UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW: FUTURE UNCERTAIN, BUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 GENEVA 000311

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/2018
TAGS: PHUM PGOV UNHRC
SUBJECT: UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW: FUTURE UNCERTAIN, BUT
INAUGURAL SESSION SHOWS THE NEW MECHANISM'S POTENTIAL

REF: A. A) GENEVA 158

B. B) APRIL 7 REES-KLECHESKI EMAIL

Classified By: Ambassador Warren W. Tichenor. Reasons: 1.4 (B/D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The UN Human Rights Council kicked off its
Universal Periodic Review (UPR) with an April 7-18 session
that examined the human rights behavior of an initial tranche
of sixteen countries. It is too early to fully assess UPR's
value, but the initial session revealed some of the
mechanism's strengths and weaknesses. It showed that UPR can
offer a good forum to pose tough questions about the State
under Review (SuR),with webcasting of the proceedings as an
added advantage. At the same time, many countries chose not
to raise significant concerns, and the interactive dialogue
did not prove an effective forum for meaningful discussion of
issues. The session also showed that NGOs can use UPR to
some advantage but are significantly constrained in their
ability to do so. While the inaugural session began with
much enthusiasm, interest soon declined, which could bode ill
for UPR's future. The session featured skirmishing over the
outcome document for each review, an important issue that
will be taken up in the June Council session. Much remains
to be determined about UPR's usefulness, but the first
session highlighted that UPR has some significant potential
as an instrument for promoting human rights. END SUMMARY.

UPR GETS UNDERWAY
--------------


2. (U) Despite controversy that had threatened to delay a
scheduled April 7 start-up (ref a and previous),the Human
Rights Council held its inaugural two-week UPR session,
conducting reviews of a first tranche of sixteen countries
(Bahrain, Ecuador, Tunisia, Morocco, Indonesia, Finland,
United Kingdom, India, Brazil, Philippines, Algeria, Poland,
Netherlands, South Africa, Czech Republic, Argentina). Each
three-hour review included up to one hour of speaking time
for the State under Review (SuR),and interventions by both
Council members and observer states. For each SuR, the
Council met again two days later for up to half an hour to
consider a report on the review, as prepared by the Office of
the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR),the SuR
itself and the three members of a "troika" that had been
randomly selected to assist in each review. The initial
review was done in a working group format, with the results,
including formal consideration of each report, to be carried
out in a one-hour plenary to be held as part of the June
Council session. The June session will also consider the
reports on a second tranche of reviews, to be held on May
5-15, of another 16 countries (Gabon, Ghana, Peru, Guatemala,
Benin, RoK, Switzerland, Pakistan, Zambia, Japan, Ukraine,
Sri Lanka, France, Tonga, Romania and Mali).


3. (SBU) Except for South Africa, whose delegation was headed
by its Geneva-based ambassador, all the other SuR delegations
were led by officials from capital. Several delegations were
headed at the ministerial level -- Algeria sent its foreign
minister and Ecuador sent its justice minister, for instance
-- and generally included officials from various agencies.


4. (SBU) The ground rules of the UPR mechanism call for a
"constructive" approach rather than "naming and shaming," and
almost all interventions were made in that spirit. Even when
Cuba's ambassador strayed from his prepared statement during
the UK session to say that he fundamentally disagreed with
the UK's approach to the war on terror, he eschewed the angry
tone that Cuba often uses in Council sessions. The UK's head
of delegation parried Cuba's comment ably, using the kind of
argument -- an acknowledgment of continued challenges coupled
with a commitment to keep addressing them in ways consistent
with human rights commitments -- that made the UK review
among the most constructive of the session.

SOME TOUGH QUESTIONING, MANY SOFTBALLS
--------------


5. (SBU) Despite the "constructive" tone of interventions,
the reviews did feature a number of tough questions and
expressions of concern to SuRs. Questions posed by the U.S.
(based on ref b guidance),focusing on specific issues of
concern, were among the most pointed, and on several
occasions, NGOs approached us after the reviews to express
appreciation for our approach. In the Algeria review,
several countries' interventions centered on equality of
women; Tunisia's review included questions on torture and
press freedom. Predictably, several countries asked the UK,
Poland and the Czech Republic about rendition flights and
detention policies. In the view of many NGO activists, those

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occasions where questions focused squarely on issues of
concern, even if not posed in a confrontational manner,
demonstrated that UPR can be used effectively to pressure
governments on human rights issues.


6. (SBU) Nonetheless, NGOs complained that the majority of
interventions avoided tough issues, focusing instead on more
marginal human rights concerns or "serving up softballs" for
the SuR. UPR Secretariat staff also privately expressed to
us their concern about filibustering: during the reviews of
African countries, for instance, virtually all members of the
African Group signed up to speak, dominating the speakers
list and limiting the opportunity for others to intervene.
In most cases, the African interventions spent far more time
praising their fellow African SuRs' human rights behavior
than highlighting problems. And when faced with a difficult
question, a number of SuRs either categorically denied the
existence of a problem, claimed it had been resolved through
new legislation, or simply avoided responding.


7. (SBU) The fact that the forum was webcast was a positive
aspect of UPR. On those occasions where tough questions or
concerns were raised, webcasting improved the prospects that
this would be publicized, with NGOs in particular saying that
they could use webcast clips to press their causes. Days
before the start of the session, some OIC countries were
still seeking to avoid having the reviews webcast, arguing
that doing so would depart from the standard practice of not
webcasting working group meetings. That position was
defeated, and in future, the UPR working group sessions, as
well as the subsequent plenaries to finalize consideration of
the initial reviews, will be webcast.


8. (C) Some SuRs made new human rights commitments in the
run-up to their review or unveiled them during the review.
Most noteworthy, perhaps, was Tunisia's announcement that it
was inviting all special rapporteurs to visit the country. A
high-ranking OHCHR staffer told us April 25 that he saw this
as a valuable step, precipitated by the UPR review, and that
he was following up promptly with the Tunisians in order to
arrange for visits for several special rapporteurs previously
not invited into the country. Tunisia also noted in its
review that it had allowed Human Rights Watch into the
country, and Zimbabwe praised that step in its intervention.
That NGO would publicize this in hopes of pressuring Zimbabwe
into letting its activists visit as well, recognizing that
this was unlikely but nonetheless seeing it as a way to
embarrass Harare.

NGO ENGAGEMENT GOOD ALBEIT LIMITED
--------------


9. (SBU) Among the more noteworthy aspects of the first round
of reviews was the role of independent NGOs. Such groups --
including both the major Geneva-based ones and indigenous
groups that had traveled to Geneva for the occasion -- were
out in force. Though not permitted to make interventions
during this phase of the reviews, they worked hard on the
margins to press their causes, highlighting the shortcomings
of the SuR and urging countries to pose questions or raise
concerns about them. In an April 24 meeting, representatives
of a number of Geneva-based NGOs told us they and their
indigenous partners were making plans to use the proceedings,
including the webcasts, to pressure SuRs. A Brazilian NGO,
for instance, was transcribing the webcast of Brazil's review
and would send it around broadly within civil society,
highlighting the concerns and suggestions that had been
raised during interventions.


10. (SBU) The activists also worked on the margins of the
session to publicize their independent assessments of the
extent to which each SuR had worked with NGOs in the run-up
to its review. SuRs were expected to engage with civil
society in preparing for their review, and virtually all
claimed, in their introductory remarks, that they had
vigorously done so. In their conversations on the margins of
the session, as well as during the side events that several
NGOs organized, the activists presented what amounted to a
mixed assessment of each SuR's claim. Philippine activists,
for instance, generally gave the Philippine government decent
marks for engaging with NGOs in preparing for the review,
although they expressed frustration that many of their
recommendations had been disregarded in the Philippine
national report. Among a group of Tunisian activists, by
contrast, those registered by the government said they had
been consulted, at least nominally, while those that had been
refused registration said they had been shut out of
consultations and highlighted the unfairness of the NGO
registration procedure. Several NGOs at the April 24 session

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noted that several SuRs in the first tranche had signed up to
treaty commitments or made other human rights pledges in the
run up to the session in order to trumpet it in their
presentations. This demonstrated another of the positive
aspects of the UPR mechanism, the activists said.


11. (SBU) NGOs will be allowed to make interventions during
the plenary concerning each SuR. Nonetheless, each plenary
is to last only an hour, and with the SuR and other countries
also able to intervene, NGOs will have minimal time to do so.
NGOs expressed bitterness about this, while also planning
how they could most effectively have their voices heard
during the plenary. Meanwhile, countries of the OIC and
their allies were seeking to further constrain NGO influence
during the plenary. They made an effort, which the EU and
others eventually beat back, to allow only ECOSOC-accredited
NGOs to speak, which would have shut out some indigenous
organizations. They also insisted that interventions during
the plenary should not affect the contents of the report on
each review, thus seeking to minimize the significance of NGO
interventions.

CROSS-REGIONAL AND MICRO-STATE ENGAGEMENT
--------------


12. (SBU) In their assessments of the first tranche of
reviews, some observers have pointed to a few other modest
but unexpected benefits of UPR. In the run-up to the first
session, Morocco and Switzerland had organized seminars for
less developed francophone and anglophone states,
respectively, on how to prepare for UPR. Both had been
judged successes in encouraging participating states to take
the process seriously and in fostering cross-regional links
on human rights issues. With Tonga in the second tranche of
SuRs, Australia and New Zealand organized a meeting to
discuss how to help micro-states prepare for UPR and benefit
most from it, and it is believed that UPR could be a spur for
such states to become more engaged on human rights issues.

UPR FATIGUE?
--------------


13. (SBU) The inaugural UPR session started with great
enthusiasm. Over 70 states signed up to intervene for the
first day's reviews (of Bahrain and Ecuador),and many of
those interventions stressed the historic nature of UPR and
their high expectations for it. By the start of the second
week, however, attendance had declined (except among NGOs),
as had the number of interventions. Particularly with the
intense UPR schedule of three two-week sessions per year,
interspersed among a busy schedule of Human Rights Council
and other meetings, the UPR Secretariat and others began
privately to express concerns that interest and engagement in
UPR would taper off so significantly as to weaken the
mechanism's overall effectiveness.

CONTROVERSY OVER OUTCOME DOCUMENT
--------------


14. (SBU) Questions about the outcome document, which had
long gone unresolved, finally came to a head as the Council
began to consider the reports of the initial reviews. While
some countries hoped the reports would provide a solid basis
to monitor an SuR's implementation of recommendations laid
out in the review, the OIC and others sought to counter this,
with an eye to circumscribing the significance of the
recommendations. With the prospect that the UPR session
would be derailed as a result of the controversy, compromise
language was hammered out for inclusion in each report.
According to that language, recommendations and conclusions
made in each report reflect the position of the state
suggesting them, and "should not be construed as endorsed by
the working group as a whole." Nonetheless, other
formulations vary in the reports from the session, and some
countries seek to standardize all the language on
recommendations. This will be addressed when the UPR reports
are considered during the June Council plenary, and could
again produce sharp controversy.

COMMENT
--------------


15. (C) Among the biggest negatives of UPR is that many
states are using it as a rationale to do away with
country-specific resolutions and special sessions. As we
have noted previously, among the arguments that Sri Lanka has
used to forestall Council action on its human rights record
is the fact that it will undergo UPR review in May. Such an
argument can be countered successfully, although it has

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gained resonance and may well continue to do so whether or
not UPR proves an effective tool in its own right. At the
same time, there is at least some possibility that a
country's disregard for important recommendations made during
UPR could become the basis for a country-specific resolution.


16. (C) Based on the initial session, it is far too early to
fully assess the effectiveness of UPR. On the one hand, it
is unclear whether, in the aftermath of the initial session,
more countries will pose tough questions and raise serious
concerns, possibly leading to a more useful interactive
dialogue. On the other hand, important procedural decisions,
including the handling of the outcome document, remain to be
made. It remains to be seen whether and how both the SuRs
and independent NGOs use the reviews to advantage: will SuRs
with flawed human rights records use UPR to help whitewash
their behavior, and will NGOs use it to pressure those
governments. It also remains to be seen whether some states
will use UPR recommendations as a political foil to pursue
sometimes difficult improvements in their human rights record.


17. (C) It is clear, however, from the initial session that
countries can use UPR to raise tough questions and
recommendations. The fact that these will be reflected in
the report of the SuR's session and that they will be webcast
are significant added benefits. Furthermore, the initial
session showed that independent NGOs can use both the
preparatory stages of a country's review and the review
itself to promote their views. Indeed, the UPR process holds
the potential to bolster the role and legitimacy of
indigenous human rights NGOs, many of which we have worked
long and hard to promote. These advantages, in addition to
less significant ones such as development of new
cross-regional linkages on human rights issues, suggest that
UPR is worth pursuing even as we keep a close eye on how it
evolves and support efforts to make it as effective as
possible.
TICHENOR