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IdentifierCreatedClassificationOrigin
08GENEVA583 2008-07-23 15:38:00 SECRET US Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

JCIC-XXXII: WORKING GROUP MEETING ON PROCEDURES

Tags:   KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ 
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O 231538Z JUL 08
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6796
CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE
DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MINSK PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
					  S E C R E T GENEVA 000583 


DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LUTI
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2018
TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ

SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXII: WORKING GROUP MEETING ON PROCEDURES
FOR CLOSING THE VOTKINSK PORTAL MONITORING FACILITY AND
POINTS OF ENTRY; ABSENCE OF ITEMS OF INSPECTION (IOI) AT
HILL AFB; AND QUESTIONS ABOUT U.S. SITE DIAGRAMS, JULY 21,
2008

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.
Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).



1. (U) This is JCIC-XXXII-010.



--------------------------


SUMMARY


--------------------------





2. (S) A bilateral Working Group Meeting was held at the
U.S. Mission on July 21, 2008, between the delegations of the
Russian Federation and the United States, to discuss the
closure of the Votkinsk Portal Monitoring Facility and Points
of Entry (POE) with the expectation that the START Treaty
will expire in 2009; issues related to the absence of items
of inspection (IOI) during a Data Update Inspection conducted
at Hill AFB on March 7, 2008; and Russian questions
concerning U.S. site diagrams.



3. (S) The Russian Delegation recommended that work begin on
generating various lists of items and equipment as well as
JCIC documents that would be used to determine the
disposition and the timetable for removal of those items and
equipment from the Portal Monitoring Facility at Votkinsk.
The U.S. Delegation expressed the view that it envisioned a
similar approach, on both Votkinsk and Points of Entry
closure, to that presented by the Russian Delegation.



4. (S) The Russian Delegation also expressed its concerns
with the information provided to the Russian inspection team
which conducted a recent Data Update inspection at the Hill
AFB ICBM Repair Facility. Specifically, that Russian
inspectors were not told the location of an MM III Training
Model of Missile (TMOM) that was absent from the facility at
the time of the inspection or the time that the TMOM would
return to the facility which, in their view, was required by
the Treaty. Drawing upon the Treaty text, the U.S.
Delegation explained that there was no Treaty requirement to
inform inspectors of the location of this piece of support
equipment since that requirement was applicable only at
bomber bases. Further, that since this TMOM was not in
transit and was not located on a road between non-contiguous
areas of the facility, there was no Treaty requirement to
notify inspectors of the arrival time at the inspection site.



5. (S) The Russian Delegation expressed concerns regarding
the lack of a prompt U.S. response to inspection team
documented discrepancies on a number of U.S. site diagrams.
In particular, they cited problems with the Oasis and Hill
AFB site diagrams which did not have structures large enough
to contain items of inspection (IOI) or road exits annotated
on them. The U.S. Delegation stated that these structures
did not need to be placed on the site diagram as only those
structures being used for, or are intended to be used for,
IOI are required to be placed on the diagram as stated in
Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding. The U.S.
Delegation agreed to review other site diagram discrepancies
and make any needed corrections.



--------------------------


CONTINUED DISCUSSIONS ON
THE CLOSURE OF VOTKINSK


--------------------------





6. (S) Ryzhkov began the meeting by explaining that the
Russian Federation felt obligated to raise the issue of
closure of the Votkinsk Portal Monitoring Facility due to its
experience with the cessation of portal monitoring activities
in Magna, Utah once the INF inspection regime came to a
close. He noted that a lot of work needed to be done on the
tasks related to the similar closure of the Votkinsk Portal
Monitoring Facility. Since the JCIC met only twice a year, a
lot of the work needed to be accomplished during the
intersessional periods. He also noted the role that the JCIC
played in facilitating inspection procedures which would also
include the closure of Votkinsk.



--------------------------


WE NEED LISTS AND
TIMELINES AND JCIC DOCUMENTS


--------------------------





7. (S) Ryzhkov explained that it was the Russian view that
various JCIC documents would need to be agreed to so that the
competent authorities could be identified and the respective
responsibilities and obligations of both Parties could be
spelled out. Further, such documents would allow both
Parties to fully assess the workload, as well as the
timelines for meeting those obligations. He noted that a
list of all items that would be removed from the Russian
Federation, to include preliminary dates for their removal,
would be needed so that the means of transportation as well
as the schedule could be determined. He also noted that
separate lists for those items which would be given to other
organizations within the Russian Federation, as well as items
that might be sold to other organizations would need to be
produced. A final list would include those items which would
be disposed of within the Russian Federation, with particular
interest being paid to any environmental or safety-related
concerns with such items. He noted that this was done when
Magna closed and Russian monitors did have some problems with
disposing of certain items due to environmental concerns.
Ryzhkov recognized that the form of any JCIC documents would
be based upon the opinion of each Party's legal experts, but
the options to consider could be an agreement, a joint
statement, or a coordinated statement. He noted that the
Russian Delegation's view was that the appropriate form would
be a JCIC Joint Statement so that all of the obligations of
the Parties related to the closure of Votkinsk would be
included. He closed by stating that the Parties could have
differing views, but these views could move closer together
if work were done during the intersessional period through
diplomatic channels so that, perhaps, a formal document could
be considered during the next session of the JCIC.



8. (S) Couch stated that the U.S. view on how to tackle this
issue, and the issue of closing START POEs for that matter,
was similar to that of the Russian Federation and asked that
the Russian Delegation provide its recommendations in writing
on how to accomplish the closure of Votkinsk. Ryzhkov noted
that he had intentionally not raised the issue of POEs as it
was a multilateral issue. Also, that the closure of POEs
would be less complicated and inspectors could simply remove
stored equipment during the last inspection. He also agreed
to provide a paper outlining Russian recommendations.



--------------------------


SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
MISSING FROM HILL AFB


--------------------------





9. (S) Ryzhkov prefaced the discussion on inspection issues
by stating that it was traditional for the JCIC to deal with
operational or inspection issues and that the next two issues
concerning events at Hill AFB and questions on U.S. site
diagrams fell into that category. He emphasized that they
were working issues and not matters of principle. Referring
to the inspection report from the Data Update Inspection
conducted by the Russian Federation on March 5-6, 2008 at the
Hill AFB ICBM Repair Facility, Ryzhkov explained that the
Russian Federation had concerns regarding the information
that was conveyed to Russian inspectors by U.S. escorts
during the pre-inspection briefing (Reftel). Specifically,
the inspection team was not told the location of one of the
five MM III TMOMs declared for the facility, but which was
absent from the facility. The inspection team was also not
told the time of return of this TMOM to the facility as
required by paragraphs 8(d) and (e) of Section VII of the
Inspection Protocol.



--------------------------


THE ANSWER IS IN THE TREATY


--------------------------





10. (S) Couch noted that the U.S. in-country escort informed
the Russian inspection team leader of the type, variant, and
reason for the absence of the MM III TMOM which was specified
for the inspection site, but was absent when the inspection
team arrived at the Hill AFB Repair Facility for ICBMs, in
accordance with paragraph 8(d), Section VII of the Inspection
Protocol. Further, there was no prohibition against this
piece of support equipment being absent from the inspection
site and no requirement to return it to the inspection site
during the inspection. Smith asked whether the Russian
concern was that the information about the absence of this
piece of support equipment was not briefed at the
pre-inspection briefing or that it was not briefed at all.
Ryzhkov responded that this was one concern, but also that
the location of the TMOM was not briefed as required by
paragraph 8(d) of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol, nor
was the time briefed that the TMOM would return to the site
as required by paragraph 8(e). Smith turned the Russia
Delegation's attention to the text of the Treaty. He
explained that there was no requirement to notify the
inspection team of the location of the TMOM since that
requirement in paragraph 8(d) was applicable only to heavy
bomber bases. Additionally, there was no requirement to
notify the inspection team of when the TMOM would return to
the inspection site, since the TMOM was not in transit nor
was it located on a road between areas of the site but,
rather, was at a location performing specific functions and
was not returning to the inspection site. In this case,
paragraph 8(e) did not apply and U.S. escorts were somewhat
confused and quite surprised when the Russian team leader
cited this reference in the inspection report. Some what
flustered, Ryzhkov noted that it appeared that both Parties
understood each other's concerns.



--------------------------


MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING;
U.S. SITE DIAGRAMS


--------------------------





11. (S) Ryzhkov reiterated that this issue was not
substantive, but was a practical matter concerning U.S. site
diagram accuracy. He noted a couple of positive examples
where each Party had promptly responded to expressed concerns
and site diagrams had been updated. He also pointed out
several instances, including the diagrams of Oasis and Hill
AFB, where Russian inspectors documented their observations
in the official inspection reports over and over again but
those concerns had been ignored for many years. These
observations included the lack of structures and road exits
depicted on the site diagrams. Couch stated that Russian
views on certain U.S. site diagrams were well-known but, in
the case of the ICBM Repair Facility at Hill AFB, the Russian
inspection team leader was informed that the structures
listed in the inspection report which were not annotated on
the site diagram were not intended to be used for IOI or
Support Equipment as specified by paragraph 9(b)(iii) of
Annex J to the MOU and, as such, did not need to be placed on
the site diagram. He emphasized that Russian inspectors were
granted access to all structures at the facility large enough
to contain IOI and that the diagram for Hill AFB fully
complied with all Treaty requirements. He closed by stating
that the United States always took note of Russian concerns
regarding U.S. site diagrams and updated its diagrams as
appropriate.



12. (U) Documents exchanged.

- Russia:

-- Russian language Ad-Referendum text of the S-Series
Joint Statement on the site diagram for Drovyanaya, dated
July 18, 2008.



13. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Couch
Ms. Bosco
Mr. Brown
Lt Col Comeau
Mr. DeNinno
Mr. Dunn
Maj. Edinger
Mr. Fortier
Mr. Hanchett
Mr. Johnston
LTC Oppenheim
Mr. Smith
Mr. Tessier
Mr. Vogel
Mr. Yaguchi
Dr. Hopkins (Int)

RUSSIA

Mr. Kashirin
Capt(1st Rank) Kuz'min
Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Semenov
Mr. Smirnov
Mr. Shevchenko
Col Zaytsev
Ms. Yevarovskaya (Int)



14. (U) Taylor sends.
TICHENOR


NNNN




End Cable Text