NDJAMENA 006: DAS SWAN MEETING WITH PRESIDENT DEBY

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PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/27/2018
TAGS: PREL PREF PGOV PHUM SU CD
SUBJECT: NDJAMENA 006: DAS SWAN MEETING WITH PRESIDENT DEBY

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CLASSIFIED BY: LucyTamlyn, Deputy Chief of Mission , U.S.
Embassy N'Djamena , State Department .
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
CLASSIFIED BY: Lucy Tamlyn, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S.
Embassy N'Djamena State Department .
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) Summary. In discussions with the President of Chad and
other GOC officials, Deputy Assistant Secretary Swan stressed
that the time was ripe for moving forward on internal political
dialogue and expressed USG support for regional initiatives to
end the cycle of violence in Chad. President Deby warned that a
new rebel attack was expected in less than three weeks and
raised the issue of a UN Security Council resolution directed
against Sudan. President Deby said that the Sudanese intention
was to "create a new Arab state in central Africa." Possibly as
a result of international pressure, former President Lol Mahamat
Choa was moved from prison to house arrest on February 26. End
summary.


2. (SBU) James Swan, Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) for
Central African Affairs met with Chadian President Idriss Deby
Itno on February 26 to express support for the Government of
Chad in the face of externally-supported rebel attacks and to
highlight the importance of continuing to work on the August 13
2007 political agreements, as well working with regional
structures with a view to ending the recurring cycles of
violence which have wracked Chad and the region. The Ambassador
and DCM (notetaker) attended. The Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, Moussa Outman (with whom DAS Swan had met
earlier in the day),Presidential Adviser for Foreign Affairs
Youssef Saleh Abbas and Djimranjor Dadnadji (Presidency
Secretary) participated on the Chadian side.

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3. (SBU) DAS Swan opened by recalling the importance of the
U.S./Chadian partnership and explaining that his presence in
Chad was the result of the Chadian Ambassador's request to
Assistant Secretary Frazer for a sign of U.S. support for the
regime and to discuss initiatives to secure a durable peace and
democratic reforms. He expressed his condolences for the loss
of civilian life during the battles of February 2-3 in
N'Djamena, and thanked the President for actions to protect
American citizens and U.S. government property in N'Djamena.
DAS Swan detailed the diplomatic efforts that the U.S. had taken
to support Chad, including backing the UN Security Council
Presidential statement and demarching other capitals on the need
to put pressure on Sudan to cease supporting Chadian rebels. He
called attention to upcoming USG visitors in support of
assistance to refugees and Chadian IDPs. He also noted strong
U.S. support for the rapid deployment of EUFOR, including a
financial contribution for MINURCAT police training.


4. (C) Having underscored USG support for the regime, DAS Swan
stated that that it was also an opportune time for President
Deby to put in place political reform. He called on the
President to make progress on the August 13, 2007 political
agreement and to create a "political space" for political
parties and civil society. He expressed hope that the State of
Emergency would be kept short. Concerning those political
leaders in detention or in unknown circumstances, DAS Swan asked
that the Government ensure the effective and transparent
functioning of the proposed Commission of Inquiry.


5. (C) Turning to the regional situation, DAS Swan noted USG
desire to see a regional security structure which would put an
end to the cycles of violence in the region. He noted that such
a structure would necessarily contain a bilateral aspect, and
hoped that Chad and Sudan would continue to try to resolve their
bilateral differences. Regional efforts had already been
launched by the AU and the CEEAC. He assured President Deby
that the United States would like to support these African
initiatives but asked for his view on their prospects. Swan
stressed that in any agreement Sudan would need to commit to
stop supporting Chadian rebels; at the same time, the Government
of Chad also needed to stop supporting Darfur rebels. He
acknowledged that Sudan's role was greater than Chad's in this
respect, but cautioned that each side needed to make efforts.
He welcomed any ideas from President Deby on next steps.


6. (C) President Deby expressed his appreciation to DAS Swan for
the visit. On suggestions for "next steps" he answered bluntly,
"we are expecting more aggression from Sudan in the coming days

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-- in one, two, but no more than three weeks." He explained
that the conflict in Darfur had "contaminated" Chad. He had met
Sudanese President Bechir numerous times, and had signed the
Tripoli accord; Sudan might appear to be cooperative, but in
actuality it never did what it promised. He thanked the United
States for support at the United Nations. He hoped that the
Presidential Statement would be turned into a UN Security
Council resolution stating clearly that Chad was being crushed
by a powerful neighbor. He noted that on February 3, Sudanese
state TV had announced "we are going to create a new Arab state
in Central Africa."


7. (C) Turning to regional initiatives to resolve the crisis,
President Deby explained that Senegalese President Wade had
invited him and President Bechir to Dakar on March 3. This was
a personal initiative on Wade's part and not under the aegis of
the African Union. President Deby had asked to have this
postponed until March 13. He did not appear enthusiastic about
the visit. "We'll sign and see" he explained. He called the
AU's efforts "the ostrich policy" for failing to identify
Sudanese aggression. He doubted it would yield much. He also
noted the "Congolese-Libyan" mediation mandated by the AU to
address the internal rebellion and said Chad had called for a
CEEAC heads of state summit in the coming weeks.


8. (C) Turning to the situation of Chadian political leaders,
President Deby explained that former President Lol Mahamat Choa
had been picked up by the army. The Commission of Inquiry would
shed light on the actual details of the arrest. He welcomed
international participation in the Commission of Inquiry. He
noted that Choa had now been transferred from jail to a more
comfortable house arrest, and that his situation was "in the
hands of justice." Concerning other members of the political
opposition he remarked that, if it turned out that they were
among those that had "formed a government" with the rebels, then
they were pure and simply "Sudanese mercenaries." Concerning
the State of Emergency, he noted that governmental institutions
needed time to start working again. For 48 hours rebels had
controlled parts of the city. The damage had been extensive -
institutions such as the National Assembly and the Supreme Court
were totally sacked. Under the constitution, after 15 days the
State of Emergency could be extended only by the National
Assembly; he expected an extension of an additional 15 days
(noting ruefully that the parliamentarians would need to find a
place to meet first). Turning to the August 13 agreement, he
stressed that the government accorded great importance to the
agreement. He noted that some rebel leaders had taken advantage
of the invitation therein to return to legitimacy; others had
not. Nonetheless, the Government would continue to implement
it.

COMMENT:


9. (C) President Deby's comments regarding the internal
political situation generally responded to USG concerns. The
President appeared to appreciate the visit, but his primary
interest was in alerting to the possibility of renewed rebel
attacks and requesting international support against Sudan. We
have learned from other sources that the Wade initiative
involves bringing together the political movements and the armed
movements in the same location, for talks in two tracks. For
now, there is not an agreed diplomatic track for Khartoum and
N'Djamena to resolve their differences.
NIGRO