UNGA FIRST COMMITTEE (UNFC): TRENDS AND ANALYSIS )

C O N F I D E N T I A L GENEVA 001048


E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2018
TAGS: PARM CDG
SUBJECT: UNGA FIRST COMMITTEE (UNFC): TRENDS AND ANALYSIS )
NUKES CAN WAIT

REF: GENEVA 1031


1. (C) Summary: The 63rd UNGA First Committee (First
Committee) offered few surprises and, as the last one before
a new US administration, saw considerable hesitation among
nations about taking new initiatives on nuclear issues. One
diplomat characterized it as "flat." While movement on big
nuclear issues appeared to wait for a new US President, it
was clear the world was not willing to wait to push forward
on conventional weapons. The P5 showed little solidarity or
transparency in communication amongst themselves as alliances
shifted issue by issue. The most contentious issue of the
session was pushed by a US ally while strongly opposed by the
US -- a draft resolution on an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). By
pushing the ATT resolution, the UK not only undermined the
unitary status of recommendations by a UN group of
governmental experts (GGE),but also opened the door to the
possibility of a majority vote approach (read "Cluster
Munitions (Oslo) Convention") within the UN framework to
future arms control treaties. Conventional weapons, and
small arms and light weapons in particular, continued to get
major attention from the non-aligned community and many EU
countries, with growing support for linking disarmament and
development strategies as a way to address problems in the
developing world. Other issues of note included a continued
move by some delegations to use First Committee as a vehicle
to gain funding for pet projects, a move by India (in the
wake of the Nuclear Suppliers Group,s (NSG) decision on the
US-India civil nuclear cooperation deal) to shift away from
its traditional resolution criticizing restrictions on
dual-use trade, and the quick capitulation by the EU bloc to
Russian entreaties on space resolutions. The results of
action on a US-sponsored resolution on compliance with arms
control and nonproliferation agreements are described in
Reftel. End Comment

Waiting for a New Administration for Nuclear Issues, but
Forging Ahead on Conventional
--------------


2. (C) The First Committee this year saw no serious new
initiatives on nuclear disarmament, and debate on the issue
was relatively tame. Characterized as "flat" by the Canadian
Ambassador, the general perception was that there was no
progress to be made as the world waited for a new US
Administration. In the thematic debates delegations stuck to
traditional positions, while the voting saw no changes in
positions.


3. (C) NGOs and delegations, however used side events to keep
a focus on some key nuclear disarmament issues, including a
major event organized by the East West Institute. Scheduled
parallel to First Committee, it featured prominent speakers
such as the UN Secretary General and former US Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger. That event generated considerable
interest and many considered it the highlight of the month,s
discussion on nuclear disarmament. In the end it was
essentially a scene-setter for what many hope will come in

2009.


4. (C) While waiting for a new US Administration,s views on
key nuclear issues, the world was clearly intent on plowing
ahead on conventional weapons and small arms. Several
resolutions highlighted new approaches to existing issues, or
introduced entirely new issues altogether. Japan, as this
year,s author of the annual omnibus resolution on the UN
Programme of Action on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and
Light Weapons, used the resolution to schedule a series of UN
meetings on the issue through 2012. The US was the sole
negative vote in the final tally. The UK aggressively pushed
its resolution on the ATT, and "won" the floor vote, despite
heavy engagement by senior Department officials urging the
UK to edit the text so the US could support it (see para 10).
Australia and the Republic of Korea (RoK) authored a new
resolution on illicit brokering for both conventional arms
and technology used for weapons of mass destruction. The US
supported the resolution, even thought it was concerned that
it could start a process leading to negotiation of an
international instrument on brokering*something that could
undercut the strong national position of the US on brokering.

P5 Unity Hard to Find ) De-Alerting again draws attention
--------------


5. (C) The P5 met regularly and outlined their official
positions on numerous resolutions, including nuclear
disarmament, "de-alerting" of nuclear forces, nuclear weapons
free zones, and arms control and confidence-building measures
for outer space. Unity, however, was a scarce commodity.
Transparency was also at a minimum, while alliances shifted
from issue to issue. The resolution on "de-alerting" saw a
semblance of joint action with the P3 (US, UK, and France)
making a joint explanation of vote (EOV) and abstentions by
Russia and China. The more common scenario was an
inscrutable China, Russia tirelessly working behind the
scenes against US interests, and the US seeking to hold (with
greater success this year than in 2007) its "P3 allies"
together as a block. Most issues found the P5 hopelessly
divided, from the ATT resolution where the US "no" was joined
by Chinese and Russian abstentions, to space where the US
voted alone, to nuclear weapons free zones which showed yet
another alignment.

"De-alerting Fails to Undermine NATO Solidarity/EU
Capitulates on Space
--------------


6. (C) The sponsors of the resolution on de-alerting of
nuclear weapons, lead this year by Switzerland, made it clear
from the start that their goal this First Committee was to
whittle away at the "abstentions" among NATO allies to
increase the "yes" vote. They launched a concerted effort to
divide the P5 and persuade U.S. allies to support the
resolution. The effort failed, with Belgium as the only NATO
ally that shifted to a "yes" vote. It did so with an EOV that
helped assuage US concerns. Lithuania up to the last minute
wanted to join the P3 and vote "no", urged that way by strong
recommendations from its NATO Mission, but in the end
"abstained" as it felt the costs for such a small state to
join the P3 against the other EU members would be too great.
In the end, a strong appeal by the U.S. to NATO capitals and
in NATO headquarters kept the result similar to last year,s
(134-3(U.S.)-32) However, interest in this measure, cited as
a possible step toward a world free of nuclear weapons,
remains high among U.S. allies.


7. (C) The U.S. again was isolated in the First Committee on
two resolutions on outer space. Of note was the quick EU
capitulation to Russian entreaties to support the Russian
resolution on transparency and confidence-building measures
for outer space. The resolution included only a passing
reference to EU interest in the matter (and no explicit
reference to the EU,s proposed code of conduct for outer
space). Side events continued to yield discussions in which
the Russian/Chinese draft treaty text on preventing the
placement of weapons in outer space ("PPWT") was a
non-starter compared to the proposed EU Code of Conduct.
Nevertheless, outer space issues will continue to play a
prominent part in discussions in the CD and future First
Committees.

Conventional Weapons Grows as Issue/Disarmament and
Development Pushed Directly
--------------


8. (C) The increase in attention given to conventional
weapons continued this year. As evidence of the direct
involvement of many countries in problems related to
conventional weapons, the section of the "thematic debate"
devoted to conventional weapons once again drew over 50
interventions, far more than the other sections. And in
contrast to the statements on nuclear weapons, many of which
seemed to have been re-cycled from previous speeches on
nuclear disarmament, those related to conventional weapons
demonstrated individual connections with the problem. For
example, African delegations raised concerns about the
problems created by land mines or the easy availability of
small arms and light weapons (which they called the
"developing world,s weapons of mass destruction"). Central
American states noted the problems created in their region by
landmines, as did South East Asian delegations. After many
years in which the US and some other nuclear weapon states
stressed the need for the international disarmament machinery
to balance its efforts by concentrating on conventional arms,
as well as WMD, issues, it is clear that the message has
taken hold.


9. (C) Emerging from this heightened interest is more support
for a linkage between disarmament and development as a policy
tool to address poverty, governance and security issues in
developing countries. Advocated most vociferously by
Switzerland through the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence,
a growing number of countries in the thematic debates and in
side events called for action to link the two issues as
nations seek to address issues in the developing world,
especially countries racked by armed violence. This theme
will likely have a growing role in the international debate
on conventional weapons in the years ahead.

ATT Highlights Widening Division between US and Key Allies on
Conventional Weapons
--------------


10. (C) The 2008 session of the UNFC highlighted a trend in
US-European/Key Allies relations that has been building for
several years. Pushed hard by NGOs, the Europeans, including
some of our closest allies, and other allies such as Japan,
Australia and the RoK, have pursued measures in the field of
conventional disarmament without taking account of US defense
and domestic concerns. This year the problem got acute
attention with the UK proposal to launch a UN process on a
proposed ATT. Two years ago, the UK raised this issue for
the first time in First Committee, which passed a resolution
establishing a GGE that would meet in 2008 to study the
issue. While the US voted against that resolution because of
concerns that an ATT would either weaken the standards the US
and its allies have in this field or, if sufficiently strong,
would not include key arms exporters, the measure passed and
the US eventually participated in the GGE. The GGE generated
a consensus report recommending continued discussions on the
issue, but also recommending that future action be decided by
consensus.


11. (C) Entering this year,s First Committee, the U.S. was
prepared to support a resolution on the ATT that accepted the
GGE report,s conclusions and provided for a year,s
reflection before taking the process further. However, the
UK, urged on by NGOs and supporters from across the
developing world and continental Europe, pushed aggressively
for a draft resolution that called for the establishment of
an Open-Ended Working Group (UN-speak for an ad hoc committee
open to all members) on an ATT in 2009. Despite U.S. and
other GGE members, calls that it operate by consensus, the
resolution could allow the group to take action by majority
vote. As the UK Ambassador confided to the U.S. Head of
Delegation, the UK did not want to "be held hostage to a veto
by Pakistan, thus it would not allow the consensus rule to
hold." (Comment: Nor did the UK want a U.S. veto. End
comment.) The resolution eventually passed 147-2(US)-18,
with many abstentions, by delegations that had participated
in the GGE.


12. (C) The potential damage of this draft resolution is
significant. Importantly, the resolution for the first time
launches a process within the UN that could lead to
negotiations on an arms control treaty not based on the rule
of consensus. Despite vehement objections by the China,
Russia and the U.S, among others, and direct intervention
with the UK by the Secretary and other senior Department
officials, the UK pushed the resolution forward with
determination. As a UK diplomat said in Geneva shortly after
the conclusion of First Committee, "the major accomplishment
of this year,s First Committee was the launching of the
process on the ATT."


13. (C) After similar experiences with anti-personnel
landmines and cluster munitions( both of which led to
"global" treaties negotiated outside of the UN by majority
vote),the ATT story may indicate a widening rift on
conventional weapons between the U.S. and its key allies in
Europe and Asia, and on the importance of consensus in
negotiating arms control agreements.

India Shifts on Science and Technology Resolution
--------------


14. (C) India made a noticeable shift on a resolution that
it has traditionally run on an annual basis, "The role of
science and technology in the context of international
stability and disarmament." The shift appears to be a direct
result of the NSG decision to approve the US-India civil
nuclear agreement. Previously, India had used this
resolution to criticize international controls on the trade
in dual-use technology as hypocritical and biased in favor of
developed countries. This year India dropped the previous
substantive resolution altogether and proposed a draft
decision, simply putting the issue on the UNGA agenda next
year. A member of the Indian delegation proudly told a US
delegate, "look at what the resolution and the accompanying
statement in the Thematic debates do not say," i.e. there was
no reference whatsoever to the regimes that govern trade in
dual use technology.

Budget issues pushed through First Committee
--------------


15. (C) At the 2007 First Committee the Nigerian delegation
successfully pushed through a resolution that requested
funding from the UN general budget to cover operating costs
and several new positions in the African UN Centre for Peace
and Disarmament. Delegations from Asia and Latin America
this year followed up with their own resolutions, despite US
objections, to accomplish the same thing for similar centers
in their regions. The resulting precedent is that the First
Committee has now seen three occasions in the last two years
where delegations have successfully used a First Committee
vote to get approval for specific budget proposals to be
funded from the UN,s regular budget, without prior action in
the Fifth (budget) Committee.

Rocca sends


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