Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08DUSHANBE1122
2008-09-04 08:30:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Dushanbe
Cable title:
TAJIKISTAN - PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER ON SOUTH OSSETIA
how-toVZCZCXYZ0000 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHDBU #1122 2480830 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 040830Z SEP 08 FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0965 INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT PRIORITY 0074 RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 0083 RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK PRIORITY 0079 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0051 RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI PRIORITY 0002 RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS PRIORITY 0002 RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN PRIORITY 0003
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 001122
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN AND EUR/RUS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2018
TAGS: PREL PBTS RS GG TITI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN - PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER ON SOUTH OSSETIA
AND ABKHAZIA
REF: STATE 93357
Classified By: Acting DCM Matt Purl, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 001122
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN AND EUR/RUS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2018
TAGS: PREL PBTS RS GG TITI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN - PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER ON SOUTH OSSETIA
AND ABKHAZIA
REF: STATE 93357
Classified By: Acting DCM Matt Purl, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Charge and Acting DCM met on September 4 with Erkin
Rahmatulloev, Presidential Adviser on Foreign Policy, to
discuss a number of issues. Charge passed Rahmatulloev a
copy of reftel demarche, and asked whether Tajikistan had
received a letter from Russia officially informing the GOTI
of Russia's decision to recognize the independence of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
2. (C) Choosing his words with care, Rahmatulloev said "I
cannot confirm" the receipt of such a letter, noting that "we
receive many letters." The GOTI was familiar with Russia's
explanation of its actions in Georgia, and was also aware of
the U.S. position. There was no need for a written
explanation from the Russians, since the leaders of Russia
and Tajikistan had just met, and would meet again at the
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) meeting on
Moscow on September 5. Rahmatulloev said the heads of state
discussed the "general issue of Georgia" at the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Dushanbe on August
28, but their discussions did not focus on the specific issue
of Abkhazian and South Ossetian independence. At the summit
"we felt no pressure from Russia" regarding the overall issue
of Georgia, or recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia,
Rahmatulloev said, and concluded that at the September 5 CSTO
meeting "we will take a decision based on our national
interests." He indicated he was not willing to say more on
the matter.
3. (C) On a more entertaining note, at meeting immediately
preceding the one with Rahmatulloev, Presidential economics
advisor Matlubon Davlatov opened the meeting by showing
Charge an article he was reading off the internet that
reported the U.S. was getting ready to help Saakashvili flee
and had offered him U.S. citizenship. Davlatov added that
the plan was to use a U.S. army medevac helicopter to
exfiltrate the Georgian president.
4. (C) Comment: Rahmatulloev's claim that Tajikistan "felt no
pressure from Russia" to support its actions in Georgia at
the SCO summit is dubious, but along with his other comments
does indicate how careful the GOTI wants to be to keep a low
profile on the Georgia conflict. His coy statement that
Tajikistan's position would be governed by "national
interest" is ambiguous, leaving the door open to stronger
support for Russia at the CSTO, or continued resistance. End
Comment.
QUAST
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN AND EUR/RUS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2018
TAGS: PREL PBTS RS GG TITI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN - PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER ON SOUTH OSSETIA
AND ABKHAZIA
REF: STATE 93357
Classified By: Acting DCM Matt Purl, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Charge and Acting DCM met on September 4 with Erkin
Rahmatulloev, Presidential Adviser on Foreign Policy, to
discuss a number of issues. Charge passed Rahmatulloev a
copy of reftel demarche, and asked whether Tajikistan had
received a letter from Russia officially informing the GOTI
of Russia's decision to recognize the independence of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
2. (C) Choosing his words with care, Rahmatulloev said "I
cannot confirm" the receipt of such a letter, noting that "we
receive many letters." The GOTI was familiar with Russia's
explanation of its actions in Georgia, and was also aware of
the U.S. position. There was no need for a written
explanation from the Russians, since the leaders of Russia
and Tajikistan had just met, and would meet again at the
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) meeting on
Moscow on September 5. Rahmatulloev said the heads of state
discussed the "general issue of Georgia" at the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Dushanbe on August
28, but their discussions did not focus on the specific issue
of Abkhazian and South Ossetian independence. At the summit
"we felt no pressure from Russia" regarding the overall issue
of Georgia, or recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia,
Rahmatulloev said, and concluded that at the September 5 CSTO
meeting "we will take a decision based on our national
interests." He indicated he was not willing to say more on
the matter.
3. (C) On a more entertaining note, at meeting immediately
preceding the one with Rahmatulloev, Presidential economics
advisor Matlubon Davlatov opened the meeting by showing
Charge an article he was reading off the internet that
reported the U.S. was getting ready to help Saakashvili flee
and had offered him U.S. citizenship. Davlatov added that
the plan was to use a U.S. army medevac helicopter to
exfiltrate the Georgian president.
4. (C) Comment: Rahmatulloev's claim that Tajikistan "felt no
pressure from Russia" to support its actions in Georgia at
the SCO summit is dubious, but along with his other comments
does indicate how careful the GOTI wants to be to keep a low
profile on the Georgia conflict. His coy statement that
Tajikistan's position would be governed by "national
interest" is ambiguous, leaving the door open to stronger
support for Russia at the CSTO, or continued resistance. End
Comment.
QUAST