Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08GENEVA603
2008-07-25 15:20:00
SECRET
US Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

JCIC-XXXII: U.S. CLOSING PLENARY STATEMENT, JULY

Tags:  KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ 
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O 251520Z JUL 08
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6860
CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
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S E C R E T GENEVA 000603 


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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2018
TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ

SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXII: U.S. CLOSING PLENARY STATEMENT, JULY
24, 2008

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States
Representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection
Commission. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 000603


DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LUTI
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2018
TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ

SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXII: U.S. CLOSING PLENARY STATEMENT, JULY
24, 2008

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States
Representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection
Commission. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is JCIC-XXXII-020.

. (U) Paragraph 3 below contains the text of the U.S.
statement that was delivered at the closing plenary meeting
of the Thirty-second Session of the START Treaty's Joint
Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC),held at the
Russian Mission on July 24, 2008. The unclassified
attachments, referred to in this closing statement, will be
sent septel.


3. (S) Begin text:

STATEMENT
BY THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO
THE JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION
AT THE CLOSING PLENARY MEETING
OF THE THIRTY-SECOND SESSION

July 24, 2008

The U.S. Delegation joins with the Representatives of
the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the
Russian Federation, and Ukraine in closing the Thirty-second
session of the START Treaty's Joint Compliance and Inspection
Commission.

I

This has again been a productive session despite the
short duration and compressed work schedule. During our
opening meeting, the U.S. Delegation indicated that, after
nearly six years of discussion on Ukrainian proposals to
eliminate SS-24 solid rocket motor cases and remove them from
START accountability in a manner that would permit their
reuse in a civilian capacity, the Parties were close to
resolution of that issue. As an additional element of the
resolution of elimination of SS-24 solid rocket motor cases,
Ukraine has made a unilateral statement committing Ukraine
not to transfer those eliminated cases beyond its national
territory. The U.S. Delegation also indicated that, after

some additional clarification of Russian-proposed changes to
the Drovyanaya ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs site
diagram, the United States was prepared to complete the
S-Series Joint Statement on Drovyanaya. I am pleased to
acknowledge that both of these issues have been resolved.

These successes are indicative of our Governments'
commitment and ability to work together constructively,
during the intersessional period, in concert with the
business-like maner in which we approach these issues here
in Geneva.

II

TheUnited States continues to be extremely concerned
regarding the use of very large covers on missilefront
sections during SS-27 Silo and road-mobileICBM reentry
vehicle on-site inspections (RVOSIs). The use of these large
covers prohibits our inspectors from ascertaining that the
front section contains no more reentry vehicles than the one
warhead attributed to these missiles. We understand that the
Russian Federation is studying how to resolve this issue and
we look forward to its solution.


III

The U.S. Delegation welcomes the changes that have been
made to the SS-25 elimination procedures beginning in 2008.
To date, 28 SS-25 ICBMs have been eliminated. However, the
United States still has concerns with the 109 SS-25 ICBMs
which the Russian Federation has removed from accountability,
but that the U.S. does not consider to have been eliminated.
Until all elements of those remaining 109 missiles are
eliminated, the United States cannot consider those ICBMs to
have been eliminated under the Treaty. The United States
understands that the Russian Federation is studying how to
resolve this issue and looks forward to a satisfactory
resolution soon.

IV

The Parties again discussed Russian concerns about
Minuteman III RVOSI. The U.S. Delegation understands that
the Russian Federation cannot commit to resolution of the
issue until a demonstration of the interior space under the
lower portion of the front section has been conducted.
However, if the United States were to commit to such a
demonstration, the Russian Federation must understand that
any additional procedures that may be used during such a
demonstration would not be incorporated into the existing
Minuteman III RVOSI procedures. The United States would
expect that inspectors would be satisfied with the results of
the demonstration and determine that additional procedures
would not be necessary for any follow-on RVOSI of MM III.

V

The Parties also discussed Russian concerns with the
Courtland Missile Assembly Facility. The U.S. Delegation
provided explanations and answers to the Russian Aide-Memoire
of March 28, 2008. The U.S. Delegation stresses that there
will be no new production of Trident I first stages at this
facility. The U.S. Delegation also stresses that the Trident
I first stages that are assembled into target vehicles
supporting U.S. Missile Defense programs remain accountable
under the Treaty and subject to the Treaty's provisions.

VI

Russian concerns with the conversion of the B-1 heavy
bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range
nuclear ALCMs to a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear
armaments was discussed at this session, as was the issue of
the basing of these converted B-1 heavy bombers. The U.S.
Delegation notes that the distinguishing features for the
converted heavy bombers were confirmed by Russian, Ukrainian
and Belarusian inspectors. Concerns with the conversion, as
expressed by the Russian Delegation, include that the items
removed from the aircraft to make it incapable of carrying
nuclear armaments were not demonstrated to the Russian
inspectors, Russian inspectors cannot confirm that the
aircraft is no longer capable of carrying nuclear armaments,
and have concerns that the conversion is not "irreversible."
The U.S. Delegation reemphasizes that the conversion
procedures used by the U.S. render the converted B-1 heavy
bombers incapable of carrying nuclear armaments in accordance
with paragraph 11 of Section VI of the Conversion or
Elimination Protocol. The U.S. also points out that there is
no Treaty obligation to demonstrate the items removed during
the conversion process. Additionally, the phrase "incapable
of carrying," in its ordinary meaning, as well as in the
context of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, means
that, with respect to the modifications carried out on the
pylon attachment joints and in the weapons bay, the converted
B-1 heavy bomber is no longer capable of, or suited for, the
operational deployment of nuclear armaments. It is clear, in
both Russian and English language texts that the phrase
"carrying nuclear armaments" does not mean simply the ability
to load or hold an object the size and weight of a nuclear
weapon. The criterion of capability or suitability to
support the operational use of the nuclear armaments, as
being inherent in the phrase "incapable of carrying nuclear
armaments," is consistent with the meaning of "carry" as used
in the START Treaty. Furthermore, the U.S. Delegation
stresses that there are no Treaty provisions that give the
other Parties the right to seek agreement on the conversion
procedures. Conversion procedures are at the discretion of
the Party conducting the conversion. What is relevant to the
inspection regime is the recognition of the distinguishing
features declared by the inspected Party, as well as the
confirmation by the inspecting Party of the requirements for
conversion.

Regarding the basing of the converted heavy bombers, the
U.S. Delegation stresses that, for Treaty accountability,
these heavy bombers are attributed to the Davis-Monthan
Conversion or Elimination Facility in the MOU. Converted
B-1s located at facilities other than Davis-Monthan will be
there in a "visiting" status.

VII

The United States appreciated hearing the views of the
other START Treaty Parties regarding the issue of meeting to
consider the extension of the Treaty in accordance with
Article XVII. As was made clear by the Parties, this is an
important issue that will require consideration by capitals.
The United States looks forward to working with its Treaty
partners on this matter during the intersessional period.

VIII

With the expectation that the START Treaty will expire
in December 2009, the Parties initiated discussion of the
activities and the planning that will be required for closing
of the Votkinsk Portal Monitoring Facility and the various
Points of Entry related to the START Treaty. The United
States is aware that much work needs to be done to
efficiently and effectively close those locations. The U.S.
Delegation agrees that there are many logistical issues that
must be resolved and that those details must be worked
together with our Treaty partners. We also note that this
planning must take into account that the United States
expects to exercise its Treaty inspection and monitoring
rights until the expiration of the START Treaty.

IX

We once again strongly encourage our Treaty partners to
communicate, through diplomatic channels, their views on
agenda items, as well as any related information in support
of those views well in advance of our next JCIC session.

As we continue to learn, communication and dialogue in
advance of a session are key to enhancing our chances of
success when we meet here in Geneva.


X

Thank you all for your work here in Geneva. I look
forward to continuing to work together during the
intersessional period.

Once again, I would like to thank our translators and
interpreters for their exceptional work. Without them, we
could not function.

Have a safe journey home.

End text.


4. (U) Taylor sends.
TICHENOR


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End Cable Text