Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08DUSHANBE591
2008-04-28 06:38:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Dushanbe
Cable title:  

POLOFF GAINS ACCESS TO TAJIK PRISONS, VISITS

Tags:  PHUM PINR PTER KJUS KDRG TI 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDBU #0591/01 1190638
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 280638Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0446
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0116
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0143
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 000591 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN AND S/WCI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2018
TAGS: PHUM PINR PTER KJUS KDRG TI
SUBJECT: POLOFF GAINS ACCESS TO TAJIK PRISONS, VISITS
GUANTANAMO RETURNEES

REF: A. A) STATE 18705

B. B) DUSHANBE 390

Classified By: AMBASSADOR TRACEY A. JACOBSON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D
)

C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 000591

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN AND S/WCI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2018
TAGS: PHUM PINR PTER KJUS KDRG TI
SUBJECT: POLOFF GAINS ACCESS TO TAJIK PRISONS, VISITS
GUANTANAMO RETURNEES

REF: A. A) STATE 18705

B. B) DUSHANBE 390

Classified By: AMBASSADOR TRACEY A. JACOBSON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D
)


1. (C) Summary: On April 24, PolOff visited Sobit Vakhidov
and Rahmiddin Sharopov, both returnees from Guantanamo now
held in Tajik prison, pursuant to a 2006 agreement between
the United States and Tajikistan. There were numerous
bureaucratic complications in gaining access to them, and we
were only able to get a general impression of their treatment
in Tajik prison colonies. However, we were also able to get
some information about the country's penal system, to which
few internationals have had access in recent years. End
summary.

Getting Past the Bureaucracy


2. (SBU) Despite the presence of an agreement specifically
giving U.S. officials access to Guantanamo returnees, the
Tajik bureaucracy presented a formidable challenge. Tajik
authorities have generally refused internationals access to
prison facilities; they continue to refuse to allow the
International Committee for the Red Cross to carry out prison
inspections. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs took more than
six weeks to coordinate the arrangements with the Ministry of
Justice, which runs the prison system. We originally sent
our request by diplomatic note on March 6. We had several
meetings with prison officials who did not appear to have the
instructions that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials
told us they had sent. We repeatedly contacted our Ministry
of Foreign Affairs counterparts to inform them of what their
Ministry of Justice colleagues told us. Just as we started
to think that the authorities intended to deny us access, we
got a green light for our visit.

High Security ) But Not Maximum Security


4. (SBU) We were escorted by Col. Hudamon Muborakqadamov, who
gave us details of the circumstances under which Vakhidov and
Sharopov are being held. (We are using the prisoners' names
as spelled on their prison uniform. Several variations exist

due to inconsistent transliterations. The names used in
post's Ref B interim response were SHARIPOV and VOHIDOV.)
Both prisoners had been convicted by Tajik courts for
terrorism related offenses (articles 335 and 401 of the Tajik
Criminal Code ) supporting mercenaries and unlawful border
crossing) shortly after returning from Guantanamo, and both
had been sentenced to 17 years of imprisonment. Both are
being held in high security penal colonies ) Vakhidov in
Dushanbe, and Sharopov in Vahdat. We were given access only
to the administrative buildings of the penal colonies; we
were not permitted to view the rest of the prison grounds,
including the areas where the prisoners were being held.


5. (SBU) Prison officials told us that each of the penal
colonies houses more than 1000 inmates, all convicted of
serious crimes. Prisoners are housed in barracks which
contain approximately 50 beds. The areas around the beds are
considered the prisoners' "individual spaces" where they are
allowed to keep personal articles. Prisoners are required to
adhere to schedules prepared by the prison authorities; meals
are served at 6am, 1pm, and 6pm, and there are 6 roll calls
during the day (when prisoners must stand beside their beds).
Lights-out is from 10pm to 6am. (Note: While the colonies
where the GITMO returnees are kept have stringent security
regimes, they are not the most restrictive in the prison
system; maximum security prisons are reserved for
Qsystem; maximum security prisons are reserved for
particularly violent criminals, such as those with multiple
murder convictions. Prisoners in these maximum security
prisons are kept in cells, not barracks, and cannot freely
walk about the prison grounds. End note.)


6. (SBU) Each of the colonies has a library and a prayer
room.
Prisoners can use the library during their free time, and
they are permitted to worship in accordance with their faith.
(There are some Orthodox prisoners, but most are Muslim.)
Prisoners may speak to imams, and they are permitted to keep
Korans in their "individual spaces." The prison colonies
have work programs, and prisoners can earn credits that they
can use to purchase items at prison-run stores. There are no
general restrictions on prisoner to prisoner communication,
and prisoners are permitted visitors pending approval by the
authorities.
E

At Last We Meet


7. (C) We met Vakhidov and Sharopov in the offices of the
prison colonies' directors, and Col. Muborakqadamov and the
prison colony director sat in during each meeting. Guards
brought each prisoner into the office, showed him to a chair
in the middle of the room, and then left and closed the door
behind them. The prisoners wore simple black pants and
shirts, and they were not handcuffed or restrained in any
way. There were no particular security precautions taken
during the interviews, although guards remained posted
outside the office. Neither prisoner had any visible
indication that he had been mistreated. PolOff spoke in
English, and PolAssistant translated into Tajiki.


8. (C) Vakhidov's demeanor was sullen. He spent most of the
interview staring at the floor; he never looked directly at
the prison officials or at EmbOffs. He corroborated the
general conditions that Muborakqadamov had described for us,
but said that he was "not allowed to go to the mosque." He
said that his father had visited twice, and that he was
allowed to speak to his father without the presence of prison
officials. He was allowed to accept packages from his father
containing food. He said that he had had some stomach
problems, and that he received medicine from his father. He
had also visited the prison doctor.


9. (C) Sharopov was more animated; he looked at EmbOffs when
speaking to them. His beard had been shaved, as prison rules
prohibit facial hair. He said that he had participated in a
work detail ) he and a group of other prisoners were taken
to a nearby factory to perform some repair work. He has had
one visitor ) a brother in law ) but has otherwise had no
contact with family members. Sharopov said that his lawyer
had asked that his 5 years in Guantanamo count against his
sentence in Tajikistan. He said the court denied the motion,
as there was no official confirmation from the U.S.
Government about his detention. He asked that EmbOffs pass
on this information to the relevant officials.

As An Added Bonus, Some Information on the Penal System


10. (C) While traveling to and from the prisons, we took the
opportunity to engage Muborakqadamov in a discussion of Tajik
prisons. Muborakqadamov described a system that has not
changed markedly from the Soviet period; the main goal of
prison guards is to "rehabilitate and correct" aberrant
behavior. He said that the system has lost specialists who
had been trained at academies in Russia and Kazakhstan, and
that the overall quality of prison officials was very low.
Prison guards have a meager salary, have dangerous jobs, and
are not trained well enough to run the system like it had
been run under the Soviets. Muborakqadamov himself has been
in the prison service for 35 years, and he regrets the loss
of professional exchanges that prison officials enjoyed
before Tajikistan's independence. He was very curious about
prison systems in the United States, and he suggested an
exchange program.


11. (C) Comment: Given the fact that we had limited access
to the prison facilities, and that we conducted interviews in
the presence of prison officials, we cannot draw any
definitive conclusions about the prisoners' detentions.
Neither prisoner exhibited signs of mistreatment, and their
accounts of prison conditions generally corroborated the
information given to us by Col. Muborakqadamov. The
prisoners had obviously gotten used to a strict regime
Qprisoners had obviously gotten used to a strict regime
imposed by prison officials. (When they sat down in our
meetings, they both voluntarily put their hands behind their
chairs, although they were not restrained.) EmbOffs got the
impression that they were both holding back at least some
information because of the presence of prison officials.
Vakhidov was not particularly communicative, and he seemed
resigned to the fact that he would be spending a long time in
jail. Sharopov was thinking of how to make his prison stay
shorter, and what he could do when he got out. PolOff
detected in his mannerisms a sense of bitterness and
hostility, although he alluded to the fact that conditions in
Guantanamo were better than those in Tajikistan.


12. (C) Comment continued: As has been our experience in
other settings, Muborakqadamov's openness and cooperation was
a stark contrast to higher level officials' obstructions.
The director of the penal system, General Izatullo Sharipov,
is regarded in the international community as being
uncooperative and corrupt. We suspect that Muborakqadamov
has accurately characterized the overall professional

capacity of prison officials as deteriorating. End comment.
JACOBSON