Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08GENEVA976
2008-11-18 14:54:00
SECRET
US Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

JCIC-XXXIII: (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON

Tags:  KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ 
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O 181454Z NOV 08
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7475
CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE
DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
S E C R E T GENEVA 000976 


DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR HAYES
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2018
TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ

SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXIII: (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON
SS-27 RVOSI AND MM III RVOSI, NOVEMBER 14, 2008

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.
Reasons: 1.5(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 000976


DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR HAYES
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2018
TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ

SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXIII: (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON
SS-27 RVOSI AND MM III RVOSI, NOVEMBER 14, 2008

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.
Reasons: 1.5(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is JCIC-XXXIII-010.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 14, 2008
Time: 10:30 A.M. - 11:30 A.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) A Heads of Delegation (HOD) meeting was held at the
Russian Mission on November 14, 2008, to discuss the SS-27
Reentry Vehicle On-site Inspection (RVOSI) and Minuteman III
(MM III) RVOSI procedures. All Parties were represented.


4. (S) The U.S. Delegation stated that the United States
remained concerned that the covers used during SS-27 RVOSIs
did not allow inspectors to determine that the number of
reentry vehicles (RVs) present did not exceed the one warhead
attributed to the SS-27 ICBM. Additionally, these concerns
had been heightened by press accounts inside Russia that
continued to indicate that Russia is planning to deploy the
SS-27 with multiple warheads and the similarities between the
SS-27 attributed with a single warhead and the prototype
RS-24 that has been flight tested with multiple RVs.


5. (S) The Russian Delegation stated that the mass media
sometimes confused issues because it did not have all the
facts and that the Russian Federation had no intention of
deploying the SS-27 with more warheads than the number with
which it is attributed.


6. (S) On the issue of MMIII RVOSI, the Russian Delegation
stated there were four main points of the Russian side's
position regarding a one-time demonstration of the MM III
ICBM front section: 1) the Russian side was interested in a
one-time demonstration of the Minuteman III ICBM front

section in order to ascertain that the space inside the lower
portion of the missile front section could not contain items
commensurate with reentry vehicles and was prepared to
participate in this event; 2) in the Russian side's view, it
did not appear possible to resolve this concern without
holding a one-time demonstration; 3) the mere fact of
conducting a demonstration, without analyzing its results,
could not guarantee resolution of the problem; and 4) based
on the results of the demonstration, the Russian side was
also prepared to consider the U.S. position that any
additional devices (for example, mirror-type devices) used
during the demonstration would not be used in future
inspections.

--------------
SS-27 - OPEN PRESS IS GOOD
--------------


7. (S) Taylor opened the HOD Meeting at the Russian Mission
on November 14, 2008, and stated that the United States
remained concerned that the covers used during SS-27 RVOSIs
did not allow inspectors to determine that the number of RVs
present did not exceed the one warhead attributed to the
SS-27 ICBM. These concerns had been heightened by specific
facts pertaining to the SS-27. First, press accounts inside
Russia continued to indicate that Russia was planning to
deploy the SS-27 with multiple warheads. Second, the United


States saw similarities between the SS-27 attributed with a
single warhead and the prototype RS-24 that had been flight
tested with multiple RVs. Furthermore, the SS-27 was a
variant of the SS-25 which had been flight-tested with a
substantially lighter RV. Taylor stated that although
Russian press had also reported that the SS-27 was deployed
with only one RV, Russia had maintained its practice of using
a very large cover on the front section during all road
mobile and silo-based SS-27 RVOSIs. This cover prevented
U.S. inspectors from exercising their treaty right to confirm
that these missiles contained no more reentry vehicles than
the number of warheads attributed to them. All of this
increased U.S. concerns regarding the number of RVs deployed
on both the silo-based and road-mobile versions of the SS-27
ICBM.

--------------
YOUR SYSTEM, YOUR
RESPONSIBILITY
--------------


8. (S) Taylor said that the United States believed that the
responsibility for proposing solutions that would resolve
U.S. concerns rested with the Russian Federation, not only
because it was the obligation of the inspected Party not to
hamper the inspecting Party in ascertaining that the front
section contained no more RVs than the number of warheads
attributed to missiles of that type, but also because Russia,
not the United States, understood the sensitivities involved
with the SS-27 system. The United States remained prepared
to work seriously, and in good faith, with the Russian
Federation to resolve this issue to the satisfaction of both
sides and would be willing to explore possible SS-27 RVOSI
solutions that took into account whatever sensitive know-how
exists on that system that has led to the use of overly large
covers.

--------------
SS-27 RVOSI - AND THE
NUMBER SHALL BE ONE
--------------


9. (S) Kashirin repeated that Russia had no intention of
deploying the SS-27 with more warheads than what it was
attributed with, which was one. The United States could
check the Russian-provided telemetry for SS-27 flight tests
to confirm this position and validate that Russia was not
violating the Treaty. Missile experts could determine
through telemetry that the SS-25 and SS-27 had only one
reentry vehicle and that the RS-24 was MIRVd. Further
complicating the issue was that it was difficult to get funds
to construct a new cover for use during RVOSIs at this stage
in START. Kashirin said that he was working with experts in
Moscow to find steps to resolve U.S. concerns. However, he
was encountering the same difficulties he encountered when
developing the Vypolzovo demonstration.

--------------
SS-27 RVOSI - MASS MEDIA
JUST CAUSES PROBLEMS
--------------


10. (S) Kashirin stated that the press and mass media are to
blame for the confusion with Russian SS-27 RVOSI procedures.
The press and mass media that covered missile development
sometimes mistakenly called all missiles Topol. The same
situation existed when the U.S. press published incorrect
facts concerning missile flights out of Plesetsk Test Range
or Baikanour Space Launch Facility.

--------------
CAN'T BLAME THE
PRESS FOR THIS MESS
--------------


11. (S) Taylor appreciated the predicament that both sides
found themselves in as START got closer to expiration.
However, limited funding did not relieve the obligation to
meet the requirements of the Treaty. He could also
appreciate that our press took liberties, and that this
created problems by having insufficient information.
Concerns raised by press reports could be understandable, but
taking into consideration all of the other sources of
information available is what created the U.S. concern.


12. (S) Taylor said he appreciated all of the effort and
time taken to conduct the Vypolzovo SS-25 demonstration.
That demonstration and others such as the Trident RVOSI and
Tridents in containers demonstrations showed the effort
needed to resolve an issue. Taylor asked Kashirin if it was
an accurate statement to say that the Russian Federation
continued to work to resolve this issue.


13. (S) Kashirin added the SS-18 RVOSI demonstration to the
list of successful demonstrations and confirmed that Russia
was continuing to work to resolve the SS-27 RVOSI issue.

--------------
MM III's BIG FOUR
--------------


14. (S) Kashirin said that as a result of the Russian
Delegation describing Russian MM III RVOSI concerns in detail
at the last session, the Parties could now work out the
details of the demonstration. He said that there were four
main points of the Russian side's position regarding a
one-time demonstration of the MM III ICBM front section: 1)
the Russian side was interested in a one-time demonstration
of the Minuteman III ICBM front section in order to ascertain
that the space inside the lower portion of the missile front
section could not contain items commensurate with reentry
vehicles and was prepared to participate in this event; 2) in
the Russian side's view, it did not appear possible to
resolve this concern without holding a one-time
demonstration; 3) the mere fact of conducting a
demonstration, without analyzing its results, could not
guarantee resolution of the problem; and 4) based on the
results of the demonstration, the Russian side was also
prepared to consider the U.S. position that any additional
devices (for example, mirror-type devices) used during the
demonstration would not be used in future inspections.


15. (S) Kashirin requested clarification of the U.S. plans
to arrange a one-time demonstration and expressed readiness
to further discuss any issues in order to move forward on
resolving this problem. He said the Russian Delegation was
also prepared to take part in further discussion of this
issue in the working group format, so as to consider in
detail, with the participation of experts, and if possible
reach agreement on, the procedural, technical, and
organizational aspects.


16. (S) Taylor ended the meeting by stating that it would be
helpful if the Russian Delegation provided these four points
in writing so that the United States could fully understand
Russian concerns, to which Kashirin agreed.



17. (U) Documents Exchanged: None


18. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Taylor
Mr. Brown
Lt Col Comeau
Mr. DeNinno
Mr. Dunn
Maj Edinger
Mr. Fortier
Mr. Hanchett
Mr. Johnston
Mr. Kuehne
Mr. Miller
LTC Oppenheim
CDR Rust
Mr. Smith
Col Summers
Mr. Yaguchi
Mr. French (Int)

BELARUS

Mr. Ponomarev

KAZAKHSTAN

Col Akhmetalin
Mr. Kasenov
Mr. Torekeldi

RUSSIA

Mr. Kashirin
Col Ryzhkov
Capt(1st Rank) Kuz'min
Col Novikov
Mr. Bolotov
Ms. Sorokina
Col Zaytsev
Mr. Gusev (Int)

UKRAINE

Dr. Shevtsov
Mr. Bondarenko


19. (U) Taylor sends.
TICHENOR


NNNN




End Cable Text