Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08GENEVA968
2008-11-14 15:38:00
SECRET
US Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

TAYLOR/ANTONOV MEETING, NOVEMBER 12, 2008

Tags:  KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
O 141538Z NOV 08
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7466
CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE
DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
S E C R E T GENEVA 000968 


DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR HAYES
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2018
TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ
PGOV, PREL, JA, MOPS

SUBJECT: TAYLOR/ANTONOV MEETING, NOVEMBER 12, 2008

REF: 07 BERLIN 000750

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.
Reasons: 1.5(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 000968


DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR HAYES
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2018
TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ
PGOV, PREL, JA, MOPS

SUBJECT: TAYLOR/ANTONOV MEETING, NOVEMBER 12, 2008

REF: 07 BERLIN 000750

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.
Reasons: 1.5(b) and (d).


1. (U) Meeting Date: November 12, 2008
Time: 3:15 P.M. - 4:05 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva, Switzerland

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


2. (S) At the request of the Russian Federation, Taylor and
Kuehne met with Antonov, Buzhinskiy, and Koshelev at the
Russian Mission to address Russian questions regarding a
post-START agreement. Antonov, after commenting on that days
CCW meeting in Geneva, questioned whether it would be useful
for the Russian side to meet again with the United States
prior to the change of administration since the U.S. and
Russian views were so far apart with respect to a post-START
agreement. Antonov lamented that the United States had not
taken into consideration any of the Russian ideas from over a
year ago. Buzhinskiy stated that he didn't see value in
trying to work a common text when there remained fundamental
disagreement on the basis of any agreement. Taylor stated
that in his opinion, for Russia's most current views to be
accurately conveyed to the next administration, Russia would
do well to meet again with the United States on this issue
and to provide a written response to the U.S.-provided draft
treaty text. Antonov also inquired as to the possibility of
extending the START Treaty for a period of less than 5 years.
Taylor explained that any proposal to extend START for less

than 5 years would require U.S. Senate advice and consent.

--------------
WHY MEET AGAIN?
--------------


3. (S) Antonov opened the meeting by introducing Buzhinskiy,
whom Antonov stated had been with him all day at their
meetings regarding CCW. (Note: The Russian Federation had
stated earlier that only Antonov and Koshelev would be
present at the meeting with Taylor. End Note.) Antonov
observed that the meetings on CCW that day had failed because
the Europeans had not supported the U.S. position, which the
Russian Federation had been prepared to support. Now the
Russian Federation would have to reexamine its position and
try to find a means to bridge the differences between the
United States and Europe. Antonov stated that the Russian
Federation now wanted to be closer to the European position.


4. (S) On post-START, Antonov stated that he was
disappointed with the U.S. draft treaty text. He stated that
the draft text included only U.S. ideas and had ignored all
of the Russian ideas. Antonov humorously observed that while
Buzhinskiy might be more flexible on the content of the draft
treaty, he was not. Taylor responded that the U.S. draft
treaty text had included some ideas that the Russians and the
U.S. had agreed on, such as data exchanges, notifications,
visits and definitions. Taylor acknowledged that the U.S.
draft was based on a Moscow Treaty approach, rather than the
Russian desire to more closely follow a START approach.
Antonov asked rhetorically if the United States believed
everything in a Cold War treaty was bad, and stated that he
believed this attitude would change after the Obama
Administration took office.


5. (S) Antonov stated that he was not persuaded that now was
the time to meet for discussions on a post-START agreement,
and asked whether the United States and Russia shouldn't wait
to convene the next meeting on this subject until after
January 21, 2009. Antonov added that he expected the Obama
team to be more flexible toward the Russian ideas. Taylor
responded that the Bush Administration still represents the
U.S. Government and that there was an interest in Washington
to see what the Russian views were regarding the draft treaty
and to move forward on a post-START agreement. Antonov
stated that Russia had already provided its views last year
in Berlin (Ref),and that these views represented Russia's
minimum requests. Antonov stated that he didn't know what to
do now since he didn't know how to deal with the current
Administration. A new era under Obama could present new
opportunities; after all, Obama had stated that he wanted to
make the world free of nuclear weapons. Taylor observed that
both Russia and the Untied States had already signed up to
the NPT and its commitment to work toward nuclear
disarmament. Antonov countered that the world community
expected further cuts in nuclear weapons; he couldn't see
beyond START without there being agreement to some decrease
in the number of U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons.

--------------
NEED TO NEGOTIATE
--------------


6. (S) Taylor stated if Russia desired to move forward on
post-START, then there had to be a negotiation. In the
normal course of negotiations, there should be a
counter-proposal to the U.S. draft treaty text. After all,
the United States had begun this process by accepting the
Russian proposal to have a legally binding treaty, and had
provided accordingly a draft treaty text. Antonov dismissed
Taylor's assertion and observed that the U.S. knew it would
be impossible to achieve agreement without a legal document.
Taylor observed that the United States and Russia had, in
fact, already accomplished significant results in their
military-to-military exchanges, none of which were based on
legally binding agreements.


7. (S) Buzhinskiy stated that his experience was that two
parties needed a common basis in order to have a successful
negotiation. At present, the United States and Russia did
not have a common basis for post-START. In 2001, the United
States and Russia did not have to agree on operationally
deployed strategic nuclear warheads as the basis for the
Moscow Treaty since the parties already had the START Treaty
as their basis. Without START as the basis, we can't keep
the Moscow Treaty concept in which one side has the potential
for 5000 warheads but only declares 1700 deployed nuclear
warheads.


8. (S) Antonov again asked what purpose there would be in
having a meeting with the current Administration. Taylor
responded that a meeting would provide an opportunity for the
United States and Russia to understand more clearly the
position of the other. Kuehne added that any update to the
Russian position would be included in briefings on the
subject that would be provided during the transition to the
new administration. Antonov observed that former DFM Kislyak
might have been more willing to have experts meet to discuss
the issues, but Antonov wanted to know if there was any
chance for a dramatic change in the U.S. position. (Note:
Antonov displayed a skeptical tone in describing Kislyak's
willingness to hold meetings. End note.) Taylor responded
that he couldn't say what the new Administration's response
would be to a Russian proposal. Antonov acknowledged that
there was no way to know if the Obama Administration would
support or reject the Russian proposal.

--------------

WHAT DO WE SAY ABOUT EXTENDING START?
--------------


9. (S) Antonov stated that he hoped the United States and
Russia had a unified position with respect to extending the
START Treaty. He did not want Russia to be singled out for
blame for not wanting to extend START. Taylor stated that
like Russia, the United States did not want to extend START
in its current form. However, it was important to note that
the United States was not looking for a decision on extending
START as a result of the meeting in the JCIC next week.
Antonov stated that perhaps the United States and Russia
should simply repeat the relevant part of the Sochi statement
in which we said we would seek a post-START agreement.
Taylor responded that he did not believe it appropriate to
bring up in a multilateral JCIC discussion the bilateral work
of the U.S. and Russia regarding a post-START agreement. The
purpose of the meeting was to meet the minimum requirement of
START Article XVII to consider extending START. There was no
requirement to reach a decision at this time.


10. (S) Antonov asked if it were possible to extend the
START Treaty for less than a 5-year period. He had heard
some speculation that the Treaty could be extended for one
year while the United States and Russia negotiated a new
agreement. Taylor responded that it was possible to extend
the Treaty for less than 5 years, but such an extension would
have to be agreed by all five parties and, for the United
States, would have to be sent to the U.S. Senate for advice
and consent.


11. (U) Delegation lists:

U.S. Delegation

Mr. Taylor
Mr. Kuehne

Russian Delegation

Mr. Antonov
Gen Buzhinskiy
Mr. Koshelev


12. (U) Taylor sends.
TICHENOR


NNNN




End Cable Text