DECEMBER 17-18 GENEVA TALKS ON GEORGIA: SECURITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 GENEVA 001128

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV RS GG
SUBJECT: DECEMBER 17-18 GENEVA TALKS ON GEORGIA: SECURITY
WORKING GROUP

REF: GENEVA 893

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Mark C. Storella, reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (SBU) Summary: During the December 17-18 Geneva Talks on
Georgia, the parties in the Security Working Group failed to
reach agreement on a draft paper that would have established
an "Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism." The
Mechanism would have consisted of weekly consultative
meetings along the administrative boundaries of South Ossetia
and Abkhazia among local law enforcement structures (Georgian
and separatist),Russian forces, and the three international
monitoring organizations: the European Union Monitoring
Mission (EUMM),UNOMIG, and the OSCE. The EU proposal also
envisioned joint investigations of incidents to provide
greater transparency and de-escalate tensions. During the
final minutes before the concluding press conference, the
Russian, South Ossetian and Abkhaz representatives vetoed
several compromise variants proposed by EU Special Envoy
Morel and UN Special Representative Verbeke by insisting
categorically on striking any reference to "joint visits" to
the sites of incidents. No plenary or informational session
was held. The next round of talks will take place in Geneva
on February 17-18, 2009. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister
Grigori Karasin expressed his view that the talks could
continue after the next meeting in February, but only every
six months. End Summary.


2. (SBU) Participants of the Security Working Group included
the three Co-Chairs -- EU Special Envoy Pierre Morel, UN
Special Representative Johan Verbeke, and OSCE Special Envoy
Heikki Talvitie -- as well as EUMM Head Hansjoerg Haber, OSCE
Head of Mission to Georgia Terhi Hakala, and incoming Greek
Special Envoy Charalampos Christopoulos. The separatist
South Ossetian representatives included de facto "Acting
Prime Minister" Boris Chochiev and de facto "Foreign
Minister" Murat Dzhioyev; the separatist Abkhaz authorities
were represented by de facto "Presidential advisor"
Vyacheslav Chirigba. The Georgian delegation was headed by
Deputy Foreign Minister (DFM) Giga Bokeria, and included
Ministry of Internal Affairs Spokesman Shota Utiashvili,
Mission to the OSCE DCM Paata Gaprindashvili, former Head of
the Temporary Administrative Unit for South Ossetia Dmitri
Sanakoyev, and Abkhaz government-in-exile leader Ada
Marshania. The Russian delegation was headed by DFM Grigori
Karasin, and included MFA 4th CIS Department Head Andrei
Kelin, and MFA Regional Conflicts Head Alexei Dvinyanin. The
U.S. delegation was led by EUR Assistant Secretary Daniel
Fried, and included EUR/CARC Regional Conflicts Advisor Mike
Carpenter, and Embassy Tbilisi Poloff David Gehrenbeck.


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Initial Round of Presentations
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3. (SBU) Morel began the Working Group on Security by telling
the parties they faced an "emergency situation" along the
administrative boundaries of South Ossetia and Abkhazia due
to the increasing frequency of violent incidents. Repeated
shootings, obstacles to crossing the administrative
boundaries, and tensions among the local population in
Akhalgori, Perevi, and Ganmukhuri made the creation of an
Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism imperative.
Verbeke echoed Morel's appeal and called for a simple,
practical, workable mechanism. EUR A/S Fried noted that
incidents on the ground can lead to catastrophic results and
said the U.S. would work constructively with all the
participants to support the EU's proposal for a practical
mechanism without prejudice to deeper disagreements about
status. Bokeria welcomed all the participants and raised the
issue of daily attacks near Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the
departure of civilians from the Akhalgori region, the denial
of access for international monitors and local populations to
South Ossetia, and forced "passportization" within the
occupied regions. Bokeria endorsed the EU's proposed
mechanism, noting that the investigative aspect was crucial,
and that the mechanism should grant access for its
participants to all of Georgia, including its occupied
regions.


4. (SBU) In contrast to all previous speakers, Chochiev
harshly criticized the EU's proposed mechanism, noting
(illogically) that it ignored Georgia's growing military

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presence around South Ossetia. Chochiev also claimed that
Perevi was within the territory of South Ossetia, accused the
U.S. of continuing to train and equip Georgian forces, and
criticized Russia for withdrawing too hastily from the
"buffer zone" around South Ossetia. Finally, Chochiev
proposed merging the Working Groups on Security and IDPs,
arguing that there was no point in discussing the return of
"refugees" (sic) until security was restored. Georgia's
former Temporary Administrative Head for South Ossetia Dmitri
Sanakoyev responded with a measured tone, praising the
proposed mechanism as a way to help prevent crimes on both
sides of the administrative boundary. Abkhaz de facto
representative Chirigba said he supported the mechanism, but
noted that it should be preceded by a formal Non-Use of Force
pledge by the Georgian government. Karasin criticized
Bokeria for using the term "occupied regions" to refer to
"independent states," echoed Chochiev's call for a Non-Use of
Force pledge from Georgia, and called for a demilitarized
"buffer zones" in Georgia around South Ossetia and Abkhazia
as well as an embargo against offensive weaponry for Georgia.

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Joint Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism
-------------- --------------


5. (SBU) After the initial round of presentations, the
Working Group settled into a discussion of the text of the EU
proposal for a Joint Incident Prevention and Response
Mechanism, which continued in a working-level format late
into the evening and again the following day in a "principals
plus one" format. After lengthy negotiations, the parties
finally agreed on a text with two sets of bracketed language.
The first bracketed text referred to the participants of the
Mechanism as "representatives of relevant structures with
responsibility for security and public order in the relevant
areas." The South Ossetian and Abkhaz representatives
ultimately rejected this language and insisted on returning
to a previous reference (which had been traded for something
else) to "South Ossetian" and "Abkhaz" law enforcement
structures. The second set of bracketed language concerned
"joint visits" to the sites of incidents. Even after Verbeke
proposed that the joint visits could be modified with the
qualifier "as appropriate," Karasin noted that he could not
agree to the language (supported in his objection by the
South Ossetian and Abkhaz representatives).


6. (C) The final working session on the text left EU Special
Envoy Morel so exasperated with South Ossetian representative
Chochiev that he on several occasions he turned red and
raised his voice beyond a conversational tone to berate
Chochiev for his intransigence. Throughout the discussions,
the Georgian representatives agreed to Morel's and Verbeke's
compromise proposals that substantially watered down the
authority of the mechanism, including a reference to the goal
of facilitating the "free movement of persons," "access for
international missions to the sites of incidents," and
"visits by the participants in the mechanism to areas of
common concern."

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Comment
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7. (C) The modest effort towards creating an Incident
Response and Prevention Mechanism consumed the entire two
days of the talks, and relegated the pressing issue of the
OSCE Mission to Georgia's mandate renewal to the sidelines.
The intransigence and continued politicization of the talks
by the South Ossetian and Abkhaz representatives pushed EU
Special Envoy Morel to the limits of his patience. Visibly
exasperated at times, Morel tried to forge a compromise until
the last possible moment, even as the scope of the Incident
Response Mechanism became increasingly restricted. The talks
ended only when the Abkhaz and South Ossetians categorically
refused to allow for the mechanism to meet inside South
Ossetia or Abkhazia. Although Russian DFM Karasin tried to
sound a constructive note throughout the talks, his hand was
forced in the final negotiating session when he refused to
accept any reference to possible access inside the two
regions (even in a non-binding manner). Separately, outside
the formal talks, the Abkhaz representatives avoided even an
informal meeting with members of the U.S. delegation,
suggesting mounting pressure on the separatist
representatives not to seek any compromises not approved by
the highest authorities.

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STORELLA