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08GENEVA1009 2008-11-22 12:23:00 SECRET US Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

JCIC-XXXIII: WORKING GROUP MEETING ON UKRAINIAN

Tags:   KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ 
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					  S E C R E T GENEVA 001009 


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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2018
TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ

SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXIII: WORKING GROUP MEETING ON UKRAINIAN
PROPOSAL AND B-1, NOVEMBER 20, 2008

REF: A. GENEVA 0998 (JCIC-XXXIII-015)

B. GENEVA 1005 (JCIC-XXXIII-017)

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.
Reasons: 1.5(b) and (d).



1. (U) This is JCIC-XXXIII-020.



2. (U) Meeting Date: November 20, 2008
Time: 10:30 A.M. - 12:00 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva



--------------------------


SUMMARY


--------------------------





3. (S) A Working Group (WG) Meeting was held at the U.S.
Mission on November 20, 2008, to discuss the Ukrainian
proposal on converting eliminated ICBMs to formerly declared
types of ICBMs and Russian concerns with the conversation of
the B-1 heavy bomber to a heavy bomber equipped for
non-nuclear armaments. Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Russia, and the
United States were represented.



4. (S) The Ukrainian Delegation offered to answer questions
on their proposal to change the designation of existing types
of ICBMs which have been completely eliminated to the
category of former types of ICBMs under the START Treaty.
The U.S. and Russian Delegations sought clarifications on the
benefits to the proposed change. The U.S. Delegation stated
that a detailed analysis was needed during the intersession
to further discuss the issue.



5. (S) The U.S. and Russian sides discussed their respective
views regarding the conversion of the B-1B from a heavy
bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long range
nuclear air launched cruise missiles (LRNAs) into a heavy
bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments. The U.S.
Delegation explained the U.S. view was that the conversion
should render the aircraft incapable of carrying nuclear
armaments so that such armaments could not be "operationally
deployed." The Russian Delegation explained that
"operational deployment" was not in the Treaty and stated
that they would study the U.S.-Proposed JCIC Joint Statement
to facilitate resolution at the next session.



--------------------------


HIT ME WITH YOUR BEST SHOT


--------------------------





6. (S) At a WG Meeting on November 20, 2008, Comeau said
that the Ukrainian Delegation had introduced a proposal at
the Heads of Delegation (HOD) Meeting on November 18, 2008
(Ref A), to change the designation of SS-24 and SS-17 ICBMs
to former types as defined under the START Treaty. Comeau
asked whether the Ukrainian Delegation could provide any
further explanation of the proposal. Shevtsov began by
saying he had provided text reflecting this proposal. He
solicited comments and preliminary reactions from the Parties
present and promised to answer right away if possible or
later after study, if the questions were more in-depth.



7. (S) Comeau asked the Ukrainian Delegation three
clarifying questions about its proposal: 1) Did Ukraine
intend to reference the SS-17 ICBM as a former type in its
proposal; 2) What benefit would be realized in re-designating
the eliminated types of ICBMs as former types of ICBMs; and
finally 3) What the link was between eliminated types and
former types?



8. (S) Shevtsov confirmed the SS-17 was a correct reference
because even though it was never deployed it was produced at
the "Uzhmash" plant, and therefore, it would be useful to
include the SS-17 with the SS-24. He added that each Party
could determine for themselves their non-deployed missiles to
add to the list of former types, noting that he could have
included more types that had been produced in Ukraine, but
since those types are being used by Russia, Ukraine decided
against doing that.



9. (S) Shevtsov clarified that the main idea was to have an
updated list of existing types and mentioned that Ukraine
would not be converting one type of ICBM to another; he did
not want to change the Conversion or Elimination (CorE)
Protocol. He continued that Ukraine did not want to change
its program with the United States, stressing that what was
left was listed as non-deployed but in fact they were just
solid rocket motors that Ukraine wanted to finish the process
and eliminate them. He said that even once they are
destroyed they could be considered "former types."



10. (S) Kuehne noted that the Ukrainian paper had stated
that the Treaty did not apply to former types of ICBMs. He
noted, however, that under certain circumstances the Treaty
did apply to former types, for example, as in Paragraph 6 of
Article X concerning telemetry. Kuehne said the United
States would have to look at the proposal and carefully
analyze its impact on the Treaty.



11. (S) Shevtsov agreed that Ukraine still needed to conduct
a thorough analysis and hoped that such an analysis would
help to resolve the issues.



12. (S) Ryzhkov said he wanted to understand why Ukraine
believed it could re-designate missiles as former types,
specifically the SS-24 and SS-17. Referring to the
definition of "former type" in the Definitions Annex, he
stated that both these ICBMs were deployed at the time of
entry into force (EIF), and asked whether the Ukrainian
position was that the definition should be changed. He noted
that there were types of ICBMs that were deployed in both
Russia and Ukraine, so, before the JCIC attempted to reach
consensus on the Ukrainian proposal, he suggested a bilateral
meeting with Ukraine to reach an understanding of the
proposal and its effect on ICBMs which were both deployed in
Russia and Ukraine at EIF of the Treaty.



13. (S) Shevtsov explained that Ukraine had not intended to
provide another definition of former type, but wanted to
provide another understanding of the term. Concerning the
SS-17, he indicated that it was important to specify when
they were deployed, and he did not believe that any such
missiles were produced after EIF. He agreed that it would be
good to meet with Russia bilaterally to discuss the issue
further.



--------------------------


EURO HEART BREAKER (HB) - B-1


--------------------------





14. (S) Ryzhkov opened the discussion on the B-1 heavy
bomber conversion by stating that his comments were very
preliminary as there had not been much time to study the
U.S.-Proposed Joint Statement (Ref B). He believed that the
United States understood the basic Russian concern of
converting the B-1 in a manner that ensured that it was
incapable of carrying nuclear armaments. He said that he
suspected the conversion of the B-1 heavy bomber, taken from
external observation, was "notional" ("uslovnyy kharakter" in
Russian). He brought up comments previously made by Shevtsov
about a "process equivalent to welding" and previous
conversion techniques for pylons to demonstrate his point.



15. (S) Ryzhkov addressed the U.S.-proposed Joint Statement
stating it introduced a new concept - "operational
deployment." Russia believed there were technical aspects
regarding conversion that needed to be addressed, and that
the notion of "operational deployment" was an abstract
concept and that without technical characteristics it would
hardly address Russian concerns. He stated that he did not
see how the measures taken conformed to the final objective
of the conversion, and proposed that the sides develop an
approach similar to what Russia did with respect to the SS-25
RVOSI: it is up to the inspected Party to remove the
concerns of the inspecting Party. He summarized the Russian
position by stating that what is needed are technical
characteristics that would determine whether the aircraft is
or is not capable, and only this would be sufficiently
convincing.



16. (S) Shevtsov added that he also did not like the phrase
"operational deployment" in this context.



17. (S) Comeau tried to clarify the concepts of operational
capability, deployment and delivery as it related to the
ability to carry nuclear armaments in a converted B-1 and
requested from Ryzhkov the precise Treaty reference to
"irreversibility," a concept that the Russians had raised
earlier in the session. Comeau also stated that he was aware
that the Treaty was old and did not include the concept of
operational deployment. However, the operational deployment
concept was inherent in the fact that the Treaty allowed for
the conversion of a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear
armaments other than LRNA to the category of heavy bombers
equipped for non-nuclear armaments.



18. (S) Ryzhkov insisted that the United States must provide
proof, based on technical characteristics, that the B-1 heavy
bomber could not carry nuclear weapons. He conceded it was a
complex issue and acknowledged that one can equip anything,
with anything, given enough money and resources, but that
merely "transporting" a nuclear weapon on a civilian
aircraft, for example, was not enough to consider that
aircraft "capable of carrying" nuclear weapons. Comeau said
that this was how the phrase "operationally deployed" should
be understood: the civilian aircraft could not operationally
deploy the nuclear weapon, and asked whether the word
"delivery" would assist in the Russian understanding of this
concept.



19. (S) Ryzhkov said that he did not question the right of
the United States to decide on how to do the conversion. All
the United States had to do was convince the other side that
this type of heavy bomber is incapable of carrying nuclear
weapons. Concerning the earlier Russian comment about
"irreversibility," he said that what he meant to say was that
any re-conversion would have to be done as provided for in
the Treaty. (Begin Comment: The impression of the U.S.
Delegation was that Ryzhkov was falling off the concept that
the conversion process must be irreversible. End Comment.)



20. (S) Comeau introduced again the idea of a civilian
aircraft that was large enough to load a nuclear weapon but
did not have the ability to use it operationally. Ryzkhov
agreed that without a technical conversion, one could not
load a missile and release it, because specialized equipment
was needed. He repeated the Russian concern as being that
the B-1 can carry nuclear weapons even after the conversion,
and Russia needed to know that this was not possible.
Claiming that the United States must have some additional
information available, he referred back to the heavy bomber
distinguishability exhibition and asked why the United States
did not show the Russian experts a converted heavy bomber
beside one that had not been converted, because without that
comparison the Russian experts could not see the
incompatibility between the two. Ryzhkov added that this
would have been the simplest way, had this been done.



--------------------------


TAKIN' IT BACK


--------------------------





21. (S) After the meeting, Smith conducted a side bar
discussion with Ryzhkov and Kuz'min about the B-52 Data
Update Inspections at Davis-Monthan CorE facility. He asked
if it would be helpful to the Russian Federation if the
United States made a unilateral statement during the closing
plenary concerning the status of the B-52 heavy bombers
located at Davis-Monthan. Specifically, that as a result of
the heavy bombers going through an ageing and surveillance
process, they were in various stages of disassembly yet were
still able to be inspected in accordance with Joint Statement
10 of the Treaty. Smith believed that perhaps this would
help clarify to all the Parties that these bombers were in a
special status and were not being eliminated.



22. (S) Ryzhkov stated that although he had not cleared this
idea with his delegation, he believed it may help. Ryzhkov
said that he and Kuz'min had discussed something like this
between themselves and were trying to decide what the best
format might be. He stated that a unilateral statement would
be an appropriate format.



23. (U) Documents exchanged: None



24. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Lt Col Comeau
Ms. Bosco
Mr. Brown
Mr. DeNinno
Mr. Dunn
Maj Edinger
Mr. Hanchett
Mr. Johnston
Mr. Kuehne
Mr. Smith
Mr. Yaguchi
Mr. French (Int)

KAZAKHSTAN

Col Akhmetalin
Mr. Kasenov

RUSSIA

Col Ryzhkov
Ms. Kotkova


Capt(1st Rank) Kuz'min
Mr. Serov
Ms. Sorokina
Col Zaytsev
Mr. Chikin (Int)

UKRAINE

Dr. Shevtsov
Mr. Bondarenko
MGen Fedotov
Mr. Makhonin




25. (U) Taylor sends.
TICHENOR


NNNN




End Cable Text