Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08GENEVA602
2008-07-25 15:06:00
SECRET
US Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

JCIC-XXXII: RUSSIAN PAPER CONTAINING QUESTIONS ON

Tags:  KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
O 251506Z JUL 08
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6858
CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE
DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MINSK PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
S E C R E T GENEVA 000602 


DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LUTI
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2018
TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ

SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXII: RUSSIAN PAPER CONTAINING QUESTIONS ON
CLOSING VOTKINSK

REF: GENEVA 0583 (JCIC-XXXII-010)

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States
Representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection
Commission. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 000602


DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LUTI
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2018
TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ

SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXII: RUSSIAN PAPER CONTAINING QUESTIONS ON
CLOSING VOTKINSK

REF: GENEVA 0583 (JCIC-XXXII-010)

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States
Representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection
Commission. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is JCIC-XXXII-017.


2. (U) The text at paragraph 3 below is the official
translation of a paper containing "Russian Questions on the
Completion of Continuous Monitoring at Votkinsk and Closure
of Points of Entry in Connection with Expiration of the START
Treaty." The questions in the paper were raised at a working
group meeting on July 21, 2008 (Reftel). The paper was
provided to the U.S. Delegation on July 23, 2008.


3. (S) Begin text:

Official Translation

JCIC-XXXII
July 23, 2008

Russian Questions on the Completion of Continuous
Monitoring at Votkinsk and Closure of Points of Entry
in Connection with Expiration of the START Treaty

In order to prepare its plans for assisting the United
States of America in activities related to the completion of
continuous monitoring at the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant
in connection with the expiration of the START Treaty, the
Russian Federation proposes that the U.S. side provide the
following information:


1. A list of the items, as well as their weight and
size, that the U.S. intends to take out of the Russian
Federation, as well as the approximate time frame for their
removal.


2. The types of transport the U.S. plans to use to
remove the items from the territory of the Russian
Federation, with reference to the list of items, as well as
the planned times of their use.


3. A list of items the U.S. intends to donate to
organizations in the Russian Federation, a list of those
organizations, and the approximate times when the items will
be donated.


4. A list of the items the U.S. plans to sell
commercially in the Russian Federation, the presumed
purchasers (if they have been identified),as well as the
approximate beginning and end of the sale period.


5. A list of the items the U.S. plans to dispose of in
the Russian Federation, as well as the methods of disposal
and the locations and time frames for this work, including
who will perform the work. And, in this connection,
restrictions (or special requirements) related to any fire,
explosion or environmental hazard posed by the items or to
any other condition of the items.


6. And other information, at the discretion of the U.S.
side, that helps to increase the effectiveness of measures
related to the completion of continuous monitoring activities.


7. Proposals regarding the removal of inspection and
other equipment (including radiation detection equipment)
from the points of entry.

We would also like to get the U.S. side's thoughts on
the Russian side's role in carrying out this work, including
funding of the work.

This information will enable the Russian side to
determine the scope of the measures needed to assist the
United States of America in carrying out its plans and to
identify the national-level entities responsible for their
implementation.

End text.


4. (U) Taylor sends.
TICHENOR


NNNN




End Cable Text