister was noted; the launch canister was braced by
elements of the suspension system. The upper portion of the
metal shaft of the silo had been removed, which is a
characteristic feature of a Peacekeeper ICBM silo launcher.

Thus, the results of this inspection confirmed that
there had been no conversion of the launchers in question and
their "re-declaration" as launchers of ICBMs of a different
type (Minuteman III) was carried out in violation of the
provisions of the Notification Protocol and is contrary to
the requirements of paragraph 7 of Article III of the START
Treaty. In view of this, we do not understand what is meant
by the following comment in the aforementioned notification:
"Silo launchers for Peacekeeper ICBMs were converted to silo
launchers for Minuteman III ICBMs so that they are now
incapable of launching an ICBM of the previous type.

We would ask the U.S. side to provide appropriate
clarification.

End text.


20. (U) Documents exchange: None.


21. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Taylor
Ms. Bosco
Mr. Brown
Lt Col Comeau
Mr. DeNinno
Mr. Dunn
Maj Edinger
Mr. Fortier
Mr. Johnston
Mr. Kuehne
LTC Oppenheim
CDR Rust
Mr. Smith
Col Summers
Mr. Vogel
Mr. Yaguchi
Ms. Gross (Int)

BELARUS

Mr. Ponomarev

KAZAKHSTAN

Col Akhmetalin

RUSSIA

Mr. Kashirin
Mr. Bolotov
Col Ryzhkov
Capt(1st Rank) Kuz'min
Maj Gen Nikishin
Col Novikov
Col Zaytsev
Ms. Komshilova (Int)

UKRAINE

Dr. Shevtsov
Mr. Bondarenko


22. (U) Taylor sends.
TICHENOR


NNNN




End Cable Text