Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08GENEVA1005
2008-11-21 16:02:00
SECRET
US Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

JCIC-XXXIII: (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON

Tags:  KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ 
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O 211602Z NOV 08
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7553
CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE
DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
S E C R E T GENEVA 001005 


DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR HAYES
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2018
TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ

SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXIII: (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON
THE B-1 HEAVY BOMBER CONVERSION AND BASING OF U.S. HEAVY
BOMBERS, NOVEMBER 19, 2008

REF: A. GENEVA 0590 (JCIC-XXXII-013)

B. STATE 120346 (JCIC-XXXIII-GUIDANCE-001)

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.
Reasons: 1.5(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 001005


DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR HAYES
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2018
TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ

SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXIII: (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON
THE B-1 HEAVY BOMBER CONVERSION AND BASING OF U.S. HEAVY
BOMBERS, NOVEMBER 19, 2008

REF: A. GENEVA 0590 (JCIC-XXXII-013)

B. STATE 120346 (JCIC-XXXIII-GUIDANCE-001)

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.
Reasons: 1.5(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is JCIC-XXXIII-017.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 19, 2008
Time: 10:30 A.M. - 11:40 A.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) A Heads of Delegation (HOD) Meeting was held at the
U.S. Mission on November 19, 2008, to discuss the B-1 heavy
bomber conversion and basing of U.S. heavy bombers. All
Parties were represented.


4. (S) The U.S. and Russian sides presented their respective
views regarding the conversion of the B-1B from a heavy
bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long range
nuclear air launched cruise missiles (LRNAs) into a heavy
bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments. The U.S.
Delegation explained the U.S. view was that the conversion
should render the aircraft incapable of carrying nuclear
armaments so that such armaments could not be operationally
deployed. In contrast, the Russian Delegation explained the
Russian view that the conversion of the B-1 heavy bomber was
grounded in the irreversibility of the conversion process.
The U.S. Delegation proposed a draft JCIC Joint Statement
that would facilitate understanding of the term "incapable of
carrying" as used in Paragraphs 10 and 11 of Section VI of
the Conversion or Elimination (CorE) Protocol. The Russians
stated that they would study the document.

--------------
YOU'RE NOT LISTENING
--------------


5. (S) Koshelev opened the HOD Meeting on November 19, 2008,

at the U.S. Mission and stated that the issue of conversion
of the B-1 heavy bomber was discussed in detail at the last
JCIC session (Ref A),and Russian concerns had been stated in
a October 23, 2008, aide-memoir (Ref B). Russia continued to
have concerns about the U.S. process to convert the B-1 to a
heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments in terms of
both its sufficiency and ensuring the irreversibility of the
conversion. Additionally, the Russian Federation view of the
U.S. interpretation of the word "carry" was not supported by
the provisions of the Treaty. The use of the phrase
"operational deployment of nuclear armaments" by the United
States meant applying a new concept or definition that was
not provided for in the Treaty instead of the clear
requirement of the Treaty that "all weapons bays equipped to
carry nuclear armaments be modified so as to render them
incapable of carrying nuclear armaments."

-------------- --------------
INSPECTORS CONFIRMED, BUT THEY WEREN'T SUPPOSE TO
-------------- --------------


6. (S) Koshelev stated that the distinguishability
exhibition provided for in Paragraph 12 of Article XI of the
Treaty was one of the obligatory elements of the Treaty.
However, the conduct of an exhibition was insufficient to
consider the change in the status, and that a Russian
inspection team did not have the power to assess the
sufficiency of the differences presented by the United
States. The inspectors participating in this exhibition
could only state in the inspection report what they saw and
what was specified in the relevant Format 90 notification of
what was converted. As a result of Russian Federation
analysis of the conversion inspection and exhibition at Dyess
Air Force Base in February 2008, the Russian Federation in
accordance with the 17th Agreed Statement believed that the
distinguishing features presented by the United States and
declared as having been converted for non-nuclear armaments
were not sufficient to put it into this category.

-------------- --------------
TO BE OR NOT TO BE, SEE THE DEFINITION FOR AIR BASE
-------------- --------------


7. (S) Koshelev reiterated the Russian Federation concern
about basing heavy bombers of different categories at the
same base, which conflicted with the requirements of
Paragraph 23 of Article V. While the Russian Federation did
not have an issue with the presence of aircraft at Davis
Monthan (DM),it did not include deployment of the B-1 at DM.


--------------
WHAT WE HAVE HERE IS A FAILURE TO COMMUNICATE
--------------


8. (S) Taylor stated that the Treaty provided for the
conversion of a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments
into a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments. The
Treaty also contained a definition for a heavy bomber
equipped for non-nuclear armaments. The implication of these
provisions was that the Treaty clearly allowed for a
converted heavy bomber to operationally deploy non-nuclear
armament.


9. (S) Koshelev responded by stating that the Russian
Federation experts focused on the definition of
"irreversibility," but asked whether this was an issue better
left for the experts to discuss within a working group.


10. (S) Taylor said that the Russian Federation should focus
on what the Treaty term "incapable of carrying" means with
regard to a converted heavy bomber. Taylor opined that
following the Russian Federation logic, a Boeing 737 was
capable of carrying a nuclear armament, and would need to be
captured under the Treaty even though it had no way of
operationally deploying the weapon.


11. (S) Taylor stated that it was clear that the United
States and the Russian Federation did not have the same
understanding on the term "incapable of carrying." The
method used for establishing a common understanding of Treaty
terms has been through the use of a JCIC Joint Statement.
While working groups were helpful, the focus must be on
developing a mutual understanding about the term "incapable
of carrying." Taylor provided the other parties with a draft
JCIC Joint Statement on the term "incapable of carrying."


12. (S) Begin text of U.S.-Proposed Joint Statement:

JCIC-XXXIII



U.S. Proposed Text
November 19,2008

JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER

ON THE CONVERSION OF A HEAVY BOMBER SO THAT IT IS NO LONGER
EQUIPPED FOR NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS

With respect to the Treaty between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July
31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties
understand the expression, "incapable of carrying nuclear
armaments," as used in paragraph 11 of Section VI of the
Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or
Elimination of the Items Subject to the Treaty, to mean that,
for modifications to convert a heavy bomber so that it is no
longer equipped for nuclear armaments, all weapons bays
equipped to carry nuclear armaments shall be modified, and
all external attachment joints for nuclear armaments and
external attachment joints for pylons for nuclear armaments
shall be modified or removed, so that they are no longer
usable for the operational deployment of nuclear armaments.

(United States of America)
(Republic of Belarus
(Republic of Kazakhstan)
(Russian Federation)
(Ukraine)

End text.


13. (S) Koshelev thanked Taylor for the draft JCIC Joint
Statement and stated that Russia would take this back for
analysis. After taking a short break, Koshelev stated that
the Russian Federation also had a presentation on the topic
and would provide it during a working group in the coming
days.


14. (U) Documents Exchanged:

U.S.: U.S.-Proposed JCIC Joint Statement On The Conversion
Of A Heavy Bomber So That It Is No Longer Equipped for
Nuclear Armaments, dated November 19, 2008.


15. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Taylor
Ms. Bosco
Mr. Brown
Lt Col Comeau
Mr. DeNinno
Mr. Dunn
Maj Edinger
Mr. Fortier
Mr. Hanchett
Mr. Johnston
Mr. Kuehne
Mrs. Nash
CDR Rust
Mr. Smith
Mr. Vogel
Mr. Yaguchi
Ms. Gross (Int)



BELARUS

Mr. Ugorich

KAZAKHSTAN

Col Akhmetalin
Mr. Kasenov

RUSSIA

Mr. Koshelev
Mr. Artem'yev
Mr. Bolotov
Mr. Kashirin
Ms. Kotkova
Capt(1st Rank) Kuz'min
Col Novikov
Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Serov
Ms. Sorokina
Mr. Gusev (Int)

UKRAINE

Dr. Shevtsov
Mr. Bondarenko


16. (U) Taylor sends.
TICHENOR


NNNN




End Cable Text