Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08DUSHANBE1396
2008-11-14 09:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Dushanbe
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR ARCENT COMMANDER LTG LOVELACE,S 20

Tags:  AF MAS MCAP OVIP PGOV PREL TI 
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 ------------------FB0319 141006Z /38 
R 140958Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
SECDEF WASHDC
SECSTATE WASHDC 1182
COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
ARCENT INTEL FT MCPHERSON GA
COMUSARCENT KU INTEL CAMP DOHA KU
INFO CIS COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 
AMEMBASSY KABUL 
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 
JOINT STAFF WASHDC
DIA WASHDC 0134
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 001396 


ARCENT PLEASE PASS TO IMA; DEPT FOR SCA; DIA FOR DHO-2; OSC
FOR OSD/P; JOINT STAFF FOR J-5; CENTCOM FOR CCJ5; SOCCENT
FOR J33

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2018
TAGS: AF MAS MCAP OVIP PGOV PREL TI
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR ARCENT COMMANDER LTG LOVELACE,S 20
NOVEMBER VISIT TO DUSHANBE

Classified By: Ambassador Tracey A. Jacobson for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 001396


ARCENT PLEASE PASS TO IMA; DEPT FOR SCA; DIA FOR DHO-2; OSC
FOR OSD/P; JOINT STAFF FOR J-5; CENTCOM FOR CCJ5; SOCCENT
FOR J33

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2018
TAGS: AF MAS MCAP OVIP PGOV PREL TI
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR ARCENT COMMANDER LTG LOVELACE,S 20
NOVEMBER VISIT TO DUSHANBE

Classified By: Ambassador Tracey A. Jacobson for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (U) Embassy Dushanbe looks forward to the upcoming visit
of LTG Lovelace. Since Tajikistan,s limited defense
capability consists primarily of Russian-influenced ground
forces, the position of the ARCENT Commander is ideal to
pursue basic and sorely needed reforms as well as further
joint Tajik-Afghan security cooperation programs. Following
is a brief overview of the current situation in Tajikistan
and our thoughts on the key issues LTG Lovelace should
discuss during his visit.

POLITICAL OVERVIEW - STAGNATION IN THE FACE OF ADVERSITY


2. (C) Tajikistan approaches its next winter ill-prepared for
the inevitable power shortages and intensified food
insecurity. The GOTI claims it has stockpiled food and fuel,
but we cannot verify this and other donors report a
continuing unwillingness by the GOTI to coordinate with them.
The global financial crisis has yet to hit ordinary Tajiks,
as the remittances from Russia which support so many continue
to pour in. However, a downturn in the Russian construction
sector could have serious impact on Tajikistan. If this
happens in the next few months, it could hit Tajikistan
simultaneously with less money for food during the difficult
winter period, and possibly more unemployed Tajiks returning
home with no job prospects.


3. (C) If the Government is feeling any effects from the
financial crisis and the decline of world aluminum prices by
over a third since July, it is not yet evident. The
Government continues to make payments for construction of the
massive $300 million presidential palace in the center of
Dushanbe, which will be complete in December. Work on other
presidential dachas around the country goes on.


4. (C) Tajikistan's political leadership continues to
stagnate, with some signs of increased intolerance of
alternate viewpoints. The Government appears to be
increasing pressure on foreign religious organizations, by

deporting religious NGO staff and banning activities of some
churches, such as the Jehovah's Witnesses. For other
motivations, namely property expropriation, the Mayor of
Dushanbe is forcing the U.S. affiliated Grace Sun Min Church
out of property it legally acquired several years ago. The
Mayor has reportedly told his staff he is "unafraid" of the
U.S. Embassy, which has sent diplomatic notes on behalf of
the Church and monitored legal proceedings in the case.
Observers of the case use it as an example of the Mayor's
willingness and ability to manipulate the court system,
getting the judge in the case to make rulings that contradict
the facts and the law. There has been a U.S. congressional
inquiry concerning this case. In other fields, the Foreign
Ministry has refused to meet with Department officials that
it invited to Tajikistan to discuss the Nuclear Smuggling
Outreach Initiative, and the Ministry of Justice has rebuffed
efforts by donors to assist in rewriting the criminal
procedure code.

POLITICAL SONG AND DANCE


5. (C) Rahmon has attempted to firm up his control of the
Q5. (C) Rahmon has attempted to firm up his control of the
regions in the face of opposition which has been violent on
at least one occasion. In response to demonstrations last
spring against government activities in Badakhshan, and the
February killing of the national police special unit
commander during an attempted arrest in Gharm, Rahmon
recently traveled to both regions, bringing clothing,
computers, tractors, and other "gifts" for the local
population (he also has brought hundreds of dancers and
singers on these regional visits). In the case of
Badakhshan, contacts there report that the President's July
visit was a success, in that it undermined any legitimacy
that local protest organizers had (they were reportedly drug
smugglers angry at government pressure on them, despite the
ostensibly political reasons for the demonstrations). The
early October visit to Gharm is harder to assess. The region
is generally anti-government, but Rahmon showed that he could
go there and get some results; the local police officer and
ex-oppositionist who was behind the killing of the police
special unit commander agreed to step down and have his unit
disbanded. He also turned in several weapons, although
sources in Gharm dismiss the handover as small in comparison
to the numbers of illegal weapons floating around the area.
President Rahmon's nascent personality cult was on display
during the Rasht visit; excessive and repetitive television
coverage of his public meetings there featured locals calling
him "king of kings" and saying there was no need for any
further elections in Tajikistan.


6. (C) Tajikistan's long-term political and developmental
challenges have not gone away. Economic flight of Tajiks to
Russia continues, and in rural areas embassy contacts report
that boys as young as their mid-teens are now leaving to look
for work abroad. More women are leaving as well, as are
those with higher education. The embassy does not see an
imminent threat from conservative Islamic movements, but the
Government's fear of fundamentalist Islam is obviously
increasing. In mid-October the Government announced that the
Salafi movement would be banned, and Salafis are now barred
from mosques (as are women and boys under eighteen years
old). Identifying Salafis is a mysterious process, but to
the degree that they exist in Tajikistan they will certainly
be driven underground and further radicalized by this measure.

ECONOMIC STEPS, AND MISSTEPS


7. (C) The Government says it plans to develop domestic
sources of alumina to supply the giant Talco aluminum plant
at Tursunzade, however this plan is years away from
execution. As noted above, low aluminum prices are likely
reducing revenues from Talco. The international press has
reported extensively on the lawsuit involving Talco in
London. Tajikistan has reportedly spent over $150 million
(approximately 5% of the country's 2007 GDP) pursuing a case
that experts give it very little chance of winning. Trial
proceedings have commenced in the case, in which Tajikistan
is pursuing the old Talco management for stealing Talco
revenue, and the old management team has lodged counter
accusations of massive fraud. An audit of Talco is in the
offing, as part of the Government's agreement with the IMF to
resolve the latest misreporting scandal; but whether the
audit will encompass the offshore company through which
Talco's revenues reportedly flow is still in doubt. The
audit and staff monitoring program at the Central Bank is due
to conclude by November 10, with a preliminary report to come
out by the end of the month.


8. (U/FOUO) In late-August Tajikistan and Afghanistan signed
a Power Purchase Agreement for electricity supplies from
Tajikistan to Afghanistan, opening the door to ADB financing
to construct a 220 kv transmission line to Kunduz by spring

2010. The Government is funding construction of the giant
Rogun Dam project, to the tune of $50 to 100 million per
year, but it has so far been unable to secure international
involvement in the project.


9. (C) Reform of the agricultural sector continues to be
Q9. (C) Reform of the agricultural sector continues to be
largely rhetorical; farmers are still forced to grow cotton,
students are forced to pick it, and a few well-connected
investors continue to squeeze everyone else with unfair labor
practices and below-market prices. State Department's Office
of Global Affairs Trafficking in Persons (G/TIP) recently
visited Tajikistan, and expressed concern about students
forced to pick cotton. The New York Times has also picked up
on abuses in the Tajik cotton sector. The cotton sector is
headed for serious troubles; disruptions last year due to
extreme cold and financial uncertainties stemming from delays
in land reform legislation, have led to a low harvest this
year. Cotton investors will likely respond to this situation
by squeezing farmers even more.

THE ECONOMY - TAJIKS LOOK FOR THE EXITS


10. (C) Estimates are for inflation to reach 20% this year,
and prices for basic foodstuffs are often double last year's
prices. With few legitimate business opportunities in
Tajikistan, and deteriorating education and other public
services, much of the population relies on remittances from
Tajiks working abroad. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the
percentage of Tajiks who move abroad to seek permanent or
temporary work (estimated at 50 percent of the working
population) is increasing. Tajik social indicators are
declining, health care and educational systems are
degenerating, and young Tajiks are arguably worse prepared
for life than those who grew up under the Soviet Union. The
business climate is not improving. Tajikistan remains a
remarkably difficult place to do business, and the climate
shows few signs of improving.


11. (C) Last year's unusually harsh winter damaged crops and
seed stores. It was followed by drought and locust
infestations in spring and early summer, resulting in lower
food production this year. Combined with mounting
agricultural debts and rapidly increasing food prices, rural
families who sold their tools and livestock to survive last
winter are headed into the next winter in poor shape to deal
with its difficulties. Tajikistan is highly dependent on
imports for its food supply and is vulnerable to the ongoing
worldwide food price increases. We expect food insecurity to
worsen.


12. (C) International investors do not view Tajikistan as a
viable place to do business. Would-be investors, large and
small, find themselves stymied by corruption at all levels,
and local investors have been the targets of property grabs
by the well-connected. Foreign investors must also overcome
restrictive visa rules, lack of air connections, and the
government's suspicion of foreign involvement in any sphere.
What little foreign investment exists is state-sponsored or
directed from Iran, China, and Russia. The President has
formed an Investment Council, including participation of
foreign investors, and attended a meeting with American
businesses in New York during the UNGA. While the meeting in
New York saw some frank comments from would-be investors, it
is too soon to tell whether they will have any impact on
Rahmon.


13. (C) In general, the political and economic background of
your security-related agenda is not positive. Constriction
of political space, intolerance of religion, obstruction of
foreign assistance and investment, a leadership
single-mindedly committed to personal enrichment, short-term
gain, and control of the economy at the expense of economic
growth; these factors have retarded Tajikistan's development
and driven hundreds of thousands of Tajiks to emigrate.
Embassy's earlier analyses predicted these would lead to an
eventual breakdown, but not
for several years. We are watching closely to see whether
the global financial crisis should change our time calculus.
Tajikistan's banking sector is isolated, but the country is
highly food-insecure and vulnerable to disruptions in the
Russian economy or decline in the world price of aluminum.

COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES


14. (C) Bridge: Use of the Tajikistan-Afghanistan bridge at
Nizhny Pyanj is growing. About 200 trucks a day now cross
QNizhny Pyanj is growing. About 200 trucks a day now cross
the bridge going north. However, obstacles to full use of
the bridge remain; there are still no provisions for
pedestrian traffic, and it remains difficult for Afghans to
obtain a Tajikistani visa, both because of bureaucratic
delays and demands for bribes from Tajikistani consular
officials. The inspection facilities at the Tajikistan end
of the bridge are complete, and the Customs Agency has
assumed responsibility for that location. However, the Agency
has stated it will not occupy the facilities until several
outstanding construction projects are complete, such as
parking lots, lighting, and pedestrian walkways. The Army
Corps of Engineers (Kabul District) is addressing these
needs, albeit slowly.


15. (C) Narcotics: Cooperation on narcotics continues to be a
relative bright spot, but only superficially. While
Tajikistan's law enforcement and security services seize more
narcotics than other Central Asian states (and overall
narcotics seizures were up 19% over 2007),they are not
willing to take on the arrest and prosecution of narcotics
smuggling ring leaders, some of whom are politically
well-connected. Three successful interdiction missions on
the Tajik-Afghan border in August by the SOCCENT-trained
Border Guard Separate Group for Special Reconnaissance are
examples of recent operational highlights. We promote and
see active and productive cooperation between the Tajik,
Kyrgyz, and Afghan drug agencies. In a mid-October speech,
President Rahmon called for joint Tajik-Afghan law
enforcement training. While we welcome and will vigorously
pursue this opening, Border Guard and Committee on National
Security generals have obstructed any forward movement on
joint training of their service personnel in the past.


16. (C) Security Cooperation: Security Cooperation remains a
strong part of our relationship, as we pursue shared
interests in building stability in Afghanistan. The
Tajikistani Ministry of Defense is opening up to cooperation
with Afghanistan. The Tajikistani Military Institute began
training 30 officers from Afghanistan in November. This
seems to be a sincere effort to assist in the process of
building stability in Afghanistan, and stands in sharp
contrast to Tajikistan's Border Guards' refusal to allow
joint training with Afghan counterparts. Tajikistan has also
accepted the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative
(GPOI),funded at $2.5 million. The Ministry of Defense
received a CENTCOM GPOI delegation in late June, and with
CENTCOM,s advisory assistance and limited infrastructure
upgrades, is committed to deploying a company of peacekeeping
troops by 2010. GPOI provides an opportunity to build a
critical capability that will not only allow Tajikistan to
"show the flag" on an international scale, but will also
offer training and reform opportunities to other cadre within
the Ministry of Defense. The embassy is working closely with
the Ministry of Defense to synchronize training and support
to make this unit a reality. After overcoming a series of
delays in obtaining Tajik visas for the Afghan contractor,
the rebuild of three border outposts has begun along the
Tajik-Afghan border.


17. (C) Regional Integration: Efforts to spark regional
integration between Tajikistan and Afghanistan, and more
broadly between Central and South Asia, have seen some recent
successes. In August Tajikistan signed a commercial power
purchase agreement with Afghanistan, paving the way for sales
of seasonal hydroelectricity to the Afghan grid starting in
spring 2010. In late-October the USG hosted a conference of
Central and South Asian aviation sector officials and
companies, to foster quicker integration of their markets.
USTDA and State Department are following up on this
conference to implement a consultative mechanism to address
issues raised there. However, Tajikistan's relations with
Uzbekistan remain poor, and there has been no progress toward
resolution of Uzbekistan's opposition to construction of the
Rogun Dam.

PROPOSED TALKING POINTS



18. (U//FOUO) During your bilateral meetings with Mobile
Forces Commander General-Major (U.S. 1-star equivalent)
Faziyev and the Commandant of the Military Institute
General-Major Teshaev, Embassy Dushanbe recommends
emphasizing the following points.

For GEN-MAJ Faziyev, Mobile Forces Commander:

--(U//FOUO) I appreciate Tajikistan's continuing support to
the United States in the CENTCOM's area of responsibility.
The generous SOFA, blanket overflight clearances and
emergency divert agreement granted to DoD are a significant
gesture of support, save valuable time and resources, and
significantly contribute to the development of a stable
Afghanistan. (Background note: On 11 NOV post submitted the
diplomatic note for the renewal of CY09 over flight
clearances. CJCS ADM Mullen also sent a letter to his Tajik
counterpart GEN-LT (U.S. 2-star equivalent) Nadirov
emphasizing the importance of this privilege. Because the
Tajik government is currently deciding this issue, your
emphasis on this point is very timely.)


--(U//FOUO) I am very encouraged by the Ministry of
Defense,s acceptance of the Global Peacekeeping Operations
Initiative. The battalion-sized installation that the
Ministry of Defense offered for the PKO unit is in excellent
condition. We look to Tajikistan to fully man and equip the
unit and then wisely focus other available security
assistance program funds on the formation of this discrete
PKO unit. CENTCOM will use GPOI funds for training the PKO
cadre as well as for limited upgrades to the unit facility. I
encourage you to actively participate in the January Action
Officer Working Group in Dushanbe to help shape the FY 2010
military to military plan. This is your forum to ensure that
you receive the necessary support for establishing the PKO
unit. Our planners at CENTCOM are working diligently to
provide you with feedback from the July assessment visit.

--(U//FOUO) I understand Tajikistan faced numerous food and
energy shortages this past winter. I am concerned that
Tajikistan may encounter similar problems this winter, which
could have consequences for regional cooperation efforts with
Afghanistan. How do you plan to address this potential
crisis and will the Tajik military play any role in its
solution?


For GEN-MAJ Teshaev, Commandant of the Military Institute:

--(U//FOUO) I welcome the steps taken by Tajikistan to build
Afghanistan's capacity. Specifically, I am pleased that the
Tajikistani Ministry of Defense's Military Institute is
currently training 30 Afghan officers. What is the program
of instruction? Are the U.S-provided generator and
furniture meeting your needs? This is the second time
you,ve trained Afghans (they trained Afghan cadets in 2004).
Do you have plans for more joint training in the future?
More joint initiatives with Afghanistan are welcomed in the
security arena and your suggestions are welcomed in how we
can help you build on this initiative.

--(U/FOUO) Thanks in advance to the Ministry of Defense for
hosting Exercise Regional Cooperation 09 (AUG 09).
Specifically, thanks to you for providing some of your
facilities as a forum for the exercise. I hope that the
national disaster response/medical scenario and the
exercise-related construction are beneficial to your long
term efforts here at the institute.


19. (U) POC: Lieutenant Colonel Dan Green, USA, Defense and
Army Attache, USDAO Dushanbe, Voice: (992)(37) 229-2701,
Cell: (992) (90) 700-7030, classified email:
digredy(AT)dia.smil.mil or GreenDR2(AT)state.sgov.gov.
Unclass email: GreenDR2(AT)state.gov.
JACOBSON