Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08GABORONE577
2008-07-15 15:51:00
SECRET
Embassy Gaborone
Cable title:  

BOTSWANA PRESENTS ITS REQUEST LIST FOR MILITARY

Tags:  PREL PGOV PINR PREF MARR MASS MCAP ASEC BC ZI 
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O 151551Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY GABORONE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5135
INFO AMEMBASSY HARARE PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY LUANDA PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY WINDHOEK PRIORITY 
HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T GABORONE 000577 


DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/EX, AF/RSA, AND AF/S
ALSO PASS TO IBB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR PREF MARR MASS MCAP ASEC BC ZI
SUBJECT: BOTSWANA PRESENTS ITS REQUEST LIST FOR MILITARY
ASSISTANCE, AND A TACIT APPEAL FOR PARTNERSHIP

REF: A. GABORONE 566

B. GABORONE 554 (NOTAL)

C. GABORONE 552

D. GABORONE 548 (NOTAL)

E. GABORONE 547

F. GABORONE 239

G. GABORONE 225

H. 07 GABORONE 298


Classified By: CDA Philip R. Drouin; Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T GABORONE 000577


DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/EX, AF/RSA, AND AF/S
ALSO PASS TO IBB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR PREF MARR MASS MCAP ASEC BC ZI
SUBJECT: BOTSWANA PRESENTS ITS REQUEST LIST FOR MILITARY
ASSISTANCE, AND A TACIT APPEAL FOR PARTNERSHIP

REF: A. GABORONE 566

B. GABORONE 554 (NOTAL)

C. GABORONE 552

D. GABORONE 548 (NOTAL)

E. GABORONE 547

F. GABORONE 239

G. GABORONE 225

H. 07 GABORONE 298


Classified By: CDA Philip R. Drouin; Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) This is an action request; please see paragraph 10.


2. (S) Summary: The GOB, through the Botswana Defence Force
(BDF) has provided July 14 to this Mission a list of the
specific request for security assistance in the form of
military hardware and equipment, as first elicited by the GOB
Minister for Defence, Justice, and Security in a July 8
meeting with the Charge. The list is for nine key items
(noted below, para. 4) ranging from helmets and flak jackets
on one end of the continuum up to helicopter gunships on the
other, which the BDF has said it "requires" due to the
current heightened tensions with Zimbabwe. The list of items
is not prioritized, nor does it include the number of items
required. When asked about the desired quantities, our
senior BDF interlocutor replied that they preferred to
establish what items the United States would be willing to
provide and then would discuss the actual quantities
required. This Mission believes this formal GOB/BDF request
and list to be less a request for emergency assistance and
more an attempt by the Government of Botswana to gauge the
USG response to their recent very public and resolute stance
against Zimbabwe. We also believe the GOB is seeking to move
the existing bilateral security relationship to a new and
elevated level of partnership. The GOB is likely probing for
the level of the U.S. commitment based on the type and cost
of the equipment that the USG might be willing to provide.
Botswana President Ian Khama, who since his April 1

inauguration has been increasingly focusing on Zimbabwe,
genuinely appears to be seeking a much deeper security
partnership with the United States. That said, this Mission
is mindful of how a closer USG-GOB security relationship,
with possible provision of new arms and and equipment, might
impact our ongoing diplomacy in Southern Africa and beyond.
Post believes we should examine ways to enhance institutional
ties and other support for the GOB and the BDF where
appropriate, but also in a manner that will not harm
overriding U.S. interests in Africa. End Summary.


3. (S) This Mission's outgoing Office of Defense Cooperation
(ODC) Chief LTC Jones and Bilateral Affairs Officer MAJ Shinn
met July 14 with Major General Tlhokwane, the Deputy
Commander of the Botswana Defence Force concerning Botswana's
request for military assistance from the United States (Refs
A and B). MG Tlhokwane provided a list of nine items he said
were "required by the BDF" due to the current heightened
tensions with Zimbabwe. The list of items is not
prioritized, nor does it include the number of items
required. When asked about the quantities required, MG
Tlhokwane replied that they preferred to establish what items
the United States would be willing to provide and then
discuss the quantities required. With one exception the
request is for a type of item or system rather than a
specific item or system. When asked what systems the BDF
needed more urgently or even desired (such as TOW missiles or
Stinger missiles),MG Tlhokwane replied that they preferred
to allow the United States to determine what systems or items
the USG is willing to provide. MG Tlhokwane stated that
Botswana would like the United States "to provide the items
to Botswana" (i.e., grant),but would discuss purchasing the
items themselves if necessary. The BDF provided only the
list itself without any explanation as to why these
particular items were an urgent necessity.

4.(C) The GOB/BDF request is organized according to the
command that requested the system and reads as follows:

Defence Logistics Command
-- Field Hospital (Level 1)


Ground Forces Command
-- Combat Helmets
-- Flak Jackets (7.62mm protection)
-- Global Positioning Systems
-- Anti-Tank Missiles
-- Short Range Air Defence System
-- Air Boats

Air Arm
-- F5 Under-wing tank system
-- Helicopter Gunships


5. (S) Comment: The BDF has very limited anti-tank and
anti-aircraft capabilities. Their basic air defense system
is the SA-7 and their primary anti-tank weapon is the SK-105
self-propelled gun system, which has been very unreliable in
Botswana's desert and dry savanna environment. The requests
for anti-tank missiles and a short range air defense system
make sense in the context of the current situation as
Zimbabwe has more numerous and more advanced tanks and
aircraft in their inventory than Botswana. The F5 under-wing
tanks also support potential operations on the border with
Zimbabwe as the F5s must operate from Thebephatswa Airbase
located in southern Botswana northwest of Molepolole (and
Gaborone),and would have limited operational endurance in
the border region. The other requirements seem to be
requests for items that the BDF already has, with the
exception of the helicopter gunships which would represent
the introduction of a new capability into the BDF.
Helicopter gunships would require extensive crew training and
would not meet an immediate need.


6. (S) When asked if the BDF had any information about
Zimbabwe that could be used to support this request, MG
Tlhokwane replied that they had limited intelligence on
Zimbabwe but believed that military forces had been deployed
into the border region. He stated that in the last week to
two weeks they had seen a significant drop in the number of
Zimbabweans crossing the border into Botswana. He stated
that Botswana had chosen to have those reports and raw data
collected by their election observers driven to Gaborone by
the GOB's Defense Attache to Zimbabwe, as during the March
elections documents had disappeared from the suitcases of
Botswana's observers when passing through Zimbabwean customs
on the way home. On arrival in Botswana the GOB's
Harare-accredited Defense Attache reported that he had passed
through a number of roadblocks along the main road back to
Botswana. The BDF apparently believes that the Zimbabwean
military is now being used, since the June 27 run-off, to
keep Zimbabweans at home in Zimbabwe and prevent (or at least
impede) their travel externally. The ODC Chief observed
during an early July visit to Francistown that the hustle and
bustle and commercial activity so prevalent in Botswana's
second city in recent months seemed much more muted now than
of late.


7. (S) Comment: MG Tlhokwane briefly showed the ODC Chief
the list of requirements submitted by the BDF component
commands containing over 50 different items which the BDF
Staff had pared down to the current list of nine items. The
page the ODC chief saw contained mostly weapons systems. The
BDF has long experience in security assistance and a large
number of U.S. War College and Staff College graduates. The
ODC Chief believes they perceive a general reluctance on the
part of the USG to provide weapons to African nations and are
familiar with the USG's reluctance to provide capabilities
into a region in order to avoid spurring regional arms races.
The ODC Chief also believes the BDF senior staff has
deliberately crafted this request list to include a number of
non-lethal items so that the USG will be able to support at
least a part of the request. Such items might include combat
helmets and flak jackets with appropriate dual-use
applications to peacekeeping and peace support operations.


8. (S) Comment Continued: Mindful of Minister of Defence,
Justice, and Security Seretse's initial July 8 demarche to
the Charge (Ref B),and our subsequent discussions and "due
diligence" locally since that meeting (Ref A),this Mission
believes this formal GOB/BDF request and list to be less a
request for emergency assistance and more an attempt by the
GOB to gauge the USG response to their recent very public and
resolute stance against Zimbabwe (Refs C and E). We also
believe the GOB is seeking to move the existing bilateral
security relationship to a new, more solid, and elevated
level of partnership. The GOB is likely probing to discern
the level of the U.S. commitment based on the type and cost
of the equipment that the USG might be willing to consider
providing, with helmets and flak vests at one end of the
spectrum and helicopter gunships at the other. While it is
not yet completely clear to post at what level decisions in
this area are being made, our best guess is that it is highly
likely that President Khama directed Minister Seretse to make
the initial July 8 formal, general request for military
assistance (Ref B). Our sense, however, is that the
President (and a one-time BDF Commander) might not be aware
of what specific items are on the final request as prepared
by senior BDF staff and presented by MG Tlhokwane at the ODC
Chief's farewell call (LTC Jones departed post ert PCS July
15). End General Comment.


9. (S) Charge's Comment: We all recognize and are encouraged
that Botswana has taken a principled and most helpful
position on Zimbabwe in recent months, but especially coming
to the fore in past weeks around the time of Zimbabwe's
flawed June 27 run-off election. Having served as DCM at and
seen this Mission for the past two years, I note that former
Ambassador Canavan and many of us here have long advocated to
senior-most GOB officials that democratic and middle income
Botswana should step up and assert itself in international
fora like the UN, the AU, and in SADC, so as to stand with
like-minded states in the Community of Democracies to promote
democracy and human rights on difficult and sometimes
defining issues -- namely Zimbabwe. We have also urged the
GOB to take a leadership role on issues of import for
regional security and stability. These two keystone
objectives are elaborated as our first two goals in the
FY2010 Mission Strategic Plan for the U.S. Mission to
Botswana. President Ian Khama has now been in office in
Gaborone for just over 100 days, but we have clearly seen a
sea change in the GOB's approach on pivotal issues like
Zimbabwe. Just prior to his April 1 inauguration, we had
reported that Khama remained a difficult read, holding his
cards as then-Vice President close to his vest (Ref G).
Since assuming office, we have witnessed how Zimbabwe has
increasingly consumed the lion's share of his focus (Ref F).
He has shown us a number of his cards by now, to be sure, but
the one he seems to be holding with an anxious interest to
play is for Botswana to seek a much deeper security
partnership with the United States. An early advocate of
AFRICOM to be sure (Ref H),President Khama's apparent desire
to expand bilateral defense cooperation should therefore not
surprise us. That said, this Mission remains fully mindful
of how a much closer USG-GOB security relationship, with our
possible provision of new and sophisticated materiel, might
play in this neighborhood and beyond and impact our diplomacy
just now. Post thus believes we should look for ways to
enhance further our institutional ties and other support for
the GOB and the BDF where appropriate, but also in measures
that will not harm overriding U.S. interests in Africa. End
Charge's Comment.


10. (S) Action Requested: Pursuant to Ref B (Notal),post
requests guidance and instruction on the appropriate USG
response to this GOB/BDF request list and general demarche on
possible military assistance from the United States, in a
manner that might serve to bolster our already strong
bilateral relationship and demonstrate U.S. solidarity for
Botswana's, and President Khama's, resolve on Zimbabwe.
Thanks and regards.


DROUIN