JCIC-XXXII: U.S.-HOSTED RECEPTION, JULY 23, 2008

S E C R E T GENEVA 000600


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TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC US RS UP BO KZ ZR ZP
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SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXII: U.S.-HOSTED RECEPTION, JULY 23, 2008

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States
Representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection
Commission. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is JCIC-XXXII-015.


2. (U) Meeting Date: Tuesday, July 23, 2008
Time: 6:00 - 8:20 P.M..
Place: 41 Quai Wilson, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) The U.S. JCIC Delegation hosted a reception on July
23, 2008, and engaged members of the other Parties'
Delegations in discussions on a wide variety of topics that
included: U.S. participation in P5 plus 1 negotiations with
Iran, JCIC issues, post-START, the political dynamics in
Moscow, the upcoming U.S. election, B-52 heavy bomber
eliminations, intrusive security procedures at the Ulan Ude
Point of Entry (POE),and the deactivation of deployed SS-25
ICBMs. The general impression of the U.S. Delegation was
that the delegates from Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and
Kazakhstan did not avoid conversations with their U.S.
counterparts and were not reluctant to engage on substantive
issues.

--------------
U.S. PARTICIPATION IN P5
PLUS 1 POLITICAL DIRECTORS
MEETING WITH IRAN
--------------


4. (S) Koshelev asked Taylor whether he had had an
opportunity to discuss the events of the past weekend with
Under Secretary Burns. (Begin comment: The weekend event
referred to the meeting in Geneva of the P5 plus 1 Political
Directors with Iranian Nuclear Negotiator Saeed Jalili to
receive Iran's response on the P5 plus 1 proposal that had
been delivered in Tehran last month. End comment.) Taylor
said that he had not been part of the discussions and had not
met with Under Secretary Burns. Koshelev lamented that it
had been a very difficult weekend. It was always a very
difficult task when dealing with the Iranians and this
weekend was no different. He had been involved with the
talks, working until 1:00 AM on Sunday morning and then again
from 9:00 AM until 10:00 PM on Sunday night. Koshelev said
that Kislyak had remarked that Jalili had been very impressed
that the United States had sent Under Secretary Burns to the
meeting. While Jalili had taken a hard line during the
discussion on Saturday, it seemed that on Sunday in the
follow-up meeting with Kislyak, Jalili had been more
conciliatory. Jalili had assumed that the opening position
by the P5 plus 1 would be whether Iran had a right to a
peaceful nuclear program. Kislyak had finally convinced
Jalili that the decision had already been made -- a peaceful
nuclear program was possible, but Iran had to cease its
provocative actions. Nothing could be accomplished until
that occurred. Koshelev informed Taylor that Kislyak felt it
was vitally important that Under Secretary Burns was in
attendance at the meeting as it demonstrated unity within the
P5 plus 1.

--------------
POSSIBILITY FOR A
ROOD-KISLYAK MEETING

--------------


5. (S) Koshelev told Taylor that Kislyak had agreed to meet
with Rood in August, if the United States had anything new to
offer on Ballistic Missile Defense or Post-START. Koshelev
said that Kislyak was taking leave during the first week of
August and he was scheduled to depart his current position on
September 5, in preparation for his new assignment as the
Ambassador to the United States. If the meeting took place,
Koshelev was planning to recommend to Kislyak that an
additional item (Obligation to Meet to Consider Whether the
START Treaty Will be Extended) be added to the Rood-Kislyak
agenda. Koshelev added that he believed it was important
that the United States and Russia address this issue in a
constructive manner so that this issue could easily be
resolved. Koshelev stated that it was the legal opinion of
Russia that it did not matter what form or level of meeting,
but that it should include all five Parties to the Treaty and
that they be specifically instructed to act on the question.


6. (S) Koshelev also told Taylor that if the Rood-Kislyak
meeting did not take place prior to the departure of Kislyak,
he would recommend that the meetings take place at the
Antonov-DeSutter level, as the individual being considered as
Kislyak's replacement was unfamiliar with the issues we deal
with and would not be prepared to discuss them in detail.

--------------
JCIC ISSUES
--------------


7. (S) When asked if he would be continuing as the JCIC
Representative, Koshelev told Taylor that he would continue
as the Moscow Treaty's Bilateral Implementation Commission
representative; however, Vladimir Yermakov would be assuming
the duties as the representative to the JCIC. Koshelev later
told DeNinno that Yermakov, who had just returned to Moscow
from the Russian Embassy in Washington D.C., was expected to
take over JCIC duties sometime in the future. Koshelev
remarked that he currently worked many strategic issues,
particularly in the areas of missile defense and arms
control. He said he had also recently participated in the P5
plus 1 discussion at the United Nations with Iran.
Yermakov's assumption of the JCIC position was expected to
provide Koshelev more time to oversee other issues.


8. (S) Couch asked Capt(1st Rank) Kuz'min and Col Akulenok
about the Ukrainian plan to reuse SS-24 ICBM solid rocket
motor cases as a result of reaching agreement on additional
elimination procedures during this session. Kuz'min stated
that he did not know Ukraine's plans and the Ukrainians would
more likely tell the United States before they told Russia,
given the current state of Russian-Ukrainian relations. He
added that he did not know why the Ukrainians wanted to reuse
the motor cases, because the material used to make those
cases was not environmentally friendly and was very
hazardous. He said that Russia preferred to simply destroy
solid rocket motor cases so that it did not have to deal with
resulting environmental issues. Kuz'min and Akulenok both
indicated that they would retire in the next year.


9. (S) Smith discussed the issue of B-52 eliminations at
Davis-Monthan Air Force Base (AFB) with Kuz'min and Zaytsev.
He reminded them that the Russian Federation had expressed
concerns during the last JCIC session regarding several B-52
heavy bombers that, in its view, had begun the process of
elimination and the Russian Federation had not been notified
so that an elimination inspection could be conducted. He
also reminded them that this issue had been fully explained
by the United States, so it was understood that the issue had
been resolved. Specifically, the bombers in question had not
begun the process of elimination since the cuts that had been
accomplished on the bomber were not done at a location
obviously not an assembly joint and that these aircraft were
under going aging surveillance. Smith also reminded them
that the Russian Federation had indicated that this issue had
been clarified and would no longer be written up as an
ambiguity in the inspection reports. He informed them that,
during the most recent Data Update inspection at
Davis-Monthan AFB, Russian inspectors had written the same
ambiguity into the official inspection report. He asked if
there had been some confusion on the part of the United
States concerning this issue. Kuz'min replied that the
Russian Federation was still concerned about the cuts that
had been accomplished on the bombers and the view was that
the elimination process had begun. Smith noted that he could
understand Russia's concerns if the United States were trying
to take credit for an eliminated bomber and remove it from
the MOU, but in this case the bombers remained fully
accountable and fully inspectable. Both Kuz'min and Zaytsev
stated that they understood, but Russia still had concerns.
When asked if this issue would be raised at the JCIC again,
they responded that it would not be during this session.


10. (S) Fortier informed Kuz'min and Ryzhkov that the U.S.
inspection team that recently conducted a Reentry Vehicle
On-site Inspection at the Dombarovskiy Silo ICBM Base was
able to view the interior of a deployed SS-18 silo launcher
declared not to contain an ICBM that had been covered with
dirt. Fortier thanked Kuz'min and Ryzhkov for the actions
taken by the Russian Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (RNRRC) to
ensure that the inspection-related issue discussed during the
last JCIC session was resolved. Kuz'min responded that he
was glad that U.S. inspectors had no difficulties getting
through the hatch because, no matter how hard they tried, the
silo door was not going to move. He commented that the
Strategic Rocket Forces had not appreciated receiving orders
from the Russian NRRC, particularly when those orders
resulted in more access for U.S. inspectors, but the NRRC
would continue to work to ensure U.S. inspection teams
receive the rights permitted under the Treaty.

--------------
POST-START: LESS CONTROL
AND MORE COMMUNICATION
--------------


11. (S) Ryzhkov thanked Fortier for the assistance he had
provided in resolving the Drovyanaya site diagram issue.
Fortier expressed his hope that the same type of candid
discussion and cooperation could be exercised in the future
to resolve other issues. Ryzhkov responded that he shared
that hope, since many issues still needed to be resolved
before START went away. Fortier inquired as to specifically
when he foresaw START actually going away. With a large
grin, Ryzhkov replied, "...when we agree to a replacement
with less control and more communication."


12. (S) DeNinno, Gondol and Tessier spoke to Koshelev
regarding what Russia would like to see in a post-START
agreement. Koshelev stated that Russia continued to wait for
a response to its last proposal from November that outlined
Russia's position. It would be difficult for Russia to make
suggestions without seeing a U.S. response. Koshelev
mentioned that the Russian Federation had been informed by a
group of former U.S. Democratic politicians that it would be
better to hold off until the current U.S. administration
leaves office, so Russia viewed the situation as a waiting
game. DeNinno said he understood that Russia was looking to
continue limitations on delivery vehicles and was interested
in simplifying the existing START treaty. Koshelev responded
that Russia was not interested in maintaining all of the
complex provisions of START, but would need agreement on
definitions. Russia and the United States have different
understandings of the meaning of many terms. Koshelev
continued that it would also be necessary to maintain control
of all warheads, including those in a non-deployed status
because Russia was concerned about a refire or reload
capability. Using his hands, Koshelev gestured and stated
that U.S. warhead levels would be up here and Russian warhead
levels down here or perhaps even lower. He continued that a
way also needed to be found to distinguish between whether a
delivery vehicle was equipped with a nuclear or non-nuclear
warhead, that it was not just a matter of what type of
warhead, but the delivery vehicle as well. Gondol asked
whether Russia was honestly still worried about getting into
a war with the United States. Koshelev replied that nobody
in Russia wanted a nuclear war with the United States and
everybody understood that a nuclear war would be a
catastrophe. However, one must be prepared for all
eventualities. He expressed his hope that Russia and the
United States would never be on opposite sides of any
shooting war (nuclear or non-nuclear) and would be on the
same side of any future conflict. Koshelev opined that the
decisions made on START would be very important since the
rest of the world looked very carefully at what the United
States and Russia did in the field of disarmament.

--------------
MISSILE DEFENSE AFFECTS
STRATEGIC STABILITY
--------------


13. (S) Shevchenko told DeNinno that the United States and
Russia understood that both countries possessed the nuclear
firepower to overcome any current form of missile defense.
The problem was the effect of U.S. missile defenses on
strategic stability. Shevchenko stated that times had
changed and the type of stability today could not be compared
to that which existed during the Cold War. After the fall of
the Soviet Union, nuclear weapons were removed from Ukraine,
Belarus and Kazakhstan. Meanwhile, U.S. allies, such as
Great Britain and France, still possess nuclear weapons.

--------------
THE REIGN OF THE
DOUBLE-HEADED EAGLE
--------------


14. (S) Yaguchi, Gondol and DeNinno engaged Koshelev, Zaytsev
and Akulenok in a discussion on the political dynamics in
Moscow. Koshelev expressed his opinion that, while Medvedev
was still young and less experienced than Putin, Putin was a
better diplomat with a broader understanding of world
politics. Putin had also surrounded himself with the right
people and structure to fulfill his duties as Prime Minister.
DeNinno questioned whether Medvedev and Putin simply
switching roles was a recipe for a power struggle as it
provided Putin the authority to continue where he left off.
Koshelev believed that it was beneficial to Russia to have
both in power and that, although there were concerns that

possible inter-party struggles could arise in the future, the
new structure would allow Putin to fully implement the
policies that he had put in place during his term in office.
He continued that Putin may pay more attention to domestic
policy initially, but would still play a role in foreign
policy because of his experience. Putin would be coaching
Medvedev for some time. Koshelev opined that the Russian
Federation had made a good decision in bringing Ushakov back
from the Russian Embassy in Washington to be an advisor to
Medvedev. Koshelev subsequently told Taylor and Brown that
Ushakov would not be taking Lavrov's position. He was now a
personal advisor to President Medvedev and would remain in
that circle of very close advisors. He was one of Russia's
most experienced advisors in foreign affairs and one of the
most skilled Russian diplomats.


15. (S) Kotkova told Brown that it was likely that Kislyak's
post would be assumed by another deputy minister rather than
someone (like current Arms Control Department head Antonov)
promoted up into that position. Koshelev noted to Taylor
that Kislyak had a generally negative attitude about
negotiations in Geneva and was reluctant to approve sending
Russian diplomats here for prolonged periods, adding that
Kislyak had remarked about the lack of results historically
achieved considering all of the time delegations spent in
Geneva. This attitude, at least about the city of Geneva,
was apparently turned around in Kislyak's mind when he
finally spent some time in Geneva and enjoyed the city and
stayed in $18,000 USD per night accommodations during the
P5 1 talks with Iran over the past weekend. Koshelev
informed Taylor and Brown that his boss, Anatoliy Antonov,
had told him of his favorable impression of Taylor during the
Rome talks, citing Taylor's professionalism and even-handed
but forceful manner.

--------------
THE UPCOMING U.S. ELECTION
--------------


16. (S) Zaytsev, Koshelev and Akulenok asked DeNinno,
Yaguchi and Gondol as to who they believed would be the next
U.S. President and who each was going to vote for. Not
receiving a quick response, Koshelev joked that was a
question that Americans never seemed to be able to answer.
Koshelev continued that it would be good for the rest of the
world to have some predictability with the Republican Party,
since that was the party that was currently in power. It was
not that the Democratic Party did not have anything good or
bad to offer, but the current party provided consistency and
predictability since the world knew what to expect. Akulenok
implied that the success of Obama was not a surprise since
the Americans were simply ready for any change.

--------------
CURRENT U.S.-
RUSSIAN RELATIONS
--------------


17. (S) DeNinno, Yaguchi and Gondol also engaged Koshelev,
Zaytsev and Akulenok in a discussion on the current
relationship between the United States and Russian
Federation. Koshelev remarked that our countries needed to
find a way to operate on a level of continuity. DeNinno
inquired as to whether there was a particular area that
needed to be focused on, with the response from Akulenok and
Zaytsev being that there was no issue in particular -- such
as economics -- that should take priority, but rather

continuity on all issues. Koshelev responded by using the
P5 1 negotiations with Iran as an example, stating that it
was important to talk with Iran because there was a
generation of young people in Iran who shared the same
interests as we did, such as in technology and personal
freedoms. He continued that there were some who still
believed that bears roamed the streets of Moscow. Having
lived in India for five years helped him to better understand
and relate to the Indians and their culture. He opined that
Russia and the United States needed to communicate better on
a basic and more personal level to increase understanding by
the people. While big decisions were made by political
leaders, the average person or even mid-level functionaries
made a difference. The more they understand about each
other, the better things would be. Russia and the United
States were in agreement and understood each other on many
current issues in the short term, such as terrorism and
nonproliferation. However, the long term did not provide
much in terms of lasting stability.

--------------
INTRUSIVE SECURITY PROCEDURES
AT THE ULAN UDE POE
--------------


18. (S) Smith explained to Ryzhkov that U.S. inspection
teams were being subjected to extreme security procedures
when exiting the Ulan Ude POE. These procedures included
asking to see inspector notes, which was clearly not
permitted by the Treaty, as well as searches of all personal
luggage and requests to remove items from the inspectors'
pockets. Smith understood the need for security procedures,
but could not understand the need in this case since U.S.
inspectors were leaving the country and boarding their own
military aircraft. Ryzhkov acted very surprised and asked
why he had not been notified of this situation before now.
He had no knowledge of these occurrences and if he had known
earlier he could have fixed it. He said what was happening
was inappropriate, that he would fix it, and apologized as a
professional member of the Russian NRRC that these actions
had occurred.

--------------
DEACTIVATION OF SS-25s
AT NIZHNIY TAGIL
--------------


19. (S) Fortier discussed with Smirnov and Kuz'min issues
associated with current SS-25 deactivation activities.
Fortier expressed confusion regarding the deactivation
activity occurring at the Nizhniy Tagil Road-mobile ICBM
Base. Although information received through various
notifications and the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program
suggested that only one re stricted area at Nizhniy Tagil was
to be eliminated this year, Russia had recently transmitted
two START notifications indicating that the elimination of
fixed structures at two re,stricted areas began
simultaneously on July 3, 2008. Fortier asked whether Russia
intended to remove nine or 18 road-mobile SS-25 ICBMs from
service at Nizhniy Tagil this year. Smirnov responded that
only two units of nine SS-25 ICBMs (one at Novosibirsk and
one at Nizhniy Tagil) were to be deactivated this year. The
activity at Novosibirsk was nearly complete and the
deactivation of nine at Nizhniy Tagil had started on July 4,

2008. Responding to Fortier's question concerning the
validity of the START notifications indicating the
simultaneous initiation of elimination of all fixed

structures at two re stricted areas at Nizhniy Tagil on July
3, 2008, Smirnov expressed his belief that the
superstructures of all 18 garages would be disassembled, with
the foundations of only nine garages being destroyed this
year and the other nine next year. (Begin comment: The
abrupt change in Smirnov's tone, facial expression and
avoidance of eye contact when the discussion shifted to the
fixed structures, gave Fortier doubts regarding the accuracy
of what he had just said. End comment.)

--------------
UKRAINIAN FRUSTRATION
WITH NATO MAP
--------------


20. (S) Oppenheim spoke with Dotsenko (staff of the National
Security and Defense Council of Ukraine) and Bondarenko
regarding Ukraine's bid for a NATO Membership Action Plan
(MAP). Dotsenko expressed frustration, stating that there
was the general sense that Ukraine had done what NATO had
asked but to no avail because their efforts had been
undermined. Bondarenko immediately injected that Ukraine's
two main obstacles were France and Germany. Dotsenko
continued that the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense had made
many changes in accordance with the advice and guidance
received from NATO consultants, but was still rejected.
Perevezentsev told Comeau that Ukraine was internally divided
into two clear camps on the subject of NATO membership, one
that favors NATO membership and one that strongly opposes.

--------------
WHO ARE THESE CHARACTERS?
--------------


21. (S) Dunn spoke with Oleg Serov about his position within
the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and his current and
previous areas of responsibility. Serov reported that he was
responsible for strategic forces and missile defense issues.
This was his first time in Geneva. He had previously been
assigned to the Russian Embassy in Washington (no further
information),as well as the Embassy in Beijing. (Begin
comment: Serov stated he speaks Chinese also. End comment.)
Serov currently participates in the Six-Party Talks on the
denuclearization of North Korea. When asked how discussions
within the JCIC compared with discussions within the
framework of the Six-Party Talks, Serov laughed and commented
that there was no North Korea participating in the JCIC, and
indicated that Russia finds it difficult working with the
North Korean delegation. Regarding future strategic
stability between the United States and Russia, Serov stated
that Russia is optimistic about working with a new U.S.
administration on a more equal basis, and being able to work
the totality of issues between the United States and Russia.
As an example, he pointed to the connection between strategic
nuclear forces and missile defenses, noting that Russia did
not possess such defenses. In that regard, he questioned the
necessity for deployment of U.S. missile defense assets in
Europe, and commented that Russia was closely watching the
participation of European nations in the U.S. ballistic
missile defense program. Serov stated that he expected to
return to Geneva for future JCIC sessions. (Begin comment:
Serov was very personable and spoke excellent English. End
comment.)


22. (S) Dunn also spoke briefly with Vladimir Lapshin, who
described some of his responsibilities. Lapshin reported
that he works in the United States-Canada office of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and a representative from that
office always participated in meetings of the JCIC. Lapshin
had participated in meetings in Geneva in the past, though it
had been a number of years since he last did so. His areas
of responsibility have included the United States and Canada,
Eastern Europe, and arms control and disarmament. He was
stationed in San Francisco with his family for three years.
He referred to having one son, who, based on context, was at
least a teenager. (Begin comment: Lapshin spoke excellent
English. End comment.)


23. (S) Comeau spoke briefly with Aleksey Perevezentsev.
Perevezentsev previously worked in the Ukrainian Embassy in
Washington, D.C. for a year and had since moved back to
Ukraine and was currently employed in the Ukrainian
Presidential Office where he works in the International
Relations/Law area. He was previously married for a few
years, but was recently divorced. He speaks very good
English.


24. (S) Violetta Yevarovskaya told Fortier that, although
she had never been to the United States, she recently
returned from visiting her brother in Mexico, where he worked
in the Russian Embassy.


25. (U) Taylor sends.
TICHENOR


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