EFFECTS OF U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL DISENGAGEMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L GENEVA 000495

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2018
TAGS: PHUM PREL UNHRC
SUBJECT: EFFECTS OF U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL DISENGAGEMENT
BEGIN TO PLAY OUT IN COUNCIL'S EIGHTH SESSION

REF: A. GENEVA 256

B. GENEVA 489

Classified By: Ambassador Warren W. Tichenor. Reasons: 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Human Rights Council's Eighth Session,
which ran from June 3-18, featured renewed efforts by the
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Organization of the
Islamic Conference (OIC) to weaken human rights instruments,
although with less drama than in previous sessions. In cases
where the U.S. del was instructed to engage, our
participation helped forestall negative results.
Like-mindeds used the session to highlight country situations
such as Burma and Zimbabwe, but a number of interlocutors
told us that our failure to take part on such issues diluted
the impact. The del succeeded in countering rumors, some of
them no doubt planted by our opponents, about alleged
ulterior USG motives of our disengagement policy (e.g., that
we seek to avoid review under Universal Periodic Review),
though our reduced presence on the ground slowed our ability
to learn about such rumors. The session showed that we
retain influence but that it is significantly constrained and
dependent on cooperation from like-mindeds; we already see
hints that our heavy reliance on them for information and
cooperation cannot easily be sustained over the long term,
particularly if we provide no reciprocal help to them in the
Council. The broader impact will become apparent in future
sessions when basic human rights principles come under
greater attack than in the relatively short and muted Eighth
Session. END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) The Council's Eighth Session featured appreciably
fewer resolutions than the preceding one. Remarkably, there
were no resolutions concerning the Occupied Palestinian
Territories (OPT),and OIC states found themselves surprised
and briefly on the defensive when Richard Falk, the new
Special Rapporteur on the OPT, unexpectedly proposed
expanding his mandate to including violations of
international humanitarian law committed by Palestinians as
well as by Israel. Although that issue is yet to be
resolved, Falk's proposal is almost certain to be rejected.
One week out of the two-and-a-half week session centered on
the plenary phase of the Universal Periodic Reviews (UPRs) of
the 32 countries in the first two tranches of that new
mechanism. This was the last session under Council President
Doru Costea of Romania, with Nigerian PermRep Martin
Uhomoibhi assuming the presidency the day after the session
closed. (Ref b discusses the UPR issue; septels will discuss
the OPT issue in greater detail, as well as offering insights
about Uhomoibhi.)

GOOD COOPERATION FROM CLOSE ALLIES, FOR NOW
--------------


3. (C) An important element of the session centered on
reviews of existing mandates. In intensive negotiations on
the torture resolution, Denmark supported our participation
in co-sponsors' meetings based on previous co-sponsorship,
though we let them know that they should not count on our
co-sponsorship this time. In addition, on the substance,
they agreed to keep out highly problematic assertions about
the status of the Convention Against Torture's prohibition on
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment; to follow our
preferred formulation for the legal status of the norm
prohibiting torture; and to keep out a number of proposals
that targeted USG detention facilities specifically. The UK,
Canada and Australia also provided some support on these
issues, while virtually all others, including other EU
countries, were prepared to ride roughshod over our redlines.
While we were able to persuade Denmark and a few others to
stay with us based on our close cooperation on these GWOT
issues and our strong interest in continuing to co-sponsor
these resolutions in the General Assembly, these were clearly
close calls.


4. (C) In the extrajudicial, summary and arbitrary (ESA)
executions resolution negotiations, we were similarly able to
keep out the most problematic proposals that would have
confused IHL and human rights law concepts. In the migrants
resolution negotiations, we worked closely with the UK and
Canada to avoid referring to the Migrant Workers Convention
as having established new international norms on par with
customary international law. In both of these resolutions,
our presence and participation helped avoid some near misses
on Department redlines.


5. (C) Finally, we enjoyed good reporting from the UK and a
couple of other like-minded delegations on a wide variety of
issues arising in informal meetings in which we were not
authorized to participate but in which the USG has a strong
interest (e.g., business and human rights). Given that this

intelligence-sharing became essentially a one-way street at
this session, however, particularly because we turned down
requests from like-mindeds to help them on issues such as
Burma, Zimbabwe and the Trafficking in Persons mandate, we
already have seen signs that our friends' enthusiasm to meet
regularly with us on these issues has and will be diminished
further. As one close EU ally told us, our ability to offer
little if anything in the Council will naturally mean that
like-mindeds will gravitate toward their own orbits, if for
no other reason than because in the rush of activity during
Council sessions, talking with us will become a lower
priority.

CONTROVERSY OVER MANDATE HOLDERS' SELECTION, RENEWAL
-------------- --------------


6. (SBU) Fueled in part by several countries' dissatisfaction
with the reports of Special Rapporteurs Philip Alston
(executions) and Manfred Nowak (torture),controversy also
emerged over the Council's usual practice of extending
mandate holders for a second term without debate. India and
Russia led a charge to link the presumption in favor of
renewal to "good behavior," such that no such presumption
would apply where a member state had complained about a
mandate holder. While Council President Costea helped head
off a resolution on this subject, he did so by way of a
non-paper of his own that contains the same problematic
linkage between renewal and complaints.


7. (C) The session also saw the selection of several new
mandate holders. As previously, the process involved
selection of a "short list" by a Consultative Group made up
of a representative from each regional group, followed by
acclamation by the Council of a final list presented by
Costea. A major spat between the Africa and Latin American
groups erupted in the end-game over the selection for the
Freedom of Expression mandate. Beyond that, however, there
is a growing sense in the Council that the entire process is
excessively opaque and politicized. There is no formal input
by countries into the selection process beyond the
nominations themselves, yet influential players (e.g.,
Algeria, Russia and other Consultative Group members) wield
disproportionate influence behind the scenes. Once again,
not a single USG-nominated candidate made the CG's short list.


8. (C) In terms of Council activity, controversy also flared
over OIC complaints that an NGO had linked Islam with female
genital mutilation and honor killings. Many observers saw
the complaint as part of the effort of the OIC and its allies
to limit NGO interventions (as described further in septel
discussion of UPR). Beyond that, however, Egypt demanded
that statements claiming a link between a religion and human
rights violations be disallowed. Costea agreed to that
limit, telling the press that religions deserve special
protection in Council discussions because of their complexity
and sensitivity. Asked by the Ambassador about the meaning
of his ruling, Costea said on June 23 that it only applied to
a direct and exclusive link of any religion with a human
rights violation; religions could still be discussed in
Council deliberations, but discreet human rights violations
could not be associated with a particular religion more
broadly. It remains unclear how Costea's ruling will be
applied by his successor, Uhomoibhi

ADDRESSING HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATIONS
--------------


9. (C) The session also featured most of a day devoted to
human rights situations (Item 4). In a segment devoted to
the follow-up to the December Special Session on Burma, Tomas
Quintana, the newly appointed Special Rapporteur on Burma
(ref a),presented a report on developments in that country,
underscoring that he had renewed his predecessor's request to
visit the country but been given no reply. Slovenia
(speaking for the EU),Germany, Japan, Canada and Singapore
were among the countries making interventions critical of the
Burmese government; India, the Philippines, Thailand, Sri
Lanka and others, by contrast, argued that Burma had made
progress in its human rights record. An EU-sponsored
resolution critical of Burma subsequently passed by
consensus, having been watered down somewhat by China, India
and others. Our Slovenian interlocutors told us that, had we
been active on Burma this time as we had been in the March
session, the resolution might well have been stronger.


10. (C) Item 4 also offered the opportunity to highlight
other troubling country situations. Zimbabwe and Sudan
received some pride of place, with North Korea, Somalia, Sri
Lanka, Iran (including the treatment of the Baha'i) and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo also addressed. Sweden was
joined by two NGOs in mentioning Tibet; China voiced regret

that Tibet was being raised. Several of our interlocutors,
commenting that Item 4 seemed more muted than usual,
attributed this in part to lack of a USG intervention on any
country situation and said that this diluted the impact of
their own statements.

COUNTERING FALSE RUMORS
--------------


11. (C) The USG decision to disengage from the Council also
proved a key theme of the session. U.S. del received
numerous queries about the decision and many calls for its
public articulation. Rumors also began to circulate -- and
even initially gained resonance with members of some of our
like-minded dels -- that the USG decision resulted from
ulterior motives, including to avoid cooperating with Special
Rapporteurs and to avoid undergoing UPR review. Although we
were able largely to nip such rumors in the bud, a number of
dels commented that publicly laying out the justified
rationale for our decision could have avoided much of the
problem.

COMMENT
--------------


12. (C) The USG assumed its new posture toward the Council
three days into the Eighth Session, but while it is too early
to draw firm conclusions about its implications, the session
offered some initial lessons. It demonstrated that we retain
influence when we engage, even if we do so selectively. At
the same time, it showed that we limit our effectiveness, and
find ourselves dependent on the cooperation of main sponsors,
especially when we do not participate in negotiations of
resolutions. The session also showed that, for now, we can
continue to rely to a certain extent on like-mindeds, both
informally and through groupings like WEOG and JUSCANZ, to
provide us with the kind of information needed to head off
serious problems. At the same time, we detect an impatience
even among some like-mindeds with our new posture, which
could limit our access to information over the longer term.
Because we are no longer active players in the Council, we
find that dels are less likely to turn to us when an issue
arises because we have little to offer. This could affect
our ability to prevent bad precedents in resolutions and slow
down our capacity to detect disturbing trends in the future.
The Eighth Session, for all its controversies, was relatively
muted and did not result in major setbacks for international
human rights law. Future sessions are likely to prove more
troublesome, and could pose far more difficult tests for our
ability to respond given our new posture.
TICHENOR