Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08GENEVA1004
2008-11-21 16:02:00
SECRET
US Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

JCIC-XXXIII: WG MEETING ON MM III RVOSI, NOVEMBER

Tags:  KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ 
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O 211602Z NOV 08
FM USMISSION GENEVA
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S E C R E T GENEVA 001004 


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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2018
TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ

SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXIII: WG MEETING ON MM III RVOSI, NOVEMBER
18, 2008

REF: A. GENEVA 0976 (JCIC-XXXIII-010)

B. GENEVA 2551 (JCIC-XXXI-011)

C. STATE 120343 (JCIC-XXXIII-GUIDANCE-002)

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.
Reasons: 1.5(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 001004


DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR HAYES
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2018
TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ

SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXIII: WG MEETING ON MM III RVOSI, NOVEMBER
18, 2008

REF: A. GENEVA 0976 (JCIC-XXXIII-010)

B. GENEVA 2551 (JCIC-XXXI-011)

C. STATE 120343 (JCIC-XXXIII-GUIDANCE-002)

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.
Reasons: 1.5(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is JCIC-XXXIII-016.


2. (U) Meeting Date: November 18, 2008
Time: 15:30 P.M. - 16:30 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) A Working Group (WG) Meeting was held at the Russian
Mission on November 18, 2008, to explore the possibility of
conducting a one-time Minuteman III (MM III) demonstration to
resolve Russian concerns over the number of reentry vehicles
loaded on MM-III ICBMs. All Parties were represented.


4. (S) The Parties discussed the Russian Delegation's four
main points introduced at the previous meeting on MM III
RVOSI regarding the potential demonstration of the MM III
ICBM front section (Ref A). The meeting concluded with the
United States agreeing to study the problem and respond to
the Parties on the results during the intersessional period.

--------------
PLEASE CLARIFY YOUR CONCERNS AGAIN
--------------


5. (S) Ryzhkov opened the Working Group (WG) Meeting at the
Russian Mission on November 19, 2008, and turned the floor
over to Kuehne. Kuehne said that the purpose of this WG was
to determine what the Russian Federation expected to see and
to explore the organizational, procedural, and technical
possibilities for a MM III front section demonstration. He
noted that the details of the proposed demonstration had to
be "checklist perfect" because of the seriousness of working
around nuclear weapon systems. He said that the United

States wanted to be sure it fully understood Russia's
concerns on the issue. Kuehne said the U.S. Delegation had
received the Russian Paper with its four main points on a
one-time demonstration of a front section of MM III.

Begin text of Russian Paper on One-Time Demonstration of the
MM Front Section:

Official Translation

JCIC-XXXIII
November 17, 2008

Main Points of the Russian Side's Position Regarding
a One-time Demonstration of the Minuteman III ICBM Front
Section


1. The Russian side is interested in a one-time
demonstration of the Minuteman III ICBM front section in
order to ascertain that the space inside the lower portion of
the missile front section cannot contain items commensurate
with reentry vehicles. We are prepared to participate in
this event.


2. In the Russian side's view, it does not appear
possible to resolve this concern without holding a one-time
demonstration.


3. The mere fact of conducting a demonstration,
without analyzing its results, cannot guarantee resolution of
the problem. The U.S. side acted in a similar fashion with
respect to the demonstration of the front section of the
SS-25 ICBM at Vypolzovo ICBM Base.


4. Based on the results of the demonstration, the
Russian side is also prepared to consider the U.S. position
that any additional devices (for example, mirror-type
devices) used during the demonstration will not be used in
future inspections.

The Russian side requests clarification of the U.S.
plans to arrange a one-time demonstration of the Minuteman
III ICBM front section. We express our readiness to further
discuss any issues in order to move forward on resolving this
problem. We are also prepared to take part in further
discussion of this issue in the working group format, so as
to consider in detail, with the participation of experts--and
if possible reach agreement on--the procedural, technical,
and organizational aspects.

End text.


6. (S) Kuehne noted that organizationally, the Parties had
conducted demonstrations before and the United States
envisioned, but was not wedded to, the one-time MM III
demonstration being part of a normal RVOSI. He asked the
Russian side for its thoughts.

--------------
WANTS HIS CAKE AND EAT IT TOO
--------------


7. (S) Ryzhkov said that the MM III demonstration should be
separate from a regular RVOSI since demonstration activities
were different from inspection activities and he did not want
to forfeit one of Russia's quota inspections. Additionally,
the other Parties wanted to participate in the demonstration
which could affect the flow of subsequent inspections, i.e.,
sequential inspections. Ryzhkov said the Russian Federation
would have to think about and remain flexible on this aspect
of the demonstration.


8. (S) Kuehne noted that START inspections were limited to
ten people, as had been the case for past demonstrations. He
asked Ryzhkov how many people he envisaged for the
demonstration.


9. (S) Ryzhkov believed that ten people should be sufficient
for a demonstration and noted that the Russian Federation
organized demonstrations in the past using that number.
Kuehne agreed that more than ten people would make crowd
control difficult and people may not see what they needed to
see if the crowd was too large. Ryzhkov said that he
understood the sensitivity of a nuclear facility and the
United States would need to determine the procedures for the
demonstration based on security, safety, and ability to view
the object.


10. (S) Kuehne asked what else should be considered
regarding organizational aspects of a demonstration. Ryzhkov
said it depended on where the demonstration would take place,
such as at the RVOSI site or another location.


-------------- --------------
MORE FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF REDUNDANCY DEPARTMENT
-------------- --------------


11. (S) Kuehne noted that the procedural and technical
aspects of the demonstration blended together. He asked the
Russian Delegation to clarify what the Russian side
considered the "inside lower portion of the missile front
section" to be. He used a photograph of the lower portion of
the MM III front section that had previously been shown in a
MM III RVOSI briefing from JCIC-XXXI (Ref B). Ryzhkov
confirmed that it was important for the demonstration to show
the portion underneath the front section.


12. (S) Kuehne said that the points provided in the Russian
document (Ref A) included a comment about a "mirror-type
device." He asked Ryzhkov to explain what was meant by that
phrase and to determine the size of such a device. Ryzhkov
said that the idea of using a mirror was merely a suggestion.
He said the principle was simple; there needed to be enough
of a view to ascertain that the space inside the lower
portion of the front section did not contain reentry vehicles.


13. (S) Kuehne asked Ryzhkov whether shrouding portions of
the underside of the front section would be a problem.
Ryzhkov noted that he could not give a proper answer to the
question. He highlighted the principles of the demonstration
included a random choice of ICBM base, random choice of
launch site (silo),and that any shrouding should not be
large enough to cover a warhead. He said that small items
that were shrouded would not be a problem.


14. (S) Ryzhkov said that Russia provided suggestions to
address the conduct of this demonstration and would analyze
the results of the demonstration before it provided a
response as to its success. This would be similar to the
work done by the United States after Russia provided a
demonstration of SS-25 RVOSI procedures at Vypolzovo.

--------------
IT'S YOUR PROBLEM SO YOU FIX IT
--------------


15. (S) Ryzhkov said that it was up to the inspected Party
to show that an item of inspection did not contain more
reentry vehicles than declared for the system. He said it
was up to the United States to determine the demonstration
procedures and present options at the JCIC. Russia merely
stated there was a problem; inspectors were not able to view
the lower portion of the MM III front section and confirm it
didn't contain reentry vehicles. He suggested that the
United States could organize the demonstration similar to the
Peacekeeper front section inspection or use devices similar
to those used in previous demonstrations.


16. (S) Kuehne told Ryzhkov that he was trying to determine
what device would be acceptable if a direct viewing was not
possible. He wanted to know whether a video camera would be
acceptable even though it was not on the inspection list.
Ryzhkov said a camera might be more interesting but the
Russian side was not stuck on particular equipment or items
on the Treaty list. He returned to his point that the
objective was to randomly select a missile to determine it
did not contain more reentry vehicles than declared.


17. (S) Kuehne said that demonstrations are usually
scheduled. He said it would be expensive to have all three
ICBM bases standing by for a visit. He said that perhaps it
would be better to have the United States select a base and
Russian inspectors select the launcher so as to minimize the
disruption to the base. Ryzhkov said this could be proposed
and discussed at the JCIC.


18. (S) Kuehne said that the United States would study the
problem and determine a proposal. He said that after review,
it could be possible that a demonstration may not be possible
or a completely different approach could be discovered. The
ball was in the U.S.'s court.


19. (U) Documents Exchanged: None


20. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Kuehne
Mr. Brown
Lt Col Comeau
Mr. DeNinno
Mr. Dunn
Maj Edinger
Mr. Hanchett
Mr. Johnston
Mr. Smith
Mr. Vogel
Mr. Yaguchi
Mr. French (Int)

BELARUS

Mr. Ponomarev

KAZAKHSTAN

Col Akhmetalin

RUSSIA

Col Ryzhkov
Capt(1st Rank) Kuz'min
Col Novikov
Mr. Bolotov
Ms. Sorokina
Col Zaytsev
Mr. Gusev (Int)

UKRAINE

MGen Fedotov
Mr. Makhonin


21. (U) Taylor sends.
TICHENOR


NNNN




End Cable Text