COCAINE CASE PROGRESS: GOVERNMENT TIPS THEIR HAND

S E C R E T FREETOWN 000529

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/W (JHUNTER/ESPRUILL),INL FOR AAE
(SLSNYDER)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL SNAR SL
SUBJECT: COCAINE CASE PROGRESS: GOVERNMENT TIPS THEIR HAND

REF: FREETOWN 505

Classified By: Ambassador June Carter Perry for Reasons 1.4 (b/d)


1. (S) Summary: Meetings with the President of Sierra Leone
and the Minister of Foreign Affairs the week of October 27
brought incremental progress in propelling the cocaine case
out of its current intertia (reftel). Though the meeting
between President Koroma, Ambassador, and DEA officials
seemed to yield no movement on the issue of whether or not
three of the accused will be extradited to the United States,
a subsequent meeting with the Foreign Minister indicated that
Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL) reticence to move forward
could in part be a calculated strategy to elicit USG funding.
With Koroma concerned over the potential political fallout of
releasing only three of the seven foreign-born accused, a
timely offer of USG financial assistance to support further
counter-narcotics efforts would likely tip the balance in
favor of bringing the case to a mutually satisfactory
conclusion. End Summary.

--------------
PRESIDENTIAL/HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS
--------------


2. (S) On October 27, Ambassador, DCM, and Foreign Minister
Zainab Bangura met with President Koroma to outline the
pending indictments against three of the detained cocaine
suspects following an Embassy/DEA discussion with National
Security Chief Kellie Conteh. Despite making clear that the
USG has no case against the four other foreign-born accused,
Koroma reiterated his previously-held position that the U.S.
must take all of the foreigners involved. The Foreign
Minister expressed pressure is coming from human rights
groups who might cause backlash if only three were removed.


3. (S) President Koroma listened intently to a potential
scenario of extracting three prisoners and escorting them to
the U.S., with others potentially following depending on
information provided by those initially extradited. The
scenario also included consideration of how to eventually
support removal of suspect Gibrilla Kamara from Guinea (Note:
An embassy source told Poloff on November 6 that the Sierra
Leone intelligence community now believes Kamara to be hiding
in Senegal. End Note.). Koroma wanted all three actions to be
taken, but seemed nervous about Sierra Leonean public
reaction if all prisoners were not removed at once.
Ambassador made clear that, under U.S. law, this could not be
done. However, she emphasized the considerable benefits to
Koroma's stature and public image if he would support even
step one -- allowing authorities to escort three to the U.S.
He is currently considering this overall scenario.


4. (S) In a separate, more general meeting during which the
specific proposal was not fully revealed, National Security
Chief Conteh expressed enthusiasm to Ambassador, DCM, and DEA
teamthat speedy action is in order. He questioned the
dilatory stance of the Attorney General (AG) in concluding
the case (Comment: The AG is widely perceived as a hindrance
to both destruction of contraband and efficient trials. End
Comment.).

--------------
FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTER WANTS ACTION
--------------


4. (S) Ambassador and Poloff met with Foreign Minister
Bangura on October 30. During the course of the discussions,
Ambassador stated the Department of Justice's offer to send a
District Attorney to explain the legalities of the case to
President Koroma. Bangura stated that the President has a
good understanding of the case, and that his concerns are
political, rather than legal. In the President's viewpoint,
according to Bangura, it would be a political "victory" for
all seven foreign accused to be extradited to the U.S.
Removing only a few makes Koroma appear weak, and renders him
vulnerable to further criticism if the remaining defendants'
court cases are mishandled (Note: Given the overall
ineffectiveness of the Sierra Leone justice system, his
concern is realistic. End Note.). The Foreign Minister stated
that the GoSL believes that the drug ring is using its
considerable funds to buy support in the media, civil
society, and the Sierra Leone Bar Association. Removing three
of seven defendants would create "noise in the country."


5. (C) Bangura said that a visit by an additional USG
representative would be welcome, but the subtext of the
conversation made clear that this alone will do little to
sway the President as he considers the GoSL's next move.
Bangura implied that a compensation package is the best
chance the USG has of securing full GoSL support for
extraditions. Helping Koroma "save face" politically by
framing him as the great hero who successfully apprehended
drug traffickers wanted by the USG will be necessary. In
addition, Bangura suggested that a USG-funded building would
show the depth of American gratitude to the GoSL for
combatting narcotics trafficking in West Africa. The
Ambassador did not commit to U.S. construction, but agreed to
look into further law enforcement and judicial support for
Sierra Leone.


7. (C) It is unclear if Bangura's statements were spontaneous
or part of a larger communications strategy between Koroma
and his closest advisors. Though the President would never
speak so baldly about a desire for this type of support,
Bangura is a friend of the embassy and known for her frank
commentary. She could be his selected go-between to make
plain his concerns about the extradition plan.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


8. (S) Understanding Koroma's political concerns is necessary
for a successful negotiation. The President is under fire for
the slow progress of the case, and media publishes frequent
reports that the defendants are being mishandled and abused.
The Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) is using the case to
discredit Koroma and the APC on a regular basis. Fearing
political backlash represents reasonable, rather than
paranoid concern. Embassy supports the idea of providing a
considerable financial compensation package to the GoSL,
particularly providing tangible support for increasing and
improving counter-narcotics investigations. Funding in the
$500,000 range would be seen here as a contribution of
sufficient size to compensate the President and his
government for detaining the indictees and approving the
extradition request. Otherwise, the President may choose to
see the case handled completely by the Sierra Leone judicial
system - resulting in low penalties at best, complete
exoneration of all charged at worst. Besides representing a
set-back for USG security interests in this particular case,
such a result would send a message that narcotraffickers are
above the law in Sierra Leone. Post strenuously and
respectfully requests that Department and other interested
USG agencies strongly consider expedient action to secure
successful extraditions. End Comment.
PERRY