HELPING BOTSWANA WITHOUT HARMING OURSELVES

S E C R E T GABORONE 000566

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/EX, AF/RSA, F/S, AND DS
ALSO PASS TO IBB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/11/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MASS MCAP AEC BC ZI
SUBJECT: HELPING BOTSWANA WITHOUT HARMING OURSELVES

REF: A. GABORONE 564

B. GAORONE 554 (NOTAL)

C. GABORONE 552

D. GABORONE 548 (NOTAL)

E. GABORONE 547

F. GABORONE 525

G. GABORONE 511

H. GABORONE 376

I. GABORONE 338

J. GABORONE 239

K. GABORONE 225

L. 07 GABORONE 1344

M. 07 GABORONE 298

Classified By: CDA Philip R. Drouin; Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).



1. (S/NF) Given our recent reporting on the forward-leaning
and principled position the GOB has recently adopted
vis-a-vis Zimbabwe (Refs C, D, and E),and the resultant
GOB-GOZ polarization that has prompted a formal GOB request
for deeper USG support with more extensive security
assistance (Ref B),post wishes to offer supplemental
commentary as to the current situation Botswana is facing and
how the United States might respond most appropriately. We
have had additional conversations and have taken added
soundings around official, military, and societal circles in
and around Gaborone this past week, and we convened a core
EAC meeting July 11 (Ref A). We also hope to make new trips
upcountry in the coming weeks, up into the border regions
with Zimbabwe for further on-site observations along the
lines of those reported in Refs G and I. Our considered
analysis follows, and especially as it relates to our
important and visible Voice of America asset here.


2. (S/NF) The Botswana government has for several months been
concerned about the security of IBB's Voice of America (VOA)
transmitting station located near Selebi-Phikwe, in the
northeast corner of the country not far from where Botswana's
Tuli Block converges with Zimbabwe and South Africa along the
Shashe and Limpopo Rivers, respectively. Some of the
station's news and other programming is specifically directed
at Zimbabwe, and the Mugabe regime has long expressed
displeasure with Botswana for hosting this facility. After
picking up intelligence in May that indicated a possible
threat to the station from the Zimbabwean government (Ref H),
the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) has since placed small
numbers of troops at the VOA facilities to provide 24-hour
security in the form of roving patrols. We had also heard
earlier from the GOB that this BDF protection was intended on
their part to be only a temporary measure, notably
implemented during the run-up period to the June 27 run-off
election in Zimbabwe. On July 8, the Botswana Minister of
Defence, Justice, and Security mentioned in a meeting with
the Charge that if the BDF were to become over-extended due
to the Zimbabwe situation, the BDF might no longer be able to
provide the troops now posted at the station. If this were
to happen, the Minister went on, the United States would be
welcome to provide any security personnel of its own that we
might wish, including regular U.S. military forces (Ref B,
notal).


3. (S/NF) Comment: The Minister's offer to allow U.S. forces
to operate on the ground in Botswana is completely in keeping
with the attitude of the new administration of President Ian
Khama in the face of the unpredictable situation in Zimbabwe.
Previously, for example, the government provided the Embassy
with assurances that uniformed military personnel could be
used in Botswana to assist with the evacuation of any U.S.
citizens fleeing Zimbabwe. That said, given the way the
subject of U.S. troops came up in our recent conversation
with the Minister, it does not seem likely that his comments
were pre-planned, or that they are even fully-vetted GOB
policy. While we felt compelled to report the Minister's
candid comments as presented to us, rather it seems most
likely that he we was speaking to us in a frank manner about
what he believes his government's response would be if a
full-blown crisis with Zimbabwe stressed the BDF's limited
manpower. As reported in Ref H, post remains unaware of any
other specific threats at present, and we continue to monitor
the situation closely (Ref A). It is therefore the view of
this Mission that while an offer such as this (i.e., the
GOB's willingness to accept U.S. military forces) is
appreciated by us, and indicative of the strength of
U.S.-Botswana relations, deployment of U.S. military
personnel to secure the VOA station here should be considered
only as truly the last available option.


4. (S/NF) Comment Continued: As we still await a tangible
list of security assistance wants and needs from the GOB via
the BDF (Ref B),the reftels (notably Refs J through M) also
provide extensive background on President Khama's strategic
thinking, decision-making style, his views of and
inclinations towards the United States, and the GOB's early
sentiments vis-a-vis U.S. security assistance and AFRICOM.
Again, we wish to offer to our readers this added context
concerning the present realities on the ground in Botswana.
We hope this additional perspective will be of use in ongoing
deliberations on how best the USG should work to help
Botswana, without hurting ourselves and key U.S. interests in
this country as well as throughout the region. End Comment.


DROUIN