JCIC-XXXIII: (U) RUSSIAN FEDERATION HOSTED

S E C R E T GENEVA 001003


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TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ

SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXIII: (U) RUSSIAN FEDERATION HOSTED
RECEPTION, NOVEMBER 17, 2008

REF: KYIV 1285

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.
Reasons: 1.5(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is JCIC-XXXIII-014.


2. (U) Meeting Date: Monday, November 17, 2008
Time: 6:00 - 7:50 p.m.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) The Russian JCIC Delegation hosted a reception on
November 17, 2008, at the Russian Mission. U.S. JCIC
Delegation members engaged members of the other Parties'
Delegations in discussions on a wide variety of topics that
included: Ukraine's possible reconsideration of Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations if START is not
extended, the U.S.-proposed post-START Treaty, JCIC issues,
the Russian invasion of Georgia, and the deployment of
Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad. The general impression of
the U.S. Delegation was that the delegates from Russia,
Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan did not avoid conversation
with their U.S. counterparts and were not reluctant to engage
on substantive issues.

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UKRAINE MIGHT RECONSIDER NPT OBLIGATIONS
--------------


4. (S) Taylor asked Shevtsov (acting Ukrainian Head of
Delegation) to explain his comment during the JCIC meeting to
consider START extension regarding Ukraine reserving the
right to reconsider the obligations it undertook when it
agreed to give up its nuclear weapons and join the NPT.
Shevtsov explained that Ukraine sought reassurances of
respect of its sovereignty and of cooperative economic
relations. Once the START Treaty expired, what assurances
would Ukraine have in this regard? Such assurances were
conditions of ratification by Ukraine's Duma. Ukraine had
given up a great deal to obtain such assurances and if these
assurances were no longer in effect, then Ukraine would
necessarily have to reconsider what it gave up. Taylor,
pointed out that indeed Ukraine's HOD Nykonenko had passed
the question of the Trilateral Statement to our embassy
officials in Kiev (Ref) indicating Kiev would like to discuss
this in a bilateral meeting with the United States. Instead,
Ukraine was not only raising the issue of the trilateral
statement in the plenary session, but was making very
troublesome statements about its obligations with regard to
the NPT. In Taylor's opinion, this was not the best way to
address this concern. Even mentioning the possibility of
reconsidering such actions regarding the NPT was
inflammatory. Shevtsov acknowledged that he could have
approached the issue in a more diplomatic manner, but the
issue was no less serious in his view. Taylor explained that
in his quick reading of the Trilateral Statement and
following discussions with his legal advisor, there was
nothing in the statement that would cause the statement to
expire with the expiration of the START Treaty. In this
regard, it was Taylor's view that the statement stood.
Shevtsov stated that this was what Ukraine needed to hear.


5. (S) Koshelev approached Taylor asking what his thoughts
were following the statement by Ukraine at the JCIC meeting
to consider START extension. Taylor informed Koshelev that
while it was important to recognize and adress Ukraine's
concern, he felt that Shevtsov had overstepped his bounds in
making the statement that Ukraine reserved the right to
reconsider the obligations it undertook in giving up its
nuclear weapons, signing the START Treaty and joining the NPT
as a nuclear-weapons free state. Koshelev believed that
Shevtsov was under strict instructions to raise the issue in
its entirety and that this was a calculated move. Ukraine
wanted the START Treaty to continue, or instead, wanted to
participate in a new strategic arms reduction agreement with
the United States and Russia. Such participation was seen as
a status symbol and would permit Ukraine to remain at the
table with the United States and Russia. Koshelev stated
that the United States and Russia must now find a way to
address the issues Ukraine and Belarus had raised without
including them in the negotiations of any post-START
agreement. Koshelev was not certain why Belarus was
supportive of extending START, but their concerns must now be
addressed also.


6. (S) Taylor asked Antonov what his impression was with
Shevtsov's comments during the JCIC meeting to consider START
extension. Antonov stated that the United States and Russia
must work with Ukraine and Belarus to address their concerns.
It seemed as if Ukraine was seeking some sort of second tier
status as an NPT member. While it was important to address
Ukraine's concerns, it was unacceptable to permit two levels
of non-nuclear weapons parties to the NPT. Moreover, Antonov
was opposed to having Ukraine join the United States and
Russia in a treaty about nuclear warheads and delivery
vehicles. In Antonov's opinion, Ukraine had fulfilled its
obligations under the START Treaty and it was now a
non-nuclear weapons state. If it needed some security
guarantees or assurances of cooperative economic relations,
then we could provide such assurances. Antonov stated that
he was preparing his Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Ryabkov, to
discuss this with Mr. Rood at their meeting in December and
asked Taylor to be sure and prepare Mr. Rood for such a
meeting. Taylor assured that he would do so. Taylor asked
Antonov if he knew whether the meeting date had been
confirmed and Antonov stated that he did not know as he had
been in Geneva this week and was not up to date on the
schedule.


7. (S) Kotkova mentioned to Miller that the Russian
Delegation was generally aware that Ukraine would raise
concerns about how the termination of START would affect the
1994 Budapest Trilateral Agreement. However, she stated they
were surprised by the statements the acting Ukrainian Head of
Delegation made with respect to Ukraine potentially
reconsidering its commitment to the NPT. She lauded Mr.
Antonov's response to Ukraine.

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FOR DISCUSSION DURING
A ROOD-RYABKOV MEETING
--------------


8. (S) Antonov told Brown that he was responsible for
preparing comments for his deputy minister to deliver at the
upcoming meeting with Acting Under Secretary Rood in Moscow
and that he wanted to alert the U.S. side in advance that the
Ukrainian comments regarding reexamining commitments taken in
1994 prior to START entry-into-force made at the JCIC meeting
to consider START extension would be one of the subjects.
Antonov explained that his concern was that this was an
official Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) position
and not just at the level of the JCIC Delegation, and that it
was important for both Russia and the United States to do
what was necessary to change that position.


9. (S) Miller asked Kotkova if she had seen the U.S.-proposed
text for a post-START agreement. She replied she had not
seen the document yet, because it was still with Mr.
Antonov's staff. However, she stated she expected to review
the document soon, and she thought Russia would have a
written response prepared for the December meeting between
Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov and Acting Under Secretary
Rood.

-------------- ---
POST-START TREATY: ONLY U.S. CONCERNS CAPTURED
-------------- ---


10. (S) Antonov told Brown that he had gone through the
U.S.-proposed post-START text and saw "nothing new" and that
he was preparing an analysis for his deputy minister.


11. (S) Serov, from the Russian MFA, spoke with Dunn about
the results of the U.S. election, and expressed optimism
about the Russian Federation being able to engage an Obama
Administration more productively. He stated that from the
Russian perspective it seemed the United States had failed to
listen to Russian concerns under the Bush Administration,
using the recently-provided U.S. draft post-START Treaty as
an example. Serov stated that Russia had made its objectives
for such a document well known, including, for example,
capturing delivery systems under a new agreement, but that
none of the components that Russia was interested in were
included in the U.S. draft. He characterized the U.S.
approach as "Moscow-plus," and the Russian approach as
"START-minus." In any follow-on agreement Russia would want
to limit not just warheads that could be re-categorized very
quickly from reserve to operational status, but instead
Russia wanted to capture "strategic potential" more broadly.


12. (S) Yaguchi and DeNinno joined Dunn and Serov to discuss
Russia's reaction to the post-START text provided by the
United States. After reiterating that Russia did not like
the U.S. draft because it did not take into account areas of
interest previously expressed by Russia, Serov questioned
what the point would be for Russia to respond to the current
Administration. Yaguchi replied that it would be much better
for Russia to provide a Russian draft document that
definitively covered Russian interests that the new
Administration could consider than it would for U.S. experts
to prepare a document that they thought captured Russian
interests, but perhaps did not. Dunn further noted that in
terms of engaging the new Administration a document provided
by the Russian Federation would get more attention and
consideration than a document being pushed from the bottom up
within the U.S. Government. Serov expressed reluctance even
to make this effort without first knowing whether the new
Administration was going to engage Russia more seriously than
had the current Administration. Serov stated that he
believed it was important to agree on a broad strategic
framework with the new Administration, and then move forward
on specific issues once it was understood how the United
States and Russia were going to engage.


13. (S) Yaguchi asked Ryzhkov if he had seen the U.S. draft
of the post-START Treaty. Ryzhkov replied that he had, but
nothing in it surprised him. Yaguchi opined that it would be
important for the Russian Federation to respond with their
points, especially with the new Administration coming.
Ryzhkov replied that the United States would receive
something back. Yaguchi replied that this was good,
reiterating that it was better for Russia to present their
own views on these matters rather than depending on the
United States to infer exactly what Russia desires in a
post-START Treaty. Yaguchi asked if Ryzhkov was working on
the post-START Treaty too, to which Ryzhkov responded by
nodding his head yes.

--------------
KAZAKHSTAN WANTS TO PLAY TOO
--------------


14. (S) Kasenov told Brown that it was important for
Kazakhstan to be brought into discussions of a post-START
Treaty because of Kazakhstan's continued interest in
strategic stability. He said that Kazakhstan's decision to
become a non-nuclear-weapon state was a wise decision made by
his president but that it was also important that Kazakhstan
had become a START Party and had participated in the
implementation of the Treaty.

--------------
JCIC ISSUES
--------------


15. (S) Kotkova told Miller that she understood the United
States could extend START for 5 years by executive decree,
without requiring ratification by the Senate. Miller
confirmed, adding that any extension for other than the
Treaty-prescribed 5 years would require Senate ratification.
Kotkova stated any extension, including the Treaty-prescribed
5-year extension, would require ratification by the Duma.


16. (S) Kotkova asked Miller several questions about how
Russia and the United States could legally transition from
START to a post-START agreement. Kotkova was particularly
interested in how to legally terminate START upon entry into
a post-START agreement (the legal mechanism to be used),in
order to avoid having both START and the post-START agreement
in force simultaneously. Miller advised her he could not
provide a legal opinion and directed her to speak with the
U.S. JCIC Legal Advisor, Mr. Brown.


17. (S) Kuehne asked Ryzhkov for his ideas on how the Parties
could solve the SS-27Reentry Vehicle On-Site Inspection
(RVOSI) problm. Ryzhkov smiled and stated that the problem
wuld be solved in December 2009 when the START Treay
expired. Then, the Russian Federation could leally place
more than one reentry vehicle (RV) onthe SS-27 ICBM.
Ryzhkov said that Russian news rports about plans to place
more than one RV on te SS-27 in 2009 were incorrect, and
that Russia ad no intention of violating the START Treaty
whie it was in force.


18. (S) Rust and Kuz'min disussed the most recent B-1
conversion inspection t Davis-Monthan AFB in which a Russian
inspection team arrived in the United States on the last day
of the 20-day inspection window. The Russian team was
permitted to inspect the bomber after the 20-day window had
expired. Kuz'min stated that future inspection teams would
arrive no later than day 19 at the point of entry allowing
time to inspect the bomber before the end of the 20-day
window. Rust reminded Kuz'min that Russian teams had been
allowed to inspect bombers whose 20-day window had elapsed
only because the inspections did not operationally impact the
bomber schedules. He also told Kuz'min this would not always
be the case since the Treaty allowed converted bombers to
depart the viewing site immediately upon completion of the
20-day window.

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WE'RE NOT HERE FOR THE PARTY
--------------


19. (S) Serov questioned DeNinno, Yaguchi, and Dunn about the
impact of the new Administration on the composition of the
U.S. JCIC Delegation and experts who work issues related to
strategic stability. Serov wondered whether the composition
of the U.S. Delegation was based on political party lines.
DeNinno replied that, at the expert level such as that on the
JCIC Delegation, a change in Administration should not affect
the composition of the U.S. Delegation. Individuals may
leave for new assignments, but that was based on career
choices and not because of political party affiliation.

--------------
WANTED: EXPERIENCED RUSSIAN EXPERTS
--------------


20. (S) Artem'yev told Brown that, with the death of
Ambassador Lem Masterkov, there were very few people left in
the Russian Government who had participated in START
negotiations and who were therefore able to easily understand
or analyze START language or language based on START
precedents. Artem'yev said that he had been out of Antonov's
directorate for a number of years since START negotiations
(he had moved to the North American Directorate) but was now
back dealing with disarmament issues. He mentioned that he
had seen Mikhail Polyakov at Masterkov's funeral but that
Polyakov (who had been a very competent military expert on
the Soviet START Delegation) was no longer involved in START
issues. Similarly, former Soviet lawyer Mikhail Lebedev was
now a deputy director of an office in the MFA dealing with
humanitarian issues and did not appear to have any interest
in returning to disarmament.

--------------
RRW: A RUSSIAN TOPIC OF INTEREST
--------------


21. (S) Serov initiated a discussion with Dunn about the
Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) Program. Serov inquired
whether Dunn expected the RRW Program to move forward under
the Obama Administration, noting the opposition expressed
among democrats for this program. Dunn replied that he did
not know. One of the reasons democrats objected was that
they wanted the Department of Defense to first conduct an
updated Nuclear Posture Review to provide a framework for
considering U.S. strategic force structure, and how an RRW
might fit within this assessment. Depending on the results
of the NPR, there could be support for the program. Support
would also likely depend on other issues as well, including
future steps in such areas as arms control. Responding to a
question about the need for an RRW, Dunn replied simply that
something needed to be done to ensure the long-term
reliability of the U.S. stockpile as long as nuclear weapons
existed.

--------------
GEORGIA ON MY MIND
--------------


22. (S) DeNinno, Yaguchi, Nash, and Dunn raised the Russian
invasion of Georgia with Serov. DeNinno asked Serov what
provoked Russia to go into Georgia. Serov became passionate
about the subject and asked for permission to speak frankly,
to which he was invited to be honest in his opinion. Serov
believed that Russia was provoked by the fact that weapons
used in Georgia came from the United States and the Ukraine,
adding the United States had also trained Georgian soldiers.
DeNinno asked if there were other factors involved in the
decision, such as missile defense or NATO. Serov immediately
responded that it had nothing to do with missile defense,
adamantly proclaiming that U.S. and Ukrainian weapons were
found in Georgia and used by Georgians, and Russia had
evidence to support that. (Begin Comment: Serov had
consistently been easy-going and willing to openly discuss a
variety of issues with U.S. Delegation members. Georgia was
the only topic that he became visibly agitated about
discussing. End Comment.)

--------------
ISKANDER A RESPONSE TO A PERCEIVED THREAT
--------------


23. (S) DeNinno asked Serov if Russia was really putting the
Iskander Missile Complex in Kaliningrad as a response to
missile defense (MD) in Europe. Serov said the Iskander
would not be put into Kaliningrad if the United States does
not put MD in Europe. Nash inserted that MD was not aimed
at, nor does it pose a threat to, Russia. Serov replied that
the deployment of Iskander missiles would be a response to
what Russia perceived as a threat. DeNinno asked Serov if he
thought that the deployment of Iskander missiles in
Kaliningrad created tension in Europe, to which Serov
responded that Europe does not want MD either. When asked
whether Russia was looking for more cooperation or simply to
get rid of MD, Serov replied that Russia had provided a long
list of steps to increase confidence with regard to MD, but
the United States appeared not to take Russian suggestions
under serious consideration by not adopting any of the
Russian suggestions.

--------------
BIOGRAPHIC TIDBITS
--------------


24. (S) Regarding Kuzmin's retirement plans, Kuz'min told
Hanchett that he had hoped to retire prior to the next
session (typically scheduled in the spring) but his superiors
had other ideas. Therefore, he believed his retirement would
be delayed.


25. (S) Yaguchi asked if Ryzhkov would be retiring soon
because it would be good to continue working issues with him.
Ryzhkov stated that he did not think he was retiring soon,
but that it is still up in the air.


26. (S) In discussion with Artem'yev and interpreters Gusev
and Cheykin, Brown was told that Kashirin was born in
Rostov-on-the-Don and was an ethnic Cossack. In response to
Brown's questions about Cossacks in the Russian military,
Gusev and Cheykin stated that while there is no strictly
Cossack military component in the Russian Army, the Cossacks
do have a uniformed border unit. They also stated that an
(unidentified) Cossack unit took part in military operations
in South Ossetia.


27. (S) Kotkova indicated to Miller that she had spent
significant time working on President Medvedev's proposal for
a new European security arrangement. She stated that she
helped prepare the draft agreement presented by President
Medvedev earlier this year (to either the European Union (EU)
or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE),she couldn't recall which organization). She said
President Medvedev only delivered a three-page draft treaty,
rather than the 20 plus page document her office had
prepared. The 20 plus page document included a series of
draft "articles." Kotkova also stated she was in Astana,
Kazakhstan, for a week in mid-November 2008 working on issues
related to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). She
said this was her second trip to Astana, having gone once
last year. Kotkova told Brown that she has worked in the MFA
for 14 years.


28. (S) General Major Nikishin told DeNinno that he is
General Buzhinskiy's Deputy and is responsible for
non-strategic treaties and security agreements, such as OSCE.
Nikishin also informed DeNinno and Yaguchi that he attended
the Harvard Senior Officers Executive Course. Nikishin
freely offered this information as well as the names of U.S.
flag officers who he has previously met, such as General
Shinseki, General Wesley Clarke, and Admiral Delaney.
Nikishin said he met Admiral Delaney during a Pacific Fleet
military-to-military exchange.


29. (U) Taylor sends.
TICHENOR


NNNN




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