Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08GENEVA592
2008-07-25 11:42:00
SECRET
US Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

JCIC-XXXII: HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON

Tags:  KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ 
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O 251142Z JUL 08
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6832
CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE
DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MINSK PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
S E C R E T GENEVA 000592 


DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LUTI
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2018
TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ

SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXII: HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON
CLOSING VOTKINSK AND POE'S ON START EXPIRATION, JULY 17,
2008

REF: A. STATE 60792 (RNC/STR 08-154/135)

B. 01 STATE 37656

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States
Representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection
Commission. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 000592


DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LUTI
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2018
TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ

SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXII: HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON
CLOSING VOTKINSK AND POE'S ON START EXPIRATION, JULY 17,
2008

REF: A. STATE 60792 (RNC/STR 08-154/135)

B. 01 STATE 37656

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States
Representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection
Commission. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is JCIC-XXXII-006.


2. (U) Meeting Date: July 17, 2008
Time: 3:30 - 4:20 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) A Heads of Delegation (HOD) Meeting was held at the
Russian Mission on July 17, 2008. Representatives from the
U.S., Belarus, Russia and Ukraine were present. Kazakhstan
was not represented. The Russian Delegation initiated the
first JCIC discussion on procedures that will be required to
terminate continuous monitoring activities at the Votkinsk
Production Facility and the closure of Points of Entry (POE)
should START expire in December 2009. The U.S. and Russian
Delegations agreed to discuss questions concerning the
completion of continuous monitoring activities at the
Votkinsk Production Facility in a bilateral working group.
All Parties present agreed that it will be necessary to
further discuss procedures for closing POEs in all countries
in the event of START expiration. The second topic raised by
the Russian Delegation was that, beginning in January 2008,
Russia had implemented the new SS-25 ICBM elimination
procedures, which included the elimination of the casing of
the self-contained dispensing mechanism (SCDM). Russia is
still considering how to resolve the question associated with
SS-25 SCDM casings that were not included in elimination
procedures prior to 2008. The U.S. Delegation said that,
since the casings were not present or eliminated, the U.S.
did not consider SS-25 ICBMs presented for elimination prior

to 2008 to be completely eliminated in accordance with the
Conversion or Elimination (C or E) Protocol.

--------------
WHEN START STOPS
--------------


4. (S) Koshelev opened the first JCIC discussion on
procedures required to complete continuous monitoring
activities at the Votkinsk Production Facility should START
expire in December 2009. Koshelev said the Russian
Federation realized that terminating continuous monitoring
activities at Votkinsk was a complex process which would take
time to plan and that is why the Russian Federation proposed
it be put on the JCIC agenda. Koshelev stated that it would
be necessary to resolve questions regarding the itemization
of assets, as well as funding and legal matters. Moreover,
the Russian Federation recommended creating a joint document
that may require authorization at the executive level
outlining agreed upon procedures for the termination of
continuous monitoring activities at the Votkinsk Production
Facility. Koshelev remarked that experience could be drawn
from procedures used to close Russian continuous monitoring
activities at the U.S. Missile Production Facility in Magna,
Utah in 2001, following the end of the INF inspection regime.



5. (S) Koshelev mentioned that Mr. Faircloth, Director of
the On-site Inspection Directorate, Dfense Threat Reduction
Agency, discussed the isse of terminating continuous
monitoring activitie at Votkinsk with the head of the
Russian Nuclea Risk Reduction Center (NRRC) on July 02,

2008. Koshelev noted that Mr. Faircloth informed the Rusian
NRRC chief of U.S. plans to transfer some U.. assets and
equipment located at the Votkinsk Poduction Facility to
Russia free of charge. Rusia did the same in 2001 upon
terminating its activities in Mgna.


6. (S) Koshelev mentioned thatanother issue for
consideration, in connection wth the expiration of START,
was the proper closue of POEs and removal of POE associated
equipmen such as Radiation Detection Equipment (RDE) from
the territory of the Russian Federation.


7. (S Taylor responded with the United States' view tha,
if the START Treaty expires and there are no fllow-on
agreements regarding the right to maintain continuous
monitoringat Votkinsk, the Unitd States would expect to
case continuous monitoring at Votkinsk and to remov all
personnel and related equipment prior to theexpiration of
the Treaty. The United States woud, of course, be open to
working with the Russia Federation to reach agreement on
suitable meansto commemorate the ending of over 20 years of
cotinuous monitoring at Votkinsk


8. (S) Taylor adressed all Parties present stating that the
expiation of the START Treaty would end the use of POE for
START purposes, unless a separate agreement were to be
reached with respect to the establishment and use of POEs.
The United States would expect to remove any equipment
currently stored at those POEs and would expect the other
Parties to do likewise.


9. (S) Taylor explained to the Parties that the United
States was still in the early stages of planning for POE
closures and the termination of continuous monitoring
activities at Votkinsk, in the event of START expiration and
that he had no further information available to relay.


10. (S) All Parties present agreed that, taking into
consideration the potential expiration of START, the proper
closures of POEs and accountability of equipment is a subject
that needs to discussed in more detail in the future. The
U.S. and Russia agreed to move the discussion about the
completion of continuous monitoring activities at the
Votkinsk Production Facility to a bilateral working group.

--------------
SHOW ME THE SS-25 SCDM CASINGS
--------------


11. (S) Koshelev stated that, in January 2008, Russia began
implementation of the new SS-25 elimination procedures in
accordance with the closing plenary at JCIC-XXXI, which
allowed U.S. inspectors the opportunity to inspect SS-25 SCDM
casings that were to be eliminated. Koshelev noted that 28
SS-25 ICBMs had been eliminated since January 2008.


12. (S) Koshelev remarked that Russian experts were still
determining how the question of SS-25 SCDM casings, not
considered to be eliminated prior to 2008, would be resolved.
He concluded by saying that all Parties would be informed
once the Russian Federation had determined how it could
proceed when it was ready to resolve this issue.


13. (S) Taylor responded by acknowledging the Russian
Federation's cooperation in bringing SS-25 ICBM elimination
procedures into compliance with the Treaty by exhibiting the
"full set of elements" for the SS-25, "including the hull of
the instrument compartments." Since January 2008, 28 SS-25
ICBMs, including their entire self-contained dispensing
mechanisms, have been eliminated. Taylor remarked that
Washington concured with the removal of these missiles from
accountability and concluded by saying that the U.S. looked
forward to receiving information on the casings that had not
been completely eliminated.


14. (U) Documents exchanged. None.


15. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Taylor
Ms. Bosco
Lt Col Comeau
Mr. Couch
Mr. DeNinno
Mr. Dunn
Mr. Fortier
Maj Gondol
Mr. Johnston
Mr. Tessier
Mr. Vogel
Mr. Yaguchi
Mr. Smith
Mr. Brown
Mr. Edinger
Dr. Hopkins (Int)

BELARUS

Mr. Ponamarev

RUSSIA

Mr. Koshelev
Mr. Shevchenko
Mr. Kashirin
CAPT(1st Rank) Kuz'min
Mr. Lapshin
Col Novikov
Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Serov
Mr. Smirnoff
Ms. Sorokina
Col Zaytsev
Ms. Komshilova (Int)

UKRAINE

Dr. Shevtsov
Mr. Bodarenko
MGen. Fedetov
Mr. Demidenko


16. (U) Taylor sends.
TICHENOR


NNNN




End Cable Text